113, 175, 795, 474 Ukraine RD1

[For information pertaining to Soviet policies in the Western Ukraine, particularly in regard to the Uniate Church and collectivization, see 26: Anonymous, R1 Soviet Union, Cat. 116.]

ween Novokhopersk and Rostov and that extending from Rostov 101
to Otomanivsk. 131

It is only in the western section that the frontier runs between the purely Ukrainian area in west Sub-Caucasia (Kuban area) and the Don area; eastern Sub-Caucasia is a mixed belt of Ukrainians and Russians. In the south-east, therefore, we must speak of two frontiers of Ukrainian territory, a narrower and a wider one. The former separates Ukrainian Transcaucasia from the eastern part of Transcaucasia that is partly Russian, while the latter also includes eastern Sub-Caucasia. Throughout its course, the south-eastern frontier is blurred and by no means fixed, as the process of colonisation is still going on.

c) Boundaries and Territories of the three Historical Ukrainian States.

The Kyiv state stretched in the 11th and 12th centuries from 131
the Wyslok to the Donets and included areas which were not 175
colonised and others whose inhabitants were not Ukrainians. It embraced almost 1153 846 square miles, almost 1/6 of which was constantly inhabited by Ukrainians.

The second Ukrainian state (the realm of the Cossacks) had an area of about 115 384 square miles, western Ukraine was not included within its boundaries.

The third Ukrainian state covered the entire area settled by the Ukrainian people, with the exception of the Don area and Sub-Caucasia. Without annexations (which were of brief duration), the third state covered about 242 308 square miles, with the Crimean Peninsula, a part of the Voronesh district, Carpathian Ukraine and Bucovina 265 384 square miles, i. e. less than the entire Ukrainian ethnographical territory (276 269 sq. miles) and much less than the entire territory originally settled by Ukrainians (357 885 sq. miles).

d) Size of the Ukrainian territory

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Up to World War I 29 039 sq. miles of the Ukrainian ter- 162
ritory belonged to Austria-Hungary and the remainder to Rus- 175
sia. After the end of World War I and a short period of inde-

131 pendence in the years 1917—1920, Ukraine was distributed
162 among the following countries:

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Ukraine Territory	Area	Population on 1. 1. 1939 (in millions)
to USSR	216 846 sq.m.	37.3
to Poland	46 932 sq.m.	9.7
to Roumania	6 769 sq.m.	1.4
to Czechoslovakia	5 730 sq.m.	0.8

A separate Ukraine Soviet Republic was formed within the USSR (170 423 sqm. with 31.9 million inhabitants). The remaining Ukraine districts in Soviet Russia belonged to the RSFSR, and a tiny piece of Polesya to the Republic of White Ruthenia. At the end of World War II almost the whole Ukrainian territory fell to the Soviet Union. 20 000 km² with more than a million inhabitants belongs to Poland, 5 000 km² with 100 000 inhabitants to Slovakia and small minorities to Roumania.

Soviet Ukraine embraces about 261 538 sq.m. with 43 million inhabitants. —

2. Natural Conditions in Ukraine

a) Landscape of Ukraine

133 Ukraine consists of vast plains and plateaus which seldom rise as high as 1000 ft. above sea-level. The monotony of the Ukrainian landscape is akin to that of neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. One can travel for hundreds of miles through a landscape that never changes, for the plateaus differ little from the plains, the transition from the one physical configuration to the other being scarcely perceptible. In the south, the scene is varied by mountains, but these constitute but 1/10 of the entire area of Ukraine.

Passing from south to north, we can distinguish 5 different forms of landscape.

In the south the southern low plain stretches along and includes the plains at the foot of the Carpathian mountains with the valley of the Vistula, the Syan and the Dnister, the Black Sea depression and the plain surrounding the lowlands of

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

The Ukrainian People

101 175 In general, the Ukrainians have marked national characteristics which make it easy to recognise them even beyond the frontiers of Ukrainian territory. They belong to the Indogermanic group — an old Slav people that grew out of elements provided by Asia Minor and Mediterranean countries. Their original home is that of all Slavs. Its neighbors in the north-west were the Baltic-Lithuanian group, in the south-west it impinged on the Thracian group. In the southern part of the territory which was not originally colonised by the Ukrainians they came into fruitful contact with the Greeks, whose influence spread as far as Poltava in early historic times.

The first Germanic colonisation in the third century before Christ interrupted the contact with the west which had brought old Mediterranean culture to the Ukrainians.

Connections with the Asiatic group of Indogermanic tribes lasted for another hundred years and were disrupted by nomadic hordes from the Urals who destroyed the last remaining Iranic tribes and from that time until the 18th century made the Ukraine steppe unsafe. Wanderings and attacks by nomadic tribes have had no influence on the physical and psychical development of the Ukrainians.

Nations of Slavonic peoples began to form between the third and fourth centuries. At that time the neighbors of the Ukrainians' ancestors in the south-west and the west were South- Slavonic and Czech tribes. In the north and north-west they were in contact with Russian, later White Ruthenian groups, though only as far as culture goes, for racially there was no contact. There is no proof that the "primeval Russian" transitional groups ever existed, though many philologists assert the contrary. On the other hand, the Ukrainian people, as the central group of central Slavs contributed much to the formation of the Russian and White Ruthenian groups of peoples.

Ukrainians appeared first in history as the "Antes" who pushed the Goths farther and farther west and who were the masters of the steppe on the shores of the Black Sea from the Dnister to the Sea of Oziv and also of the forest steppe farther north between the fourth and sixth centuries.

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The Slav migration dates from this time; the Western Slavs slowly moved towards the Vistula, the Oder and the Elbe while the South Slavs wandered to the Balkans, perhaps a little later. Thereupon, ancient Ukrainian tribes also expanded to the west and the south-west, reached the Vistula and, in constant conflict, held these areas against the Poles till the 11th century and longer in parts. In the South the coast of the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea was occupied and, at the close of the sixth century or, at latest, at the beginning of the seventh, the central Carpathian area and Carpathian Ukraine — long before the Magyars came.

During this period when the Antes were supreme, the formation and the character of the Ukrainian people was strongly influenced by the Goths. The ancestors of the Ukrainians in those days were separate tribes with no tendency to national unity. It was only when towns were founded (Kyiv, Chernyhiv, and others) and when trade connections were developed that the tribes came closer to each other, thus making it possible form a state under a Germanic Viking dynasty. The capital was Kyiv, which had assumed the former rôle of the Greek towns Olbia and Kherson since the 9th century and had become the most important center of trade in Eastern Europe.

Nestor's chronicle and other sources mention many old Ukrainian tribes who lived in accordance with customs of their own (above all marriage and funeral customs). Leadership was in the hands of the numerically small but centrally situated tribe of the Polyany. West of them, as far as the Prypyat, the Derevlyany settled while the largest tribe of the Severyany were particularly active in pushing east and settled on the Desna, the Sejm and the Sula. South of the Polyany on the western bank of the Dnipro were the Ulichy and the Tyvertsy to the west of these, on the Dnister and at times on the Danube; in the 10th century, however, they were forced north and north-west by pressure from the Magyars and Pechenegs.

Many tribes, among them the Duliby, lived in the west of the old Ukrainian area. Tribal names soon made way for political designations which, as for instance in the case of the Volynians, have been preserved till to day. Altogether the tribes of

101 Western Ukraine, which were later organised in the united state
175 of Galicia and Volynia, are more pronouncedly national than the Eastern tribes round Kyiv. The Ukrainian tribes were united by the end of the 10th century and the beginning of the 11th, this process being promoted by a common religion and a common culture composed of Byzantine and Slav influences; at the same time the feelings of unity among Ukrainian peoples was furthered by political pressure from the Poles and the princes of Suzdal and Vladimir at the head of a growing Russian people (since the 12th century). Other factors that helped this union were the transfer of the political center of Ukraine to the west and the political and cultural tendencies of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state..

It is only in the north and on the western frontiers of Ukraine that many traditional features and a great variety of signs betraying differences between tribes have been preserved. Here, and in parts of the Carpathian area there are rich sources of ancient Ukrainian folklore.

101 These Ukrainians of the mountains and the foothills fall into
181 the three almost equal groups of Lemky, Bojky, and Hutsuly. The Lemky, also called the Lemaky, south of the Carpathians, inhabit the upper course of almost all the Carpathian tributaries of the Vistula and the Visloka as far as the Syan and, along with the foothill group of the Samishantsi (in the Jaslo area), are often called Ruthenians. They cling to their traditions and are economically in a sound position. They were the natural mediators between the Ukrainians and the Western and Southern Slavs, for instance, in the art of folkpoetry. Syanik and Krynytsja are the chief centers in this area.

The Boyky or Verkhovyntsi (dwellers in mountain pastures) live east of the Syan, in the districts of Sambir, Turka, Drohobych, Dolyna, and Kalush and also south of the Carpathian range. The inhabitants of the southern areas of the Bojky in the Carpathian Ukraine were also called Dolyniany (valley dwellers) and are rightly deemed to be the pioneers of the ancient Ukrainian colonisation in the South Carpathians, being in many respects different from their brethren in the north. The Tukholtsi, round Skole and Smorze, are another group that are

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The Ukrainian Church

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When it was spreading throughout Eastern Europe, Christianity as a rule encountered peoples that were in early stages of spiritual development, when the ideas of religious, intellectual, cultural and political life were scarcely differentiated. At this time the Christian religion was the content and the basis of every development in culture, so that the acceptance of Christianity by a people was first and foremost an event of cultural and polititical importance in its life. It goes without saying that the embracing of Christianity was accompanied by contacts with those countries which were most interested in spreading the new religion. There were two possibilities for the ancient Kyiv empire which Norman Vikings had developed in the heart of present-day Ukraine in the 9th and 10th centuries to become a powerful and unique political factor in Eastern-Europe: it could either embrace the Christianity of Rome in the west, or of Constantinople in the east, i. e. draw on either of the two centers of Christianity which were at that time on terms of bitter, if veiled, hostility.

The fact that the Grand Princes of Kyiv were christianised from Byzantium is partly explained by the geographical position of their state. Their campaigns of conquest led them along the course of rivers, which, in those days, were the natural channels of intercourse. This meant that the warlike Kyiv rulers extended their territories to the south where trade contacts were first established with Greece and that the new Christian creed could be demonstrated ad oculos when Constantinople was visited, whence it therefore slowly filtered into northern areas. A considerable number of Greeks are known to have been living in Kyiv even before Volodymyr the Great's conversion to Christianity, a fact which must have had percussions on that event. Nor must we forget that just then Byzantine culture was at its height and that, in consequence, it far outshone the culture of western peoples and further that it was already pervaded by Slavonic factors which brought it nearer the consciousness and feelings of the population than the remote sun of the west which was just rising. It was the nearest and most natural solution that the

175 Grand Princes of Kyiv, i. e. the leaders of the Norman Vikings should fetch their Christian faith from Byzantium and we are probably right in maintaining that any other state in the same circumstances would also have been christianised from Byzantium.

175 The new religion was at first embraced only by the Princes
797 and their courts, but later it was forced on the people by their superiors and became a bond that united the entire state organism. There was no fear that the people would make a combined and successful stand against Christianity for there was no pagan order of priests to take over leadership in such a contest. The people had only sorcerers in place of priests and so it was possible to christianise the country by peaceful methods though pagan ideas continued to live in popular consciousness for a considerable time. It is quite legitimate therefore, to speak at this time of a "double faith".

175 The organisation of the church in the Kyiv empire came from Byzantium which was also the home of the higher clergy with
792 the exception of two cases when representatives of the native
795 population were consecrated metropolitans. The conventual orders and the many monasteries, among which the Cave Monastery in Kyiv attained a great reputation throughout the world of orthodoxy, attempted to shape the lives of the people on Christian lines and to realise the ideals of Christianity. The monasteries were the most important and indeed the only centers of cultural life at that time.

175 The Tatars who raided Europe in the 13th century destroyed
795 the Kyiv empire and then pushed further west though they were brought to a halt in the battle of Liegnitz in 1241. Nevertheless for centuries the countries of Eastern Europe had to submit to the yoke of East Asiatic nomads.

In the Mongolian era the position of the church was not exactly unfavorable, for the Khans allowed it a certain freedom and state protection. The metropolitans had, however, to fetch the written pardons (Jarlyks) from the horde personally which was a voluntary acknowledgement of their dependence on the secular power. The dignitaries of the orthodox church continued, it is true, to be consecrated by Constantinople, but no longer directly but on the mediation and the recommendation of the Khans. 175 795

In the course of the 14th century after their liberation from the Tatars Ukrainian areas came under the sovereignty of the rulers of Lithuania and were then slowly absorbed by Poland after the union of that country with Lithuania. The position of the orthodox church in Ukraine which had already been weakened by the inroads of Tatars was further shaken by this political development and by the subjection of the country to an alien sovereign. It was degraded within the Polish republic from its former status as a state church to a factor of cultural life that was merely tolerated. It thereby lost authority as there was no executive power behind it and the general disorganisation and decay increased from year to year.

The southern sphere of Eastern European territory and the Ukrainian church were unmistakably characterised by a predilection for the west, and a spiritual kinship with the culture of Central and Western Europe. Even the Kyiv Grand Princes were plainly inclined to the west and, in spite of the dependence of their church on Byzantium, they contracted marriage unions with the Catholic dynasties of several European countries. The Tatar raids interrupted this movement, but only for a short time; for as soon as Ukrainian territory was absorbed first by the principality of Lithuania and then by the Polish state, it immediately formed contact again with the west. It is true that the orthodox church of Ukraine was subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople up to 1685, but spiritually it was turned towards the west. It remained loyal to its dogmas but fetched its spiritual weapons in its fight for equality from the arsenal of the leaders of the western churches, Catholic and Protestant. The educational institutes which trained for the priesthood in Ukraine borrowed their organisation from the Jesuit Colleges. Latin was the language used and Aristotle, and after him Christian Wolff with his systematic methods, reigned supreme. So it is no wonder that the youth trained in such schools was not suffocated by formalism and was therefore able to assimilate and develop new ideas. It was from this conciliatory

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spirit that all the movements for union with Rome sprang which were so characteristic for orthodoxy in Ukraine.

The orthodox church in the south, in Ukraine, followed its own historical development independent of events in the Muscovite state in the north. Up to the middle of the 17th century it was subject to Constantinople but incorporated within the Polish state and fought with unequal weapons for equality within the organism of a foreign state. But when, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow, the "third Rome", became more and more supreme in the ecclesiastical and religious life of Eastern Europe, a dilemma arose for orthodox Ukrainians in Poland; they could either remain loyal to a weak Byzantium, or subject themselves to the new power of Moscow, or they could improve their political position and come into closer contact with the general process of culture in Europe by uniting with Rome. The movement for union was therefore determined not by dogma, but, in the first instance, by political and cultural considerations. The year 1596 finally witnessed the union of part of the orthodox Ukrainians with Rome. For, when faced with the choice between Moscow and Rome, most of the Ukrainian bishops decided in favor of the latter and thus created a split within the orthodox church which was to be of far-reaching consequence for the shaping of political events in Eastern Europe. Thus, since the end of the 16th century there were two church organisations on Ukrainian territory, the orthodox which was able to maintain itself chiefly in western areas and the united, which, in the course of time, developed to be the national church of Ukraine. With the increasing political importance of the Cossacks throughout the 17th century, the orthodox church tried to rise again and succeeded, above all in the province of culture, in creating new values which ultimately permeated the whole of Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Cossack state and the incorporation of the most of Ukraine in the Russian Empire in the course of the 18th century, the united church was more and more persecuted and in 1838 was finally banned; the Ukrainian orthodox church, on the other hand, fell increasingly under Russian influence. This process gained in intensity with time so that at the beginning of the 20th century the orthodox church in Ukraine was one of the most powerful instruments for "freeing" the population from national sentiments. After the establishment of an independent Ukraine in 1918, the orthodox church in Ukraine experienced a fresh, if shortlived, renaissance. It could not last long for, when the bolshevists gained the upper hand, the entire religious life of Ukraine suffered the same treatment as that in other parts of the Soviet Union. In the first years of the Soviet regime when the pressure of the government was bearable, orthodox Ukrainians in Soviet Russia organised themselves into the Ukrainian Independent Church, replacing the Old Slavonic church language by the modern mother-tongue. But when the new order in Eastern Europe grew stronger and all religion was banned from public life, the Ukrainian Independent Church had to cease functioning at home and confined its activity to the numerous circles of emigrants who, especially after World War I, sojourned in western countries.

As already mentioned, the orthodox church in Western Ukraine, in areas like Galicia and Volynia, held its own against the Union. But at the beginning of the 18th century these sections were also won for the idea of the union, which was finally stronger here than anywhere. For, even in the days of Polish supremacy, and still more after the occupation of this area by Austria, the United or Greek-Catholic church developed into a Ukrainian national church which protected the people on the one hand from Russian, and on the other from Polish influence. In the 20th century Count Andreas Sheptytskyj, the Lviv metropolitan of this church, who accomplished much not only as the supreme head of the church but just as much as a national leader, became the symbol of the church's wide-spread significance. So it is no wonder but a procedure of accepted political expediency that, even during the First World War the Russian Government, rightly seeing in the Greek-Catholic church a centre of Ukrainian nationalism, arrested the Metropolitan Sheptytskyj immediately after the occupation of Lviv and sent him into exile. Similarly, the report which appeared last year in all newspapers that the several million members of the United Church had submitted to the Patriarch of Moscow after the country was occupied by bolshevist troops and had thus returned

● 175 775 to the bosom of orthodoxy, was in the same category. That this did not happen voluntarily but was carried out by means of pressure from above is as certain as the fact that it was not religious and dogmatic consideration but solely political factors that were the motive forces behind this change of front from west to east.

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728 The Peace of Riga (May 18th, 1921) between Poland and Russia allocated to the former Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm, formerly parts of the Russian Empire, while the Ambassadors' Council on March 14th, 1923 added Galicia to Poland's gains. In the Treaty of Riga both partners promised to respect the rights of their minorities while the Ambassadors' Council declared that Poland was to issue laws that would preserve Ukrainian rights and that this was why the Entente Powers relegated their supreme authority to Poland. In reality, throughout the period of Polish supremacy there was little or no attempt to satisfy Ukrainian claims. The Ukrainian Chairs, established at Lviv University by Austria, ceased to exist and the law providing for a Ukrainian university was never implemented. Ukrainian schools were slowly but surely replaced by others where Polish was used either in some or in all classes. Polish became the language of instruction in secondary and vocational schools. The Ukrainian language was not recognised legally either in the administration or in law courts and Ukrainian influence declined in all selfgovernment organisations. Poles colonised Ukrainian areas. A campaign of public opposition was opened against the Ukrainian church: hundreds of churches were shut, above all in the district round Kholm, and the buildings were frequently burned.

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871 The reaction of the Ukrainian population was considerable. In the field of education steps were taken to organise private Ukrainian schools; thus in 1934-35 there were 21 Ukrainian secondary schools, 5 continuation vocational schools — mostly in the towns. This is no mean accomplishment in view of the Polish resistance. Besides actual schooling, Ukrainian youth outside of the schools was organised. In 1938 in Galicia alone the Ukrainian Union for Adult Education had half a million members, 84 branches, 3208 reading rooms, 2065 theatrical societies and 1105 choirs (the Union was forbidden by Polish Law outside of Galicia). 175 474 Cooperative stores also served to support Ukrainian interests. In 1935 there were incorporated in the Ukrainian Central Cooperative Organisation 3013 cooperative societies with a membership of 541 508. This organisation of economic selfhelp had also to struggle against bitter Polish resistance, as expressed in the military pacification of Galicia in 1930 or the

pogroms in the autumn of 1938 when Ukrainian economic 175
establishments and their equipment in towns in Eastern Galicia
were almost completely demolished by the Polish mob. The 474
Ukrainians who had been incorporated in Roumania had lived 175
undisturbed under the Austrian Empire. In Bucovina there were Ukrainian elementary and secondary schools and a Ukrainian Chair at Chernivtsi University. The Ukrainian language was recognised in administration and law. Under Roumanian supremacy these rights were all forfeited and replaced by a policy of deliberate denationalisation. The only thing that Ukraine achieved during this period was the introduction of Ukrainian as an optional subject in some elementary schools. Officials who were not Roumanian nationals were dismissed without notice.

Ukrainian territory which belonged to the Czechoslovakian republic, so-called Carpathian Russia, although it was least significant in area and culture, enjoyed the greatest measure of freedom. It cannot, however, be said that Prague satisfied all the national claims of the Ukrainians.

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The History of Ukraine

● 175 The two prime formative influences on the growth of the
167 Ukrainian people are the struggle for the steppe and the drive for expansion southwards; there never was any migratory movement towards Central Europe. All the strenght of the Ukrainian people was absorbed by the struggle in the steppe with an opponent who commanded respect and whose riding tactics were certainly superior to those of European armies of knights, by battles in an area devoid of natural and artificial obstacles, by the necessity of moving repeatedly into the plains of Polesya and Volynia with their great forests and many rivers and lakes whenever the mounted hosts from the east swept over the steppe. It was only at the end of the eighteenth and in the course of the nineteenth century that the steppe was finally subdued, the shores of the Black Sea reached and the eastern frontier pushed far ahead. The expansion of the territory settled on by the Ukrainians which is three times as great as 200 years ago, took place solely at the expense of nomadic peoples. It were the colonial acquisitions of the nineteenth century which brought the Ukrainian people within the orbit of Europe.

This strengthening of the Ukrainian people at its circumference was detrimental to intensive development within the state. Insets of alien nationalities remained on Ukrainian territory, above all in the towns, where trade and industry fell into the hands of foreigners. Partitioned among four states as it was after World War I, and now completely dependent on a rigidly centralised Great Power, the Ukrainian people has not yet evolved a political form of its own. Its future as a state still lies ahead.

175 Ukrainian history may be divided into the following periods:

1) the political supremacy of Kyiv up to 1154
2) the supremacy of the Galician-Volynian state from 1154-1340
3) the Lithuanian-Polish period, 1340-1648
   a) the Lithuanian 1340-1569
   b) the Polish 1569-1648
4) the Cossack State 1648-1782
5) the Russo-Austrian period 1792 (1772)-1918

● 175 Such a division seems practical, even if it does not hold for all sections of the country. Thus for the Right Bank Region the Polish period does not end in 1648 but only with the Second Partition of Poland, and for Galicia it lasts from 1349 till 1772. For Carpatho-Ukraine the Austro-Hungarian period lasts from the beginning till 1918, with short interruptions. But, regarded from the standpoint of the history of the nation as a whole, these areas are peripheral and of lesser significance, in spite of their having repeatedly supplied the capitals with leaders who played a decisive part in national life.

Political Supremacy of Kyiv till 1154

Mention is first made of the Ukrainian people as we know it now in Byzantine chronicles. If we add to these the historical records left by Kyiv monks, we can form an idea of Ukraine at the end of the 9th century as a conglomerate of strictly isolated tribes, each with its own primitive political life. Their religion was uncertain, except for vestiges of a cult of the dead. They had no distinct priest caste. The tribes of the Severyany, the Polyany, the Derevlyany and the White Croats are at this time pushing southwards, the Uglichi and Tyvertsi have already reached the shores of the Black Sea and are in touch with Byzantium. This drive south takes place under the protection of the Khazar Empire which blocked the route of the nomads towards Asia. At the end of the tenth century, Eastern Europe had become the center of the Occident as far as commercial and financial transactions were concerned. An extensive network of waterways faciliated intercourse through the plains of Eastern Europe from north to south. In the seventh and eighth centuries, the Khazars on the Volga flourished as long as they controlled the trade routes to Bagdad, then a highly developed state; the Slavonic tribes on the Dnipro were vassals of the Khazars.

The decay of Bagdad entailed changes in the economic interests of the Khazar Empire, the religion and dynasty of which were of Jewish origin. The Khazars formed closer relations with Byzantine nations, and with the decline of the Volga as a trade route, the Dnipro and the tribes on its banks gained in impor-

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

UKRAINIAN PRINCIPALITIES in the XI—XIII C.
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 100 200 Kilometr.
KYIV
Chernyhiv
Pereyaslavl
Turiv
Volodymyr
Halych
Smolensk
Roha
Mstyslavl
Minsk
Horodno
Wizna
Pinsk
Mozyr
Lubech
Homil
Starodub
Trubchevsk
Novhorod
Putyvl
Kursk
Tarusa
Kozelsk
Novosil
Vshchyzh
Pryluk
Romen
Lubny
Ltava
Korsun
Trypillye
Kotelnytsya
Vasyliv
Vruchyi
Luchesk
Belz
Kholm
Lublin
Zamichest
Krakow
Peremyshl
Lviv
Zvenyhorod
Terebovl
Kolomea
Kalius
Uzhhorod
Vasluy Torh
Berlad
Little Halych
Bilhorod
Oleshye
Surozh
Korsun
Tmutorokan
Rusko Selo
Dnipro R.
Dnister R.
Boh R.
Prut R.
Seret R.
Danube R.
Tisa R.
Wisla R.
Prypyat R.
Desna R.
Sula R.
Dniepr R.
Oka R.
Don R.
Oskil R.
Donets R.
Kalka R.
BLACK SEA

175 tance. Of these, the Polyany, numerically small but excellent soldiers, formed the kernel of the Kyiv state. The most generally accepted theory to-day, that the Kyiv state is of Scandinavian origin, is founded on philology*) alone, while archaeology and traces of law and culture testify against greater Germanic influence. In the army of the Kyiv princes Germanic elements were strongly represented though they were eventually quickly and completely absorbed by the Slavs round them.

At the beginning of the tenth century the power of Kyiv increased rapidly and soon dominated all Slavonic tribes. Novgorod and the area of the upper Volga on Russian soil were annexed. Now the entire trade route from the Gulf of Finnland to the mouth of the Dnipro was under the suzerainty of the Kyiv princes. There were repeated clashes with Byzantium, as is seen by the peace treaties of 911 and 945, these being mostly the result of conflicting trade policies. Prince Svyatoslav the Brave (956-972) destroyed the Khazar Empire and conquered Bulgarian land on the Lower Danube, though only for a decade, for Byzantine pressure forced him to withdraw again after desperate battles.

The destruction of the Khazar Empire was a blunder from the political point of view for it left the way clear for Asiatic nomads to overrun Europe. The first to appear were the Pechenegs who besieged Kyiv in 962. Svyatoslav lost his life and the Ukrainians were pushed back northwards. Svyatoslav's son Volodymyr the Great or Holy (979-1015) was exhausted in the struggle against the Pechenegs; nevertheless he was able to extend his empire by the addition of land in West Ukraine (Galicia and perhaps also Carpathian Ukraine). The fact that he embraced the Greek form of Christianity which permitted the use of Slavonic in its liturgy had still greater repercussions. The reigns of Volodymyr and his son Yaroslav (1019-1054) mark the zenith of the power of Kyiv. In the battle at Eckfeld (1036) the Pechenegs were so utterly routed that they henceforth disappear completely from Ukrainian history. The first collection of Eastern Slavonic laws, the law of the "Reussen" (Ruskaja Pravda) dates from these years. From it we learn that the prince and his body-guard held the central power of the state. The latter lived at the prince's court and supplied the most important state officials. Its members were bound to the prince, though not insolubly, by oaths of loyalty and obedience. The prince consulted his body-guard before launching any important undertaking.

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*) The name Rus (Reussen) is said to originate from the Scandinavian Vikings The similarity of the word with "Russia" has led to great confusion. At the time of the Lithuanian realm, Ukrainians and White Ruthenians both called themselves "Reussen" and this is the connotation which the word has in the present text. With the rise of Moscow, the Tsar assumed the title of "Ruler over all Reussen". In the present text, "Russian" and "Russia" are used exclusively for the northern neighbors of the Ukrainians.

The town was the political center of the surrounding country and the town assembly the supreme authority of administration. A certain balance of power was maintained between the towns and the dynasty for they were dependent on each other. The peasantry had no political rights though its members were personally free and only paid tribute in kind to the prince and his body-guard. In addition there were also slaves, mostly recruited from captives taken in battle.

The theory that the entire dynasty should have the right to rule as princes prevailed generally, i. e. every prince claimed a share of the paternal possessions. This naturally caused a splitting up of the country which inevitably led to decay.

Principalities grew up in Pereyaslav, Chernyhiv and Galicia, and Turiv-Pinsk, but these became later still more disintegrated. The authority of the Grand Prince was centered in Kyiv and lasted for about another century. For the rest, there were incessant internal feuds which involved the larger cities as well as the country districts.

About the year 1060 great hordes of Asiatics, the Polovtsy or Cumans swept over the eastern frontier. The unity of the state was a thing of the past, resistance was weak and the land was hurried into the heart of the country round Kyiv and Chernyhiv. It was only after Volodymyr Monomakh, Yaroslav's son and Prince of Pereyaslav, succeeded in routing the Polovtsy in 1103 and 1111 that peace prevailed for a time.

Monomakh became Grand Prince of Kyiv (1113-1125); and the years of his reign and that of his son, Mstyslav, mark for the last time the supremacy of Kyiv. At the same time the jealousy of the Chernyhiv dynasty caused a hundred years' struggle for the prize of Kyiv. Monomakh's youngest son profited by these feuds and founded on Russian soil the principality of Suzdal and later Vladimir. The Finnish-Slav state seceded from Kyiv, soon acquired considerable power, finally aiming at supremacy over Kyiv. After the death of Isyaslav (Mstyslav's son) who had been able to maintain the authority of the state on the Dnipro from 1146 till 1154. Kyiv was stormed and sacked by the Suzdal troops in 1169. The victory of the Kyiv princes at Vishgorod (1172) rescued the country from direct dependence on Suzdal, but up to the beginning of the 13th century supremacy in Eastern Europe was centered in the settlements in Russia, north of Ukraine.

The end of the Kyiv state is linked with the decay of Byzantium and the ebb of the Scandinavian wave of expansion, both of which robbed the capital on the Dnipro of its importance as a center of trade. The inroads of Asiatic nomads made for a general feeling of insecurity and so, up to the 19th century, Ukraine remained on the periphery of the civilised world, impotent to attain its former greatness. The traditional customs of living in the primitive state which had been founded on trade, were gradually disintegrated and replaced by a new society which was in some ways analogous to the feudalism of Western Europe.

Political Supremacy of the Realm of Galicia and Volynia

Towards the end of the 11th century a new state grew up in the western part of Volodymyr's realm. At the turn of the century Galicia had already become a powerful principality that had successfully defended itself against Poland and Hungary. At that time it comprised the valleys of the Dnister and the Prut as far as the Black Sea. These rivers had gained in importance as they were less threatened by nomads than the Dnipro, especially in view of the Crusades. Nevertheless the Galician-Volynian realm never attained the position of Kyiv.

175 It enjoyed a period of prosperity under Yaroslav Osmomysl (1153—1187). As it was only sparsely populated, it had to expand east at the expense of the principality of Kyiv and thus had to come into conflict with the principality of Suzdal.

The solidarity of its ruling house was the chief foundation of Galicia's strength. Usually several brothers were ruling at the same time; the younger or less talented submitted themselves to the others without question. Its weakness lay in the country aristocracy, the boyars, with the resources of their estates behind them, and not bound to the person of the prince. The history of the Galician-Volynian state is a record of feuds between the prince and the boyars. While the Volynian nobility remained loyal to the prince, their Galician compeers did not shrink from alliances with rebel groups or foreign powers (Poland and Hungary). In these constant struggles Roman the Great, Prince of Volynia (1199—1205) gained a great, but only temporary victory; after overcoming the resistance of the boyars, he took Kyiv and ruled over almost all Ukraine. His early death prevented the consolidation of these successes; their sole lasting result was the union of Galicia with Volynia whither Roman's wife had fled with her young son, Danylo. In the long feuds connected with the dynastic succession. that laid Galicia waste, Volynia was an island of peace from which Danylo in the thirties extended his power once more to Kyiv. Then the invasion of the Mongols changed the situation entirely.

Already in 1223 a battle had been fought on the Kalka between the Mongols and the princes of Eastern Europe; but at first this victory of the Asiatics had no consequences to speak of, as they immediately withdrew to the east. In 1240 a new incursion followed, claiming Kyiv as a victim. From time to time Danylo had to acknowledge the supremacy of the Tatars but his entire energy was now directed towards throwing off the Mongol yoke at all costs. After routing the combined Hungarian and Polish armies at Yaroslav in 1245, thus putting an end to the claims of both countries for a hundred years, he tried to win the support of the Pope for a crusade against the Mongols. All he received at the Papal hands, however, was the royal crown (1253). All Danylo's attempts to attack the Tatars single-handed were in vain and in 1264 he died.

By this time the Galician-Volynian state was played out. The lands in Eastern Ukraine were lost, minor successes of Leo (1264—1300) and George I (1300—1308) did not last. In 1340 the last scion of the Rurik dynasty, George II Boleslav was poisoned, the consequence being the occupation of these areas by Poland. 175 ●

Lviv, founded in the middle of the 13th century, is characteristic for the development of Galicia during this era. The Magdeburg Code was introduced into Western Ukraine and the social structure of society in the provinces adjacent to the Tatars was changed. The small princes became simple landowners. In the Kyiv district and Podolia, however, independent village communities arose which only paid certain tribute to the Khan's officials. The yoke of dependence was not heavy, and when the empire of the Tatars (the Golden Horde) began to dissolve, single communities became quite independent. These relatively good relations between Ukrainians and Mongols ended with the expansion of the state of Lithuania-Reussen.

The Lithuanian-Polish Period

From the 13th century the Lithuanians, under pressure of German colonisation in the east, had been seeking to form an alliance with the higher developed Slavonic tribes on its frontiers. These had so little political unity that they offered no resistance to the Lithuanian advance. Lithuanian princes were often called to the throne, marriages took place between Lithuanian and Ukrainian royal houses, and when George II Boleslav was murdered, the Lithuanian Prince Lubart was called to be head of the Galician-Volynian state. Lithuanian towns like Vilna, Grodno, or Kovno were Slavonic in character. As the supremacy of Lithuania-Reussen did not affect life in the single provinces, this state really consisted of a union of half independent states.

The deeper reason for the rise of the Lithuanian state lay in the decline of the trade route to the Black Sea and the fall of the Byzantine Empire. On the other hand towns like Breslau, Riga and Danzig prospered and this new life was not without importance for Ukraine. When the Teutonic Order cut these centers off, the peoples of Eastern Europe allied themselves with the German towns and rose against the Order.

After the final decline of the Golden Horde Lithuanian feudalism determined political and social life among the tribes of "Reussen". Smart military organisation transformed peaceful peasant communities into settlements of soldiers. The nobility were bound by oath to bear arms; the peasants who were personally free, had to support their overlord by tributes while they were constantly at his command. In case of disobedience the land passed into the possession of the state. The citizens were responsible for the fortifications of the towns and maintenance of the garrisons. The higher nobility had some sovereign rights and played the part of intermediary between prince and people.

Under the Lithuanian Prince Gedymin (1315—1341) the Prypyat area was annexed to the state of Lithuania-Reussen. His son Olgerd was converted to the Orthodox Faith. He completed his father's work, beat the Tatars at the "Blue Water" (1363) and liberated the whole of Ukraine from the Mongols. Five years later he sacked Moscow, thereby protecting his eastern provinces from the rising power of the Muscovites. His most stubborn battles were those waged against the Teutonic Order and for succession to the state Volynia and Galicia (1340—87). Olgerd's brother, the Prince Lubart already mentioned, managed to keep Volynia only and it remained a reliable province in the Reussen state. In 1386 Yagailo, Olgerd's successor, acquired the throne of Poland by marrying the young queen Yadwiga; at the same time he joined the Roman Catholic Church, many of his nobles following his example, and he united Lithuania and Poland.

This union led to a rising of the Ukrainian nobility who thought that Poland had deceived them. Vitold, Yagailo's nephew, forced his uncle to acknowledge him as Grand Prince of Lithuania and his reign (1392—1430) marks the height of the power of the Lithuania-Reussen union. The Ukrainians reached the coast of the Black Sea for the second time and came into contact with the Genoese colonists in Crimea. Moscow was forced to recognise the suzerainty of Vitold. The victory at Grunwald

(1410) put an end to all danger from the Teutonic Order. At the same time he played off the Prussians against the Poles to keep the latter in check. Vitold's state was systematically centralised and the little principalities disappeared. Fedor Koryatovych, Lord of Podolia, crossed the Carpathians and laid the foundation for the more dense colonisation of Carpatho-Ukraine. (1393—1415).

Vitold's death was followed by lengthy domestic feuds. If the Poles succeeded in gaining Podolia, the attack on Volynia was held up by the courageous defense of Lutsk (1430). The nobles were victorious after the murder of Grand Prince Sigismund (1432-1440). In the reign of Kasimir, Sigismund's successor (1440-1492), a "council of the nobles" conducted the affairs of the state. In 1446 Kasimir also became King of Poland; henceforth the king's person was the only link between Poland and the Lithuania-Reussen union.

The supremacy of the nobles in Lithuania was the beginning of decay. Poland, strengthened by the weakness of Germany in the 15th century, made increased efforts to join the neighboring state. In the east, Moscow's power was increasing, while Crimea in the south was in the hands of part of the Golden Horde. The Khans in Crimea recognised the suzerainty of Turkey in 1475 and for several years they made an annual incursion into Ukraine, sacking all in their way. Once more Ukraine had to abandon the sea-coast. The country was laid waste as far as the Prypyat and in 1482 Kyiv itself was destroyed. The Russians formed an alliance with the Tatars from Crimea and took Homel, Chernyhiv, and Smolensk. The reigns of Kasimir and his son Alexander (1492—1506) were a succession of catastrophes which was only broken by a breathing-space under Sigismund I (1506—1548). The Russians were beaten by the Volynian prince, Constantin Ostrozhskyj, at Orsha (1514) and protection from the Tatars on the frontier was better organised.

While the rule of the nobles brought constant unrest to Lithuania, Poland absorbed western culture and finally attracted some Ukrainian nobles. They became more and more Polish till the union between Reussen and Lithuania was so weakened that Sigismund II, the last of the Yagailo dynasty, accomplished

● 175 the real union of Poland with Reussen and Lithuania. Thus, the Ukrainian areas, while retaining their own language and laws, came under the control of Poland.

The Polish Period

By this time attacks by the Tatars in the Crimea were beginning to slacken. At the same time increasing prosperity in Central and Western Europe caused a greater demand for grain. The fertile soil of the steppe attracted cultivators and the Ukrainians began to expand again, though no longer as military colonies, but as large landowners, they alone being able to maintain the forces necessary for fighting against the Tatars. The lot of the ordinary peasant grew worse, the change in his status being reflected in various laws and finally in the Statute of Lithuania, issued in 1529. The first version was still founded on the law of the Kyiv dynasty but later (1566, 1588) the peasantry was degraded to a serfdom that had no rights at all.

The freedom of the towns also came to an end. It is true that the kings tried to win over the towns by granting them the Magdeburg Code but this intention was thwarted by the nobles, who as starosts, voevodes and officials in these towns were able to command armed support for themselves.

After 1569 the aristocrat was the only citizen of the Polish Republic to enjoy full rights and the same held for Ukrainian aristocrats. They became more and more Polish and Roman Catholic, a process hastened by the Jesuit seminaries that sprang up during the Counter-Reformation. Thus the greater part of its leading circles was lost to the Ukrainian people and little resistance was offered to the campaign of the Church of Rome. Only when, in the reign of Sigismund III (1587—1632), the Metropolitan of Kyiv and most of the bishops decided at the Council of Brest-Litovsk to proclaim the union did part of the population rebel. Brotherhoods were formed to defend the faith; but as they did not enjoy the protection of the nobles who had embraced the Roman Catholic faith, they were powerless to carry out any comprehensive scheme of action. It was only when the Cossacks intervened as the champions of the Orthodox population that matters were altered.

Cossacks — a Tatar-Turkish name for vagabonds and fighters — those Ukrainians were called who in summer earned a hard living on the steppe frontiers under constant threat of attack by the Tatars, and who thereafter, in autumn, sold the harvest of their labor in the towns (honey, fur, leather, fish and, later, also grain). They began to set up a military organisation of their own and to attack the Tatars independently (for the first time in 1492).

A proud feeling of independence developed among the Cossacks who were bound by no feudal laws of serfdom. They attracted numerous peasants desirous of throwing off the nobles' yoke. The bitter struggle against the frontier guards who represented the supremacy of the nobles, resulted in the formation of societies like the Zaporog Fastness „Sitsh", a fort founded amid the rapids on the Dnipro by the Cossack leader Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetskyj. All the surrounding area was regarded by the Cossacks as the special property of the Zaporog army, which only nominally acknowledged the superiority of the Polish king, while entertaining its own relations with foreign neighbors.

In 1571 King Sigismund II recognised the Cossacks as the protectors of the frontier and as auxiliary troops in time of war. The Cossacks paid no taxes; they had their own law courts and administration under a Hetman. The Cossack, therefore, was a member of a privileged class, which attracted many of the settled Ukrainian population. This influx changed the entire Cossack organisation, while the defense of national faith and life enhanced its popularity.

In the second half of the 16th century the Cossacks began to launch attacks, by water and on land. Constantinople, even, seems to have been threatened. But they also rose against the great landowners in Ukraine. It is true that the Polish general, Zolkiewski, inflicted defeat on Nalyvajko, the Cossack Hetman, at the Solonytsia (1596), but the rout was not complete. Poland required the help of the Cossacks in her wars in Moldavia, Livonia and against the Russians (1604—1613) and had therefore to continue granting them concessions. The position of Ukrainians in Poland was strengthened when Chernyhiv was once more seized from the Russians. At this time, Peter Konashevych-Zahaidachnyj (1614—1622); a Cossack leader, appears as spokesman for the entire Ukrainian people. His conduct towards the Poles was loyal; he saved the Polish troops under Prince Vladislav, who were besieged before Moscow and took a number of enemy fortresses. After Zolkiewski's death at Tsetsora (1620), Sahaidachnyj took over the command of the troops against the Turks and with the Poles won the victory at Hotin. At the same time he promoted the interest of Ukraine by bestowing the See of the Kyiv Metropolitan, vacant since the union of Brest, on the Patriarch of Antioch. He also strengthened the Kyiv Brotherhood and the Academy founded in 1615, which had been a refuge for scholars forced by the Poles to flee from Galicia. Jesuite intrigues and the persecution of adherents to the Orthodox faith combined with the cleft between Cossacks and nobles to make the continuance of Cossack loyalty to Poland impossible. There were various Cossack risings (1625, 1630, 1637-1638) which, though resulting in victory for the Poles, did not lead to any definite decision.

The Cossack Period

The man who succeeded in uniting the Ukrainian people against the Poles was Bohdan Khmelnytskyj, born in 1593, Hetman from 1648 up till 1657. He formed an alliance with the Crimean Tatars and attacked the Poles. By his victories at the Yellow Waters (Shovti Vody) and Korsun he liberated the Dnipro areas. After his victory at Pylava he marched on Varsaw. Circumstances such as the death of King Vladislav IV (1632-48), the accession of the new king and Polish peace overtures persuaded him to retreat; but when peace negotiations fell through, Khmelnytskyj besieged a Polish army at Zbarash and beat the new king, Jan Kazimir, at Zboriv. Thanks to the mediation of the Tatar Khan, peace followed for two years.

The reason for Khmelnytskyj's success was his great talent as an organiser. He merged the Ukrainian lesser nobility which had remained loyal to the Orthodox faith with the Cossacks, increased the fighting value of the Cossack army, and freed the peasants from serfdom and the tyranny of the gentry. The entire country received a military organisation and was divided into hundreds (sotni). The head of a hundred directed all the administrative, legal and military affairs in his district. The military commander and the Hetman were the supreme authorities. The Lithuanian Statute continued valid for the open country while the Magdeburg Code held in the towns. The area round the Zaporog Fastness was a special unit of administration, subject to the Hetman alone. Khmelnytskyj's rebellion put an end for ever to the idea of the Yagailo dynasty (i. e. that Ukrainians and Poles should live in one state). An alliance with Russia was even accepted in order to win the freedom of Ukraine from Polish supremacy. This alliance was concluded by the Hetman in 1654 at Perejaslav after various battles, (defeat of the Cossacks at Berestechko in 1651; Khmelnytskyj's victories at Batih in 1652 and Zvanets in 1653). Ukraine acknowledged the Tsar as overlord, but retained its own army, finances and foreign policy. The combined Ukrainian and Russian armies now took Smolensk and Vilna and, with the help of the Grand Prince of Transylvania, the Cossacks occupied Varsaw. But when Khmelnytskyj saw that the Tsar was not willing to acknowledge the independent rights of Ukraine, he formed alliance with Transylvania and Sweden. The Hetman died while those negotiations were in progress.

Internal unrest, caused by the attempts of gentry and Cossack authorities to restrict the freedom of the peasants still further, resulted in a movement among the broad masses of the people for alliance with Russia. As there were at the same time feuds between the Cossack aristocracy and the Hetman it was easy for the Tsar to exploit the situation. Another important factor in the general dissatisfaction of the people was the attempt made by the Zaporog Fastness under Ivan Zirko (died 1680) to obtain hegemony over Ukraine. The result was that some of the Cossack gentry wished to renew the alliance with Poland. Thus Ukraine was divided and two Hetmans were appointed simultaneously. The Cossacks who wished to be rid both of Poland and Russia, joined with the Turks, thus completing the chaos. The so-called "ruin", or Time of Troubles, began (1657—1676), a time of decay when Ukraine was divided. Hetmann Ivan Vyhovskyj (1657-59) formed an alliance with Poland and beat the Russians at Konotop (1659). But he was forced to abdicate by circles hostile to Poland. Yurij Khmelnytskyj had to follow suit after four years in office, he having inherited his father's name but none of his gifts. Paul Teterya (1663-1665) and Ivan Brjukhovetskyj (1663-68) were too servile to foreign rulers to enjoy the respect of their own people; the former, with Polish help, ruled over the Right Bank area, while the latter controlled the Left Bank with the help of Russia. There were lively battles between the two factions.

A final partition was arrived at in the Peace of Andrusovo (1667) when the Right Bank area fell to Poland, while the Left Bank came under the suzerainty of Moscow. Ukraine laid down arms. Hetman Peter Doroshenko (1665-76) drove out Poland and Russia for a short time and sought refuge with the Turks; but the latter kept Podolia and their Tatar allies pillaged Ukraine. Poland and Russia set up a Hetman in opposition (Michael Khanenko 1669-1974; Damian Mnohohrishnyj 1668-1672; Ivan Samoylovych 1672—1687).

Doroshenko finally surrendered to Samoylovych who fought with the help of Russia, trying in vain to unite all the Ukrainian area. Poland, Turkey and Russia agreed to let the Dnipro Right Bank area lie waste for ever; the remnant of the people living there was driven by force on to the Left Bank. A fresh attempt on the part of Jan Sobieski III to settle Cossack captains on the devastated area led to the military organisation of Semen Palij who made Fastiv his center of operation (1688-1704). He protected the country against the Tatars, acquired for it a measure of independence from the Poles and recognised the suzerainty of Ivan Mazeppa, who had succeeded Samoloyvych as Hetman. This led to fresh conflict with Poland. In 1702 Palij took Bila Tserkva, thus extending his power to the Dnister. Mazeppa, who, by command of Peter the Great, marched against Charles XII of Sweden in 1704, once more united the territory conquered by Palij to the Left Bank Region

Mazeppa (1687-1709) was the last great Ukrainian Hetman. He managed to convince Peter the Great of his loyalty while remaining the actual ruler of Ukraine. When Charles XII marched against Moscow, Mazeppa thought that the hour had come for throwing off the Russian yoke completely. The Zaporog Fastness joined the alliance between Mazeppa and Sweden. But Peter invaded Ukraine so quickly that plans for a general rising were frustrated. The Russians were victorious at Poltava. Charles XII and Mazeppa fled to Turkey where the latter died shortly afterwards (1709). An attempt made by Pylyp Orlyk, his successor, to regain Ukraine, failed. The Zaporog Fastness joined the Tatars and erected their new Fastness on the Lower Dnipro.

Ukraine now lost all its special privileges. Mazeppa's successor, Ivan Skoropadskyj, was Hetman merely in name, while on the other hand, the Cossack aristocracy grew in importance so that Ukraine became an autonomous oligarchy within the Russian Empire. Often for long intervals there was no Hetman and a "Little Russian Board", consisting of Russian and Ukrainian officers, ruled the country. Though fresh concessions were made to Ukraine by Peter's weak successor, the good old days had gone for ever.

It was Catherine II who finally put an end to home rule in Ukraine. In 1764 Hetman Cyril Rosumovskyj had to abdicate and in 1775 the Fastness was destroyed for good. The Zaporog Cossacks founded a new Fastness at the mouth of the Danube in Turkey (existed till 1828) and laid the foundation of Ukrainian colonisation in Southern Bessarabia. In 1782 governments on the Russian model took the place of regiments. Catherine did indeed appoint her favorite, Prince Potemkin, to be Hetman (1790-91) and tried to form new Cossack regiments, but the attempt failed from the start. About the middle of the 18th century the new Cossack aristocracy acquired Russian manners and education and were lost to the nation; they forfeited all their special privileges for equal rights with Russian nobles, while the Ukrainian peasants became serfs. The mass of the Cossacks continued to exist as personally free peasants, but it lost all military organisation. Their name appears in history for the last time in 1812 and 1831 when they voluntarily marched against Napoleon and the Poles respectively. In 1835 the Magdeburg Code was abolished as was also the Lithuanian Statute in 1842.

● 175 In order to consolidate her power in Ukraine, Russia gave the Right Bank of the Dnipro back to Poland. But the Polish Republic of nobles was not able to assert itself against the Zaporog Fastness and its guerilla warfare (Haydamak movement). At times (1743, 1750, 1768) all Ukraine rose in rebellion. It was only after the destruction of the Zaporog Fastness that the country became quiet and complete order was re-established only after the Second Partition of Poland when the Right Bank Area of Ukraine was given to Russia. In the Carpathians there were also risings, the rebels being called „Opryshki“ there. More important, however, is the colonisation which took place here in the 18th century. At that time Ukrainian settlements reached the river Tisa.

The eastern areas of Ukraine, the so-called Slobodian Ukraine, were quietest in these troublous times. Here the war-weary people of the western districts found refuge and peaceful work. It is true that the country belonged to the Tsar, but the Ukrainian people were allowed to retain a certain measure of self-government, and the Cossack organisation. Both of these were finally abolished in 1765 when the Slobodian aristocracy also became russianised.

The Russo-Austrian Period

175 167 In the 19th century it seemed as if the Ukrainian people had more or less resigned themselves to being under Russian rule. All energy was concentrated on colonising the areas freed from Turks and Tatars; the frontiers of the country settled by Ukrainians were pushed farther and farther east and south. Russia was not blind to the threat to her national existence implied in this movement and sought to counteract Ukrainian expansion by forming colonies of Germans, Bulgars, and Greeks. But to no avail. Ukrainian colonisation crossed the upper and the lower reaches of the Don and villages even sprang up on the eastern bank of the Volga. Finally the Kuban area was settled by descendants of the Zaporog Cossacks who first occupied territory in North Caucasia and later, after bitter struggles with the mountain tribes in the Caucasus, had spread south.

175 The general situation of the Ukrainian people thus improved in this era of peaceful consolidation. The coast of the Black

Sea was reached, serfdom revoked (1861), valuable deposits of 175
coal, iron and manganese were discovered; the population in-
creased considerably, all of which caused other national questions
to recede into the background. It was only in 1900 that the 175
first unmistakable signs of the spread of national consciousness 186
among the broad masses began to appear. In this year the 668
Revolutionary Ukraine Party included a demand for an independent Ukraine in its program and the Ukraine movement made great progress in the short constitutional period after 1905. Ukrainian books and reviews, the idea of national societies and unions for adult education began to spread. And yet we must admit to-day that national consciousness among the peasants was slow to awaken; the solution of social questions was felt to be more urgent.

In Galicia more progress was made. At the outbreak of World War I there was already a well-developed system of Ukrainian schools, gymnastic societies and cooperative associations built up in constant conflict with Polish officials. The Ukrainians were loyal in their feelings for Austria; they thought that the victory of the German side would bring their own national struggle immediate advantages.

Revolution and Post-War Years

When war broke out, Ukrainian divisions immediately took 175
part voluntarily in the fighting in the Carpathians. Special 669
camps were erected for Ukrainian prisoners of war in which Ukrainians were separated from the Russians and trained in the spirit of nationalism. In the country itself the Ukraine Central Council was formed at Kyiv after the fall of the Tsar and it demanded the right of self-government from the provisional government in St. Petersburg. This was refused and negotiations were broken off when the bolshevists finally seized power. Towards the end of 1917 Lenin sent bolshevist troops to Kyiv, whereupon the Central Council declared the independence of Ukraine on January 22nd, 1918. Now the misfortune that political power was almost exclusively in the hands of members of the socialist and democratic Left, avenged itself; for those parties had no experience in the political control of a state. No

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steps were taken to create a national army. While the peasants were engaged in carrying out agrarian reforms, they were horrified to hear that the Central Council was planning to do away with private property altogether.

The Central Council was strengthened anew by the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. German and Austrian troops occupied the whole of Ukraine. But soon the Utopian social policy of the Central Council led to friction with the Germans so that they furthered the coup d'état of April 29th, 1918 whereby Paul Skoropadskyj, the descendant of a former Hetman became the ruler of Ukraine. But Skoropadskyj's policy of conciliation towards conservative and military groups which were more or less indifferent with regard to national problems soon met with opposition with Ukrainian nationalists. When in November 1918 the Hetman announced the federation of the new Russian state to be established from a center in the south area, there was a general rising. The Germans left Ukraine along with the Hetman as the war had meantime drawn to a close and in December 1918 a Council of Rebels took over the government in Kyiv. It had been possible to mobilise the peasantry against Skoropadskyj because they were told that under his authority they would have to give back the land that had been taken from the nobles; but the Council was unable to devise any effective slogan against bolshevism, it being itself entirely under the influence of cosmopolitan and international theories.

So the reunion with Galicia (constituted as "West-Ukrainian Republic" after the fall of the Danube monarchy) that was proclaimed on February 22nd, 1919 in Kyiv was merely the recognition of a principle. The war on two fronts against Poland and the bolshevists overtaxed the powers of the new-born state. In February 1919 Kyiv was lost and shortly after there was only a small part of Podolia still in the Council's hands. In July the government decided to abandon the struggle against Poland and to concentrate its energy against the bolshevists. The united army of Galicia and the Eastern Ukraine beat the bolshevists and towards the end of August Kyiv was re-taken. At this point Denikin's Russian White army attacked the flank of the Ukrainians who were forced to retreat once more. Typhus decimated

the forces. Simon Petlura, who was in command, negotiated 175
with the Poles for an alliance against Russia. All men still fit 669
for service were organised to produce a successful guerilla attack against Denikin's lines of communication and those of the bolshevists. Late in the spring of 1920 the Ukrainians, having once more beaten the bolshevists, formed an alliance with the Poles. A counter-attack by the bolshevists resulted in a common front of Poles and Ukrainians, on the south wing of which the latter defended the Dnister line. After the "miracle on the Vistula" the Poles forgot their allies who had finally to clear out of Podolia at the end of November.

As a result of these struggles the greatest part of Ukraine became an "independent republic". In reality the country was handed over to the central bolshevist power. Moreover about 7 million Ukrainians were incorporated in Russian territory. The Ambassadors' Council of 1923 allocated Galicia to Poland and that province, as well as the neighboring provinces of Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm enjoyed all the advantages of the Polish police system for two decades. Carpathian Ukraine which in 1919 had voluntarily joined Ukraine, was annexed to Czechoslovakia after the end of the war, while Bucovina and Bessarabia fell to Roumania. In spite of this partition of Ukrainian territory the struggles of 1917-1920 cannot be regarded as a failure.

Thanks to them the Ukrainian idea has now become the possession of the entire people.

It is obvious that hard times are ahead of the Ukrainians but the end of the present situation (the whole Ukrainian territory is occupied by the Soviet Union to-day) is in sight. There is a general feeling of injustice that spurs the people's determination to utilise every opportunity of launching a campaign for the life of the national state!

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

National Minorities in Ukraine

162 563 Minorities in Ukraine amount to 20 % in purely Ukrainian territory and to 24.7 % in other parts of the country and are the consequence of long domination by foreigners and the immigration that entailed. The same cause is responsible for increasing Jewish immigration; Jews have always appeared to assist the spread of Russian influence in the East and Polish in the West.

175 167 563 Contemporary minorities rarely date earlier than the second half of the 18th century, if we except a few peripheral areas in the west, the Tatars in Crimea and Russian colonisation in the east in the 17th century. Several earlier efforts made by the Polish Government and individual magnates to colonise the Right Bank region of Ukraine were unsuccessful; the first wave spent itself in the 16th century in the rebellion of Khmelnytskyj, while later colonists were completely absorbed by the native Ukrainian population. The Roman Catholic faith was able to persist only in a few places. A similar fate overtook Roumanian expansion in the 14th and 15th centuries in the Carpathians; it left traces in names and in the legal code of the settlements.

167 563 The Russians form the largest minority. Apart from the common colonisation of the Don area, it was only after the catastrophe at Poltava (1709) that Russians slowly penetrated into Ukraine. More numerous Russian settlers did not arrive till after there was no longer a Hetman (1764) and after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress (1775). At the same time the Turks were driven back from the Black Sea; the Ukrainian population, which had suffered great losses in the struggles with Turks and Tatars, was unable to tackle this job alone. But the Russians, who had been systematically settled, were disinclined to cultivate the steppe and preferred to move into the rising towns as officials, artisans and laborers.

Ten thousands of German colonists took their place, settled by Catherine II in the former Governments of Kherson, Taurien, and Katerynoslav, later also in Southern Besarabia. At the same time Emperor Joseph II settled German colonists in

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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The Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon World

It is sad but true that the Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon world have never developed through the centuries that close and constant relationship which has existed in the case of so many other peoples. There have been moments of contact but these have never lasted and did not until the present time result in a steady stream of interest. — Yet this unfortunate fact has been due rather to the history of the two peoples and to their geographical locations than to any deliberate neglect on either part. The Anglo-Saxon race, taking its rise from England, an island on the northwestern coast of Europe, was chiefly concerned with areas that it could reach by sea. During its long centuries of oppression, Ukraine was completely landlocked. It was cut off from the Black Sea by the Tatars. It was hemmed in on the north and east by Moscow and on the west where it formed part of the Polish-Lithuanian state, there was little encouragement for foreigners to travel to it.

It is interesting, however, that in all of the periods when Ukraine was playing an important rôle in European affairs, knowledge of it reached England, but almost invariably it was by means more or less connected with the sea.

Let us look first at the Kyiv period, when Kyiv was one of the great capitals of Christian Europe and when it far surpassed in wealth and culture any of the western capitals. At this period the bonds between Kyiv-Rus and Scandinavia were close. Even Volodymyr after the death of his father Svyatoslav was obliged to retire to Scandinavia and return with Varangian troops before he could establish himself on the throne. It was the same period when England was being ruled by King Canute t' Dane. The Northmen, sailing back and forth across the North Sea, could not fail to carry news of the exploits of their Varangian cousins. A little later one of the daughters of Yaroslav was married to King Harold Hardraga, the King of Norway, who was later to fall in 1066 at the battle of Stamford Bridge only a few days before his conqueror King Harold II, the last Saxon King of England, was destined to fall before William of Normandy at Hastings. Later a daughter of Harold married Volodymyr Mono-

175 648 makh. Thus by the nature of events, during this period when both England and Ukraine were connected with the Scandinavian north, the court of Kyiv became well-known to English and especially Saxon nobles fleeing from their enemies in their own land. It brought about a personal acquaintance which had no deep roots and which ended with the disintegration of Kyiv and the absorption of England into the area of the Norman influence.

Nevertheless there was established at Kyiv a Scotch Benedictine Monastery in the eleventh century which continued until the Mongol invasion. It would be interesting to know whether this was a purely missionary establishment in the hope of introducing the western traditions into Kyiv or whether the monks had fled from the Norman conquest and the border disturbances, since at that time the King of Scotland was connected by marriage with the Saxon royal family and strove in vain to assist them against the new conquerors. At all events their residence in Kyiv was marked by signs of close friendship between them and the clergy and population of Kyiv.

After the Tatar conquest, we find that the Metropolitan Ruthenus Petrus, the Ruthenian Metropolitan Peter, was present at the First Council of Lyons in 1245. He had been installed as Metropolitan of Kyiv about 1242 with the aid of the patriotic groups, especially Prince Mykhajlo of Chernyhiv, who was later martyred by the Tatars. It is interesting that his presence at the Council in an attempt to secure the aid of the West has been recorded only by two English chroniclers of the Council, a fact that suggests some personal friendship which had perhaps been formed at Lyons.

Then came the Middle Ages, the period of the Crusades, and the constant wars of England and France. It was a period, in Ukraine, when there was not much to attract foreigners. The English were finding themselves on the sea and their sailors appeared quite frequently in Baltic ports and in the White Sea, but the latter were in far closer relations with Moscow than with Ukraine, especially as the Muscovites completely ignored the Ukrainian Orthodox at this period.

As we might expect, it was the exploits of the Cossacks that reawakened interest and this time the English inspiration to learn more of the Ukrainians was largely derived from their relations with Constantinople. It was the sea-raids of the Cossacks that won their attention and the importance of these were stressed by the Patriarch Cyril Loukaris, who was very familiar with the situation in Ukraine. As a young man, the nephew of the then acting Patriarch, he had taught in Wilno. He was a friend of Count Constantin Ostrozhskyj and he was present at the Council at Brest. Ever after he retained his friendship with the leaders of Ukraine, Moldavia, and Vallakhia, and so he remained posted on the progress of the Orthodox in Ukraine and the history of the Cossack movement. 175 648

The English ambassador at Constantinople in the early seventeenth century, Thomas Roe, who played an important rôle in the religious conflicts in that city, was a strong supporter and friend of Cyril. He made many reports on the Cossacks and their raids and even attempted to save the life of the Cossack leader Samuil Koretsky, who had been taken prisoner by the Turkish forces, by pleading for him in the name of the King of England. Roe also, as a friend of Prince Gabriel Bethlen of Transylvania, may perhaps have been the author of the plan to unite the Ukrainian Orthodox with the Transylvanian Calvinists and the Swedes for overthrowing Poland during the Thirty Years' War. At the same time Yuryj Nemyrych who was later to succeed in arranging an alliance between Ukraine and Sweden was a student in England.

The revolt of Khmelnytskyj in 1648 was frequently noticed in the English newspapers which compared the Cossacks' leader to Oliver Cromwell. There are constant rumors that there was some correspondence between the two men but this has never been proved, perhaps because of the destruction of many of the documents of the day. It is, however, said that the radical Cossack leader who played an important rôle during part of the period, Maksym Kryvonos, Maxim of the Crooked Nose, was a Scotsman. He appears and disappears mysteriously in the course of the Cossack movement. He was far more bitter in his hatred than Khmelnytskyj and it is perhaps conceivable that

175 he was a fanatic Protestant who had come to the Cossacks to
648 stir them up to increased and unreasoning bitterness.

During the years after the Cossack uprising, several Englishmen who were either in Poland or in Russia made lengthy reports on the life of the Cossacks, but the next important event in Ukrainian history, the revolt of Mazeppa, again aroused considerable interest, no less so because Peter the Great in an endeavour to break support for Charles XII of Sweden had apparently at one time thought of making the Duke of Marlborough the master of Ukraine. Nothing of course came of this plan but the English ambassador in Russia, Charles Lord Whitworth, reported on the actions of Mazeppa and the destruction of Baturin by the Muscovite armies.

After the defeat of Charles XII at Poltava, English diplomatic circles joined the Swedes in the effort to stop the advance of Peter the Great against that country. This brought them into contact with Phillip Orlyk, who was elected Hetman after the death of Mazeppa, and who spent years in Sweden and Turkey in an effort to form a coalition against Peter and restore freedom to Ukraine. None of Orlyk's hopes materialised but when he was in Turkey, he had the active support of the British ambassador who put pressure upon the Turks to counterbalance the demands of the Russians that he be surrendered.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the destruction of the political liberties of Ukraine and the general temper of the times tended to accept Ukraine as definitely part of Russia. England's opposition to Russian expansion became more and more felt in Asia and in the Balkans, where Russia was trying to bring under her control the other Orthodox Slavs. It was a period when Western Europe abandoned any hope of securing allies from the oppressed nations of Russia, even though there was a growing interest in the cultures of the different Slav peoples.

Thus by the time of World War I, the British authorities like the Americans were inclined to accept the statements of the Tsarist diplomats that the Ukrainian movement was solely a product of German propaganda and even after the Russian

Revolution, they did not seriously consider the situation which was then presented. At the same time, the French were so interested in the restoration of Poland that they had little inclination to listen to representatives of a people who were in opposition to their friends. 175 648

We thus see that the chief relations between England and Ukraine were to be found in the diplomatic sphere and in the reports of travellers and the works of various professors who were interested in the Slav languages and literatures, while the professors of history in the later periods were inclined to accept the various Russian theories of their own history, which were of course opposed to Ukraine. There was no opportunity for any large-scale personal acquaintance with the Ukrainians or their problems, and in this the Ukrainian situation followed closely the general pattern of British relations with the other countries of Eastern Europe.

Then at the end of the nineteenth century, a new situation arose in the United States and a little later in Canada. There came a relatively large-scale immigration of Ukrainians who settled chiefly in the factory and mining centers of the Eastern United States and the prairie farming regions in Western Canada. Most of these new immigrants came from Western Ukraine which was under the domination of Austria-Hungary as a wave of the great migration of peoples from that area. The difference in their choice of occupations in the United States and Canada was largely due to the difference between the methods adopted by the two countries in dealing with new arrivals. In the United States, they were allowed to find employment as they would and they gravitated to areas where there was already a considerable population of Slavs from Austria-Hungary. In Canada they were encouraged by the government to settle on still unoccupied land in the northwest and were given opportunities for acquiring their own land, as immigrants had been in the United States a half century before. 167

Relatively few of the Ukrainian educated class came to the New World. The vast majority were peasants who hoped in the beginning to acquire the money in a few years to return to their old homes and live there in relative comfort. They were only

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III

Cultural life

The General Trends of Ukrainian Culture

When studying the intellectual characteristics of the Ukrainians we come to the conclusion that their often too marked individualism and their ideals, which display themselves in the necessities of everyday life, stamp them as unmistakably western in their attitude to the world, while their geographical position drew them from the very beginning within the orbit of Central and Western Europe and later on made them instrumental in handing on the products of Western culture to the nations of the East. 181

The first mention of the Kyiv empire in history shows it in connection with a western power. In the Annals of Bertinius we read how emperor Ludwig received a Grecian delegation at Ingelheim on May 18th, 839 and how, in the company of the ambassadors sent by Theophilus, the Greek emperor, there were also certain men, "qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant." We may assume with great probability that these men were first sent from their home, Kyiv, to Constantinople, and had then accompanied the Grecian delegates on their long journey from Byzantium to the Rhine and that the name "Rhos" is identical with the later Rus-Ukraine. 175

Grand Princess Olga, who had embraced the Christian faith of the West, sent a delegation in 960 to the German Emperor Otto I, requesting that priests should be sent to her country that was so little known. Missionaries under Adalbert set out

● 175 on this long journey with, however, little practical success. As early as the reign of Volodymyr the Great and Yaroslav, his son, definite attempts were being made to share in the general cultural life of Europe through alliances with the powers of the West. Yaroslav in particular was zealous to form family alliances with western princes. It was also in keeping with this policy that he appointed Hilarion, a native monk of some standing, to be Metropolitan of Kyiv, a position hitherto always held by a Greek; he sought thus to strengthen his position with regard to Byzantium in the ecclesiastical as well as in the political world. Izyaslav, Yaroslav's eldest son, first negotiated with King Henry IV, whose wife, Praxedis, was a daughter of Vsevolod, Grand Prince of Kyiv, and later with his adversary, Pope Gregory VII, in order to establish contact with Rome. These and similar events point clearly to the fact that, in spite of geographical position and distance from Western Europe, in spite of the vicinity and the influence of the Byzantine empire, the Kyiv state and its leaders pursued a policy that was definitely directed towards the west.

175 177 After the Tatar invasion of the Ukrainian steppe, the reins of government in Ukraine fell into the hands of the Galician-Volynian Realm which, as an advanced outpost on the way to the West, became a channel of communication between the "world" of those days and the East. As was natural, western influences here became stronger, the romanesque style dominated in architecture and Latin became the language of public life. But the waves sent out by the West did not stop merely at the country that was nearest in space; they spread further east, where from the outset they counteracted a one-sided influence from Byzantium.

Lithuanian dominion over Ukraine was fundamentally peaceful in character; Lithuania had the upper hand in politics, but Ukraine was superior to her partner in culture, an advantage which was not abandoned when the Union with Poland took place. But this latter historical fact nevertheless brought Ukrainian territory into still closer contact with movements in the culture of Western Europe which, favored by fortunate conditions, spread rapidly eastwards. The Magdeburg Statute which

175 177 had been known earlier in Western Ukraine as a privilege of the towns (Volodymyr from 1324 and Syanik from 1339) becomes the basis of organisation for further settlements in newly acquired areas. German artisans and artists are welcome to these areas and the youth of Ukraine are fired with enthusiasm to attend German and Italian universities in order to acquire learning with which they will subsequently enrich life at home. Thus western cultural movements like Humanism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation penetrated at long length the wide-flung steppe. It is true that they sometimes caused effects there that could not have been expected from experience in other countries. This is seen best in the case of the Reformation.

795 After the amalgamation of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state with Poland, the Orthodox Church, though already shaken to its foundations, begins to play an important part in public life; after the loss of Ukrainian independence, it becomes a rallying point for national feeling and the difference in creed between the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches coincides with the political difference between Poles and Ukrainians; it was therefore natural that nationalist circles should be absolutely opposed to every further attempt to weaken the Ukrainian Church. It was well known that grievous abuses had crept into the organisation and life of the Orthodox Church, for those abuses arose from the new position it had been forced to assume. From having been an all-powerful state church it was degraded to become a factor in a strange country that was barely tolerated and was therefore unable to control its own administration, all the more as it had no longer a decisive say in making church appointments. It was common property that Orthodoxy in Ukraine was in a critically weak condition of disintegration, but nobody dreamt of opposing it and still less of replacing it by another creed, its fall would have been a severe, if not fatal blow to the entire life of the nation.

Such were the psychological reasons for the fact that the reformation movement found such a weak echo in Ukraine, though the necessity for a change in conditions, for reform, but from within, was felt by all.

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113 Moshin, V. 'Nachalo Rusi: Normanny v Vostochnoy Evrope' (The Beginning of Russia: the Northmen in Eastern Europe), *Byzantino-Slavica*, Praha, 1931–2.

Smirnov, P. *Volzhski Put' v Starodavney Rusi* (The Volga Waterway in Ancient Russia), Kiev, 1928.

(6) *On the term 'Rus' in Western sources*

In the St Bertin Annals of the year 839 Bishop Prudentius writes about certain men who accompanied the envoys of the Emperor Theophilus on an embassy to the Emperor Louis the Pious: 'qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant, quos rex illorum, Chacanus vocabulo, ad se amicitiae, sicut asserebant, causa direxerat.' When the Emperor Louis began to ask who they were, he gathered from their answers that they were Swedes: 'comperit eos gentis esse Sueonum.' *M.G.H.* I, p. 434.

Luitprand of Cremona, about the year 970, writes: 'Rusios, quos alio nomine Nordmannos appellamus.'

In Arab sources

Numerous Arab writers mention 'Rus' or the 'King of Rus' or the Rus 'Kagan' (e.g. Ibn Rusta and Gardizi). The latter: 'Many men among the Slavs go over to the Rus and serve them in order to be under their protection.'

See A. Harkavy, *Skazaniya Musulmanskikh Pisateley o Rossii* (Statements of Moslem writers concerning Russia), Petersburg, 1870.

Minorsky, V. F. *Ḥudūd al-'Ālam*, London, 1937, pp. 427–438.

Cf. also S. Rapoport, 'Mohammedan Writers on the Slavs and Russians', in *Slavonic Review*, vol. VIII, no. 22.

(7) *On Kievan Russia*

Courses of Russian history by V. Klyuchevski, Moscow, 1923; S. Platonov, Petersburg, 1917; M. Lyubavski, Moscow, 1913; E. Schmurlo, Praha, 1931; also M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraina*, Kiev, 1913 (Ukr.); D. Doroshenko, *Outline of the History of Ukraina*, Warsaw, 1932 (Ukr.).

(8) *On the Nomads and Kiev*

Golubovski, P. *Pechenegi, Torki, Polovtsy do Nashestviya Tatar* (Pechenegs, Turks and Polovtsy before the Tartar Invasion), Kiev, 1884.

Bruce-Boswell, A. 'The Kipchaks', in *Slavonic Review*, vol. VII, no. 16.

Macartney, C. A. 'The Petchenegs', in *ibid.* vol. VIII, no. 23.

● 175 For an understanding of the role of the Altaian nomads in medieval Russia it is essential to read Boswell's brilliant study. 'The Arabs and the Georgians alone called the Kipchaks by their proper name. It appears in Western sources for the first time in Edrisi, who refers to the original Kipchak in Asia, after a detailed description of Comania. While the Greeks called the Kipchaks "Comans" the Saxons of Transylvania called them Valvi, or Falben, i.e. "sallow people". The Russians called them Pólovtsy, which some philologists derive from *polóvy* (*pálevy*), "sallow", but which is generally taken to mean "steppe folk" from *póle*, "field", i.e. it is a translation of the Turkish "Kipchak". (These Kipchaks should be distinguished from the Golden Horde, v, p. 42.)

● 175 Gorlice, and the Russian armies, after heavy fighting and enormous losses, began to retreat from Galicia into the Ukraine.

By the beginning of autumn the front had been established on a new line; the Russians continued to hold only a strip of Eastern Galicia and had been compelled to abandon to the enemy part of Volhynia with the towns of Kovel, Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynsk.

Anxiety was very great at that time and even Kiev seemed to be threatened. Podolia, Eastern Volhynia, right-bank Ukraine, had become regions in the immediate neighbourhood of the front. The evacuation of Galicia had been a difficult and painful proceeding. The Russian armies had been accompanied in their retreat by thousands of Galician peasants evidently in fear of the reprisals awaiting them at the hands of the Austro-Hungarian troops. They went on foot, and some in carts with their households, driving their cattle before them. Over a hundred thousand of such fugitives crossed the Russian frontier. Numbers of Jews followed the retreat in order to escape from the scene of war; and the Russian military authorities deported with them also all people who were considered 'suspicious' from the political point of view and such Ukrainians, Poles and Jews as were supposed to harbour 'criminal intentions'.

For the latter elements prisons were hastily improvised in Kiev, but no one knew what to do about them nor why they had been brought there. Charitable institutions had to feed and clothe them as though they were the most peaceful citizens. There were days when at the Kiev Central Station as many as 60,000 meals had to be provided for these swarms of unwanted 'guests'.

The Russian Committee from Lvov, with its chief, Dudkevich, also came to Kiev. Such an agglomeration of demoralized peasants and Jewish crowds in the rear of the South-Western Front was dangerous in every respect, and to begin with from a sanitary point of view. Beginning with the end of 1915 and all through 1916 the clearance of these 'new-comers' from Kiev went on. Dudkevich's Committee and other organizations were sent to Rostov-on-Don and later to Turkestan—whither was directed the main flow of fugitive peasants. Jews were allowed to go beyond the Dniepr into the Governments of the interior and the limits permitted them for settlement were temporarily abolished. Many of them remained in left-bank Ukraine and the towns of New Russia; and this migrant Jewish element, combined with the 'suspicious characters' who gained their liberty after the outbreak of the Revolution, constituted an unsettled and disintegrating factor during the period of social dissolution.

During 1916 life in the Ukraine approached normal conditions

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again, after the offensive of General Brusilov had broken the Austro-Hungarian 175 Front at several points. Part of Volhynia was cleared of the enemy and the Russians again invaded Galicia, occupying Stanislavov and also Czernowitz and the whole of the Bukovina. The Front was again removed from the region of Kiev.

Under the influence of the Russian victories the Roumanians entered the war, but they proved to be unprepared for serious conflict. A Russian army was sent to check the German invasion in Moldavia, and a new 'Roumanian Front' was created, so that the battle-line now ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea. During the winter of 1916–17 the South-Western Front was stabilized. Headquarters were planning a new offensive in the spring against Lvov and believed in its ultimate success. Peace and quiet reigned in Kiev and in the neighbourhood of the Front. (1)

§2. HRUSHEVSKY AND VINNICHENKO: THE UKRAINIANS AT BREST-LITOVSK

When the news of the February Revolution (February according 669 to the Old Style, March according to the New) in Petrograd 208 reached Kiev neither the authorities nor the populace would at first credit the truth of it. However, it was not long before the events which had taken place in the northern capital were repeated in Kiev and the cities of the Ukraine.

The process of decomposition which was destroying the armies of the North-Western and Western Fronts infected somewhat later the forces on the South-Western and Roumanian Fronts. As for the Ukrainian national movement, no one thought about it during those first days of revolution. With the exception of Finland, where the revolutionary movement was accompanied by a wave of feeling in favour of national independence, in no part of the Russian Empire were nationalist aspirations the motive of the Revolution. The first impulse of the masses, irrespective of their nationality, was to look upon the Revolution as a means of ending the war which had lasted too long. The other motives which soon made themselves apparent were everywhere of a social nature.

The state of mind of the masses found expression in the institution 208 of 'Councils (*Soviety*) of Soldiers', Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates' 623, in the creation of which all the leading socialist groups and parties took a hand. People of all nationalities participated in these Soviets; Georgian politicians, who for a generation had played a leading role in Russian radical movements, made themselves par-

Let us, therefore, look briefly at 175

the outstanding elements of the situation as they were at the beginning of the revolution.

From the time of the organization and Christianization of the Kievan state at the end of the tenth century to the eighteenth century, Ukraine, whether independent, or subject to Poland-Lithuania, or to the Russian Tsars, had remained as a political unit, even though divided. However, in 1775 Catherine II destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich, the centre of the Ukrainian Kozaks, and in 1783 she abolished all Ukrainian political institutions and privileges. From that time the area was divided into *gubernias* as the rest of the Russian Empire and the full Russian methods of administration were introduced.

From that moment, too, the Russian government spared no efforts to destroy every vestige of Ukrainian national and cultural consciousness. The Ukrainian language was treated as a peasant dialect of Russian; the name Ukraine was forbidden and even the substitute Little Russia was treated as a generic term for the area north of the Black Sea, but it did not figure on the political map of the Russian Empire as a distinct entity. The Ukrainian revival in the nineteenth century beginning with the publication of Kotlyarevsky's [536] parody of the *Aeneid* in 1798 was confined to the cultural sphere and could offer little or nothing in the way of administrative experience to the Ukrainian people. Those Ukrainians who entered the Russian service were usually sent to distant areas, while the administrative personnel in Ukraine was chiefly Russian in origin and feeling.

The great estates were largely owned by Russians or by Poles 186 and even many Ukrainian landowners who had succeeded in retaining their holdings were so thoroughly Russianized that they [423] felt little sense of kinship with the peasants on their estates. Ukrainian life was lived chiefly in the villages. The Ukrainian language was not taught in the schools or used in the courts, for all education and administration were in the Russian language. Still the peasants continued their own manner of living with their own traditions and their own tastes and desires.

[133] culture of the more northern region. The reasons for the smaller 175 farm population are historical rather than purely economic, however. Most of the area was fully settled many generations later than the more northern regions, for it was the principal area of conflict of the Slavic settlers moving down from the north and the Tatar warriors based on the Crimea. The major instrument of colonization was the Cossack fortress settlement or *sich*. In the mid-seventeenth century the Cossacks accepted the suzerainty of the Orthodox tsar, but it was only in the late eighteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Crimean Tatars, that the steppe [563] was fully opened to peaceful development. These new lands, frequently called "Southern Russia," came to include considerable bodies of non-Ukrainian settlers, mostly Russians, but also large numbers of Germans and Serbs. In 1917 the Provisional Government in Petrograd strongly rejected demands of the Ukrainian Rada for the extension of its authority to the *guberniias* of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida, the last three corresponding roughly to the southern steppe region, since it felt they were not Ukrainian in character.[32]

369 The northern section of the steppe region, comprising the northern halves of the *Generalbezirke* Nikolaev and Dniepropetrovsk, did contain a preponderantly Ukrainian peasantry. The presence of two very important natural resources—the iron mines of Krivoi Rog and the water power of the Dnieper rapids—had led to rapid industrialization of this area during the period of the Soviet Five Year Plans, with a consequent large increase in the urban population. According to the census of 1939 five of the fifteen Ukrainian cities of over one hundred thousand population 369 lay in this region.[33] At the start of the period of industrialization, 563 in 1926, the city population was very largely non-Ukrainian. For example, Ukrainians formed less than half the total in Kirovograd (then Zinovevsk), Jews being the next largest ethnic group, closely followed by Russians.[34] In Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'e the

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[32] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 72–73.

[33] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250–53.

[34] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Recensement de la Population de l'URSS*, XIII (Moscow, 1929), 13–14.

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[For a summary of the history of the Ukraine from ancient times through the eighteenth century, see category 116, pp. 27-106.]

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Sometimes these laments bear a character of bitter 538
irony. The pretended infallibility of German opinion concerning the fate and the history of the Ukrainian people exasperates him. 'The German will tell you: You are Mongolians. Yes, Mongolians, nude descendants of Tamerlaine clothed in gold. The German will tell you: You are Slavs. Yes, Slavs, unworthy great-grandsons of glorious ancestors.'

While ironizing about the faithful pupils of the German school he continues: 'They spoke according to German precepts in such a way that the German himself, though a great professor, could understand nothing of it . . . at Sitch the German, full of wisdom, grows the potato and you buy it and eat it for your health and you glorify the Zaporoges . . . but by whose blood has this earth been fertilized to produce the potatoes? . . . Her own children have led the Ukraine to the edge of the precipice, they have crucified her worse than the Poles, they want to teach them, at least they pretend it . . . they want to train this blind old man which is the Ukraine under German influence.' (*Kobzar.*)

For him the German question was not only one of literature since he, his sister and his two brothers were serfs of the German estate-owner Engelhardt, who was noted for his coarseness and the absence of any culture.

The Liberal era which began in Russia with the 668
accession of Alexander II gave broad satisfaction to the 175
aspirations of the circles of the former opposition. The liberation of the serfs in 1861, the inauguration of municipalities elected by the people, the radical reforms based on the permanence of judges, and the establishment of juries and judicial guarantees, eliminated the major reasons for the old revolutionary leanings. A wide movement of reconciliation began to develop which would probably have benefited the Ukraine as

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 well as the whole empire. The Imperial Government 175 was clearly inclined to the idea of a regime of constitutional monarchy, based on the cultural autonomy of the various Russian territories and on the application of sufficiently broad systems of political autonomy to the ethnically non-Russian majorities.

As before, the Government was in no way opposed to the publication of books and journals in the Ukrainian language.

000 This whole evolution was compromised by the Polish insurrection of 1863. One knows that in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Alexander I committed the mistake which the great Catherine had taken care to avoid at the moment of the partition of Poland. He annexed the greater part of the ethnically Polish territory, the Grand duchy of Warsaw. Despite all the attempts at the establishment of an autonomous regime, the 'Polish question' became henceforth the most vulnerable point of internal Russian policy. During the Liberal era of Alexander II the autonomous political regime was naturally intended to be applied first of all to Poland. Nothing came of this attempt except a new and violent Polish insurrection. The insurgents, traditionally attached to the old conception of the Great Poland of former times, maintained the old pretensions to the Ukraine and White Russia. The programme of Prince Adam Czartoryski, the forerunner of the Polish insurrectionist movement, envisaged the co-ordination of the Polish and Ukrainian movement, the latter to be included in the plan of the Polish insurrection, in order to shake the omnipotence of the Russian Empire and to create a Slavonic federation under the direction of a Great Poland on her ruins! The efforts to draw the Ukrainian and the White Russian peasants towards her were to experience a fatal check; the peasants did all they could to facilitate the task of

0 00 lent its other ear to the Polish landowners who described the Ukrainian peasants as fomentors of trouble, aiming at the overthrow of the existing agrarian order, which offered great advantages to the Polish nobility.

204 As a result of the circular of Valouiev,[1] publications in the Ukrainian language almost ceased in Russia. The review *Osnova*, which had been the rallying centre of Ukrainian intellectuals, was closed. As a result there was an almost total eclipse, for several decades and almost until the Revolution, of the Ukrainian journalistic movement in Russia. Nevertheless some periodicals appeared, among which *Ukrainskaia Jizn* (Ukrainian Life), edited in Russian at St. Petersburg by that same Simon Petlioura who later became the chief of the insurrectionary Ukrainian movement against the forces of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, and who was assassinated in Paris in 1926. But now, in the place of a cultural Ukrainianism, there formed, on the other side of the frontier, in Galicia, a political Ukrainian movement which was openly anti-Russian and even aimed at the separation of the Ukraine from the rest of Russia.

175 Henceforth Galicia played the role of the Ukrainian 'Piedmont.' We know that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Galicia had been the real centre of Russian resistance in Poland. But after the armistice of Androussovo which, in giving Kiev to Russia, had nevertheless left the land of Halytch under Polish domination, many things had changed there. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Poland had reached the aim never yet achieved before: the definite union of the Orthodox Church in Galicia with Rome was introduced. The last attempts at resistance of the old Russian brotherhoods, now fallen into decadence, did not suffice to prevent it. The direction of religious affairs passed to the Poles and to Polonized Russians who

[1] i.e. the circlular which declared that the Ukrainian language was 'only Russian, corrupted by Polish influence'--Analyst]

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were so detached from the popular masses that often they did not understand the Slavonic language in which, however, they had to read the liturgy of the Eastern rite. This led immediately to a terrible decadence of religious instruction among the people, an instruction which had, during centuries, been the backbone of national resistance.

The later evolution which followed soon showed that the Polish State had never been concerned with religious unity in the matter of dogmas but much more with the total denationalization of the Russian people. The Church of the Eastern rite remained in Poland in a position of political and social inferiority, even after its union with Rome. The Poles wanted to achieve a complete latinization of the Church, that is to say a total Polonization of their Russian subjects. As a result the Uniat Church, remaining a more or less persecuted Church because it maintained that ancient national rite, was gradually transformed into a guardian of national traditions in general and became in Galicia the last bastion of resistance to the invading Polonism, thus reassuming the role of the Russian Orthodox Church of former times.

But, dogmatically separated from the Russian Church, she could not direct herself towards Moscow and, later, towards St. Petersburg as easily as the Orthodox Church of Eastern Ukraine had done it. This was all the more so as the Empire continued to consider her as being suspect of Polonism to such a point that she was interdicted on Russian territory (decree of Nicholas I of 1839). This suspicion did great harm to the Russian cause in Galicia even during the Great War. Only a new and violent Polish persecution was required—that which raged in Galicia just before the present war—to induce the Orthodox and the Uniats to unite in a common

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175 wish for resistance. We shall return to this question later.

Nevertheless the hopes which were founded on the power of the Russian Empire never ceased entirely to manifest themselves in Galicia. They were alive at the moment when Austria seized this territory during the partition of Poland. That was understood at Vienna, and to ward off this danger the Austrian Government adopted a clever policy of attempting to favour the development of a separatist national consciousness among the Russians of the 'Kingdom of Galicia.' Vienna immediately displayed a Liberalism towards the Uniat Church such as Poland had never shown. This had the effect of raising the level of religious instruction among the clergy and the people. In putting the difference which existed between the Uniat Church of Galicia and the Russian Orthodox Church into relief, the Austrian Government tried to give the word 'Ruthenian' a meaning which opposed it to the conception of 'Russian.' It did not prevent publications in the local language, especially religious ones, but it did not allow the penetration of the language and the influence of the immense empire of the east.

The struggle between the Poles and the 'Ruthenians' continued, however, in other forms under the Austrian domination. The Polish element had always been represented by the great landowners, the clergy of the Latin rite, and by a great part of the middle classes of the towns, whereas on the other side were the peasant masses and the Uniat clergy of the Slavonic rite. The first great political shock in Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian revolution of 1848, could, therefore, be nothing but a new episode in this region of the now four times secular struggle with Polonism.

The Danubian Monarchy, frightened by the rising of

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the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Poles, allied itself 175 at this moment with the anti-Polish Ruthenian movement, just as it allied itself at the same time with the Czechs and the Croatians. The greater part of the promises of the Austrian Government, given under the pressure of revolutionary events, were not kept afterwards. This applied particularly to those promises which concerned the partition of Galicia into two provinces, that of Polish Cracov and of Ruthenian Eastern Galicia.

Nevertheless this 'springtime,' although of short duration, did not fail to awaken the hopes which had survived so long and which helped the task of Austrian policy. An important social consequence emerged from the events of 1848: the abolition of serfdom thirteen years before the emancipation of the serfs in Russia.

In the following decades Austrian policy developed cleverly between the Poles and the Hungarians, although more inclined towards the first who were more conservative from the social point of view and, consequently, more in tune with the general lines of the policy of Vienna.

The Ruthenian language and instruction continued to enjoy a certain liberty on condition that they did not fall under Pan-Russian influences.

Austrian policy at least had the merit of allowing the 517 Ukrainian language and culture to develop and thus to give birth to an imaginative literature and to a journalistic movement of some importance, having its centre at Lvov, which became the nucleus of Ukrainian intellectual life. Numerous cultural institutions appeared one after another; journals, reviews, literary circles, and finally the Ruthenian University of Lvov.

After the measures of restriction which were taken against Ukrainianism in Russia, the intellectual circles of authorities by its rapid development and by its hold on 000 the people. Some months before the declaration of war a monster trial took place at Marmaros-Sziget, in which the adherents of the russophile organizations were tried for high treason. Most of the accused were peasants, which confirms the success of Russian ideas among the popular masses. Many were condemned to long terms of imprisonment. Immediately after the beginning of the war arrests again took place among the same Russian circles. These measures led to another trial at the beginning of 1915, but this time the tribunal sat at Talerhof under martial law and pronounced several death sentences. The account of these repressions against the Russian circles of Galicia by the Austrian Government was brought back by Count Bobrinsky, who served as a liaison agent between the Russian organizations in Kiev and those of Galicia and who was a witness at the first trial.

We have seen that the anti-Ukrainian police measures 648 taken by the Russian Government after the Polish 175 insurrection of 1863 were politically directed against the eventual possibility of Polish-Ukrainian collaboration, which was incidentally unrealizable. These measures did not bring about any political reaction in Russian Ukraine. They only brought the Ukrainian intellectual circles into evidence by their brutality and lack of justification. On the contrary they helped to crystallize the anti-Russian Ukrainian movement in Galicia, which found a loyal supporter in the Austro-Hungarian Government. The ideas developed in the plan of Prince Adam Czartoryski, despite their being out of tune with the whole history of the Ukrainian-Polish relations, were later adopted by certain Austrian circles which, as one knows, had become masters of Galicia after the last partition of Poland. Austria-Hungary

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intended to put itself in the place of the Great Poland of other days and to create, under the sceptre of the Hapsburgs, a federation of Slavonic lands. In the immediate entourage of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne, the idea of transforming the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a federal State found great favour. The idea of taking advantage of the anti-Russian Ukrainianism of Galicia as a counterweight to Russian power and, at the same time, to Polish pretensions to cultural and political direction of the Ukrainian movement, was quite in tune with this plan. It was the intention of the Austrian politicians to use Ukrainian separatism as a means of creating difficulties behind the Russian front in case of war, and of securing some allies on the other side of the frontier.

In order to attract the sympathies of the Ukrainian intellectuals the Austro-Hungarian Government showed great tolerance towards the cultural institutions of the country, readily authorizing the creation of Ukrainian schools and putting no obstacles in the way of the development of political societies and institutions which, as we have already said, also served to eclipse the Polish influence over the leading circles of Galicia. The Austrian Government did not only authorize the creation of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine,' but gave effective assistance to its development in granting it the means of action, which it did not grant to the political organizations of the other Slavonic minorities. Skoropis-Ioltoukhovsky, Jouk, Dorochenko, and Salisniak, all convinced separatists and extreme anti-Russians, were placed at the head of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine.' The Russian general staff became alarmed by this movement, whose principal aim it suspected—the disorganization, in case of war, of the foundations of the army which would be formed in the south of Russia. Later on, in 1917, the bulletin which was published at Stockholm by the members of the 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine' confirmed the justified anxiety of the Russian military authorities. This bulletin declared that the 'Union' had taken up a clear-cut position in all that concerned the relations with Russia, in basing all her hopes on the military defeat of the latter. It hoped for the occupation of the Ukraine by the troops of the countries at war with Russia, in order to attain a national independence with the aid of the central empires. Thanks to the great ability of her propagandists and to the continual support of the Austrian Government, the 'Union' was able to obtain considerable financial assistance consisting, apart from the contributions of the Galician and Bucovinian peasants and the Ukrainian colonists in America, of the grant of the 'Friends of Ukrainian Independence,' who belonged to those nationalities who were prepared to go to war with Russia. The accounts of the financial organization of the 'Union' were brought, in 1917, to the Russian military authorities by one of its former collaborators. One can say without exaggeration that the initiative and the elaboration of the programme of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' can be traced to Austria, which proposed, in case of an offensive in Russian-Ukrainian territory, that the members of this organization should follow her army with the aim of finding supporters of separatism among the native population of Russian Ukraine, and on the other hand for creating the new administration in the conquered country. But the Austrian advance did not take place. The Russian troops invaded Galicia and the most active members of the 'Union' had to take refuge in Vienna. Many of their number simply entered the Austrian secret service after this failure. That which remained of the 'Union'

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continued to receive subsidies from the Austrian Government and engaged in cultural work and autonomous propaganda among the Russian prisoners of Ukrainian nationality.

This propaganda began immediately after the Austrian defeat in Galicia in 1914. Special camps were organized in which Galician instructors tried to subject the Ukrainian peasants to their influence and to the idea of Ukrainian autonomy. The conditions under which these prisoners lived were better than those of Russian soldiers from other parts of Russia. But soon, owing to her continual military and political defeats, Austria began more and more to make way for Germany, who finally took over the affairs of the 'Union.'

The idea of a confederation of vassal States carved out of the Russian territory developed in Germany in certain intellectual and political circles since the end of the era of Bismarck. The decisive role in the development of these ideas was played by Baltic Germans originating from the Russian Baltic provinces, whose influence, at first purely cultural, became progressively stronger in the Reich.

000 The short-sighted policy of crude and superficial russification, inaugurated in the Baltic provinces in the reign of Alexander III, had exasperated a part of the Baltic nobility and especially of the intellectuals. Their national pride, encouraged by the great rise of Germany in 1870–1, was deeply offended by the policy of russification. Thus these barons and these intellectuals began to turn more and more towards the Reich. Some of them even tried to find a new home in the at last united Reich. They took with them a hate of Russian politics, their contempt of all the native peoples of Eastern Europe and their historical traditions, full of reminiscences of those struggles which the Teutonic order

000 to make the Ukrainian idea one of the principal pivots of German claims.

● 175 If, under Austrian direction, one did not dare to speak
668 of separatism to the prisoners, the German general
701 staff, the new master of the Ukrainian movement, thought of the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State, under German control, and gave its propagandists directions in this sense. From 1915 the Little Russians who agreed to declare themselves Ukrainians and not Russians were sent to the camp of Radstadt. In this camp specialists of the Ukrainian question, under the direction of Professor Bezpalko, undertook a series of lectures in which they drew pictures of the independence and liberty of the Cossacks for the benefit of their hearers, appealing to them to reject the 'heinous yoke of Asiatic Muscovy.' Towards the beginning of 1917, that is to say after two years of assiduous work, the German general staff succeeded in recruiting, in the camp, 15,000 prisoners. The regiment of 'Taras Chevtchenko' was created. This regiment consisted of eight companies and had about 1600 men. The soldiers of this regiment, looked upon as undoubted partisans of the independence of the Ukraine under German protection, were armed and equipped in readiness for being used in a possible offensive in South Russian regions. The remainder was divided into four groups:

1. About 1500 men formed the *Sitch* (the name of the ancient Cossack community) and enjoyed the complete confidence of the German authorities with regard to their loyalty to the new Ukrainian cause, without yet being entrusted with arms.

2. The 'apprentices,' about 3000, still considered as not absolutely reliable but already somewhat influenced by the propaganda.

3. The 'candidates,' about 3000, those who were

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neutral or indifferent to the question but without marked hostility.

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4. Finally the ' opponents,' about 6000, who, although they had agreed to take the name of ' Ukrainians,' were actively opposed to separatist propaganda. They were continually sent to penal work and had to undergo severe and frequent punishments.

Thus of the 15,000 men who, enticed by the promise of an improvement of their lot, had agreed to join the Ukrainian units, one could only rely with difficulty on 3000 (the Chevtchenko regiment and the *Sitch*) who had been really affected by the propaganda. At this period the number of Russian prisoners exceeded 3,000,000, of whom at least 700,000 were Ukrainians, which confirms the absolute failure of this movement.

It would be interesting to remember that from the Russian side the same policy was inaugurated with respect to the prisoners of war of Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, etc., origin. This move enabled one to establish whole divisions composed of Slavonic minorities. From the beginning of the war Austro-Hungarian military units formed of Slavs, and especially of Czechs, went over to the Russians with their officers, arms, and baggage. Not a single similar case occurred in the Russian Army, which included many entirely Ukrainian regiments. On the contrary, according to the evidence of high Russian and German officers, the Ukrainian regiments were among the best troops, often used as shock units, the most famous of which was the ' Iron Brigade ' commanded by General Denikine, future commander of the White Army.

To sum up, the political movements of autonomy and of Ukrainian separatism gave no tangible results despite a subsidized propaganda having the support of such powerful organisms as the central empires.

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When the February Revolution broke out in St. Petersburg no political Ukrainian movement developed in the early stages. Quite naturally the intellectual circles obtained more liberty to spread their ideas, which were not anti-Russian.

The municipal elections undertaken at Kiev almost immediately after the February Revolution, and which had undoubtedly taken advantage of all the liberties which characterized the first days of all revolutions, gave a result which clearly shows the almost complete non-existence of a Ukrainian political movement. In fact, of ninety municipal councillors the so-called Ukrainian parties obtained only six places, and that was in the capital of the Ukraine itself.

All classes of society hoped that the Provisional Government which replaced the Monarchy would be able to maintain the front and would allow the country to convoke a National Assembly which would decide the future political regime on the whole territory of the former Russian Empire. As soon as the active members of the Ukrainian political organizations of Galicia entered the Russian Ukraine they organized a kind of Ukrainian committee at Kiev, which started its autonomist political work. On 24 March 1917 the Ukrainian Associations spread over the whole territory were called upon to send their representatives to Kiev to form the first nucleus of a future Ukrainian Parliament. Although only the representatives of such Associations which had declared themselves Ukrainian were invited to this assembly, and although the direction of the assembly was entrusted to Galician Ukrainians, under the Presidency of Professor Hrouchevsky, not only was the idea of separatism absent, but the autonomous aspirations were of the most mild kind. This first assembly of Ukrainian deputies took the name of ‘ Rada ’ (the name

of the Cossack Assembly of the time of Bogdan Khmelnitsky), which means 'Diet' or 'Council' in Ukrainian. 175 668
Once installed, it tried to establish relations with the 642
central Provisional Government, whose power became more and more fictitious. The menace of a Bolshevik *coup d'état* hung over the Government of St. Petersburg, a fact which allowed the Rada to justify its own establishment in declaring itself alone capable of protecting the Ukraine from Bolshevik invasion. This political manœuvre had many chances of success. The Ukrainian peasant was fundamentally hostile to Bolshevism, to the social levelling, and to the collectivization of the land. Nevertheless, anxious for the peace which the Bolsheviks had promised, the Ukrainian peasant lent them his ear. The leaders of the Rada, loyal to the principles of the 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine,' were also not opposed to the idea of an immediate peace and their promises to preserve the Ukraine from Bolshevism and to conclude peace with the central powers was their most important trump card. The Provisional Government, in a state of complete disintegration and without any remaining support, hastened to recognize the Rada as a political organization, although no election in the proper sense of the word had taken place at the time of its formation. A statute, known under the name of 'Universal,' was instituted on Ukrainian territory. After the agreement between the Provisional Government and the Rada, Ukrainian autonomy was recognized but was limited to questions of language and culture and to the organization of local administration.

All other important questions, including the agrarian question, were left to the future National Pan-Russian Assembly. The administrative activity of the Rada was, at the beginning, limited to the town of Kiev alone, where its assemblies took place. During the summer of

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● /175 1917 the propaganda agents of the Rada covered the
668 whole country where they organized meetings and
642 distributed pamphlets. They tried to persuade the proprietors of land that their aspirations would be more easily realized within the framework of an autonomous State and underlined the impotence of the Central Government in the face of a Bolshevik attack. The Ukrainian peasant, like that of the Volga and of Siberia and like the Cossacks of the Don, opposed the revolutionary theories, and it is in these countries that they met with the strongest opposition. The Rada could not have a better justification of its authority in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasant than the statement that the Bolshevik movement, of Great Russian origin, was imported into the Ukraine from the outside, which, moreover, was true. The title which the Ukrainian anarchist, Nestor Makhno, gave to his book on the Civil War, *The Russian Revolution in the Ukraine*, is singularly significant. The leaders of the Rada were careful not to proclaim their separatist ideas openly, knowing that such ideas would never find the support of the popular masses. Profiting, however, by the decay of the Provisional Government, they formed, with its consent, a sort of Ministry which took the name of 'General Secretariat,' and which declared itself the supreme power in the Ukraine on 29 July of the same year. The agrarian movement which spread over the whole territory of the Ukraine aimed especially at the great landowners, most of whom, especially in the west, were Poles. Thus the real popular movement took the form of the ancient quarrel between the peasants and the lords and developed quite independently of the Ukrainian movement represented by the Rada. When, in October 1917, the Provisional Government fell as the result of a Bolshevik insurrection, the only official

authority existing in the Ukraine was represented by the General Secretariat of the Central Ukrainian Rada. 175 668 642

The peasants, hostile to Bolshevism, did not find any other political organization on which they could lean. Mistrusting the organizations of the Right (which were later to form the political nucleus of the White Armies) and equally fearing the local democratic municipalities where the intellectual and Jewish elements dominated, openly hostile to the working class which was almost entirely Bolshevized and consisted of non-Ukrainian elements, the farmers seemed to tend more and more towards the support of the Rada which seemed to be the only force capable of realizing their aspirations. Nevertheless the first clash between the elements which accepted the idea of an autonomous Ukraine and those which rallied to Bolshevism, was not to the advantage of the first. The agrarian question meant much to them. The Ukrainian Rada was unable to formulate a clear policy with regard to this most important question. Its resistance to the anarchical division of the lands, supported by the Bolsheviks, rapidly reduced the number of its supporters and the already small authority enjoyed by the General Secretariat in the eyes of the peasant mass. Nevertheless, on 20 November, the Rada proclaimed a democratic Ukrainian Republic. It is at this period that the allied military missions then resident at Kiev recognized *de facto* the Ukrainian Republic. At the same time the fourth 'Universal' was promulgated, one of the articles of which declared that the independence of the Ukraine was considered indispensable only because the rest of the Russian territory had fallen to the power of the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to remember this detail because it again proves that, even in politically favourable circumstances, the Rada did not dare openly to declare its separatism. This act did not increase the

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175 642 668 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local municipal or other organization took the slightest note of its existence. Every department, every district, and every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

648 727 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

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[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

CHAPTER VI

THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM TO-DAY

IF before the Great War Galicia was the home of the 175 Ukrainian movement, and if since 1917 the first landmark of the new Ukrainian State was erected in the Russian part of the Ukraine, it is since 29 September 1938 that the tiny Sub-Carpathian Russia was invested with the role of a 'new Ukrainian Piedmont.' How did this come about? How could a country, linked with Hungary during seven centuries, though sentimentally tied to Russia, become this new 'Piedmont'?

We know that during the Great War the Carpatho-Russian people showed their attachment to the Russian cause almost openly, which exposed them to the severest repressions on the part of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The inter-allied agreements of the time of the war, in giving Russia full liberty of establishing her new frontier with Austro-Hungary, seemed to have prepared the annexation of this small country by Russia.

The Russian Revolution, and the anarchy which followed, rendered these arrangements void. President Masaryk mentions the following in his memoirs:

'The collapse of Russia made the annexation of Sub-Carpathian Russia by the Czechoslovak Republic possible. First it was only a hope, but when I was in Russia, and particularly in the Ukraine, I was forced to give my attention to this plan.'

Immediately after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary the Czech legions were eager to occupy the western

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[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

175 part of Carpathian Russia—the district of Priachev. On 9 January 1919 this district was purely and simply annexed by Slovakia, which had herself become an integral part of the young Czechoslovak Republic.

In the other, the greater part of Carpathian Russia, power had fallen into the hands of the Russian national committees which remained in constant contact with the representatives elected by the Carpatho-Russian *émigrés* of America. This American delegation played a decisive role in the events which followed. Greatly attached to the national Russian cause, it nevertheless bowed to circumstances in recognizing the impossibility, owing to the situation in Russia, of uniting the Carpathian country to the Russian State. And it is thus that the Carpatho-Russian committees accepted, on 16 May 1919, the decisive resolution:

'Sub-Carpathian Russian forms an autonomous State within the Czechoslovakian Republic.'

It was this solution—the inclusion of Sub-Carpathian Russia as an autonomous entity in the Czechoslovakian State—which was expressly ratified by the peace treaties. Articles 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Treaty of St. Germain established in effect the international status of Carpathian Russia:

Czechoslovakia accepted the proposal of the powers of the *entente* which aimed at endowing Sub-Carpathian Russia with the largest possible autonomy (Article 10). She undertook to give her a Diet freely elected by the population as well as a local administration responsible to the Diet (Article 11). The officials of the State in Sub-Carpathian Russia were to be natives of the country and the Carpatho-Russian people were to be fairly represented in the common Parliament of the republic (Articles 12 and 13).

This statute, guaranteed by the powers of the *entente*,

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was never put into operation, notwithstanding the repeated demands of Carpatho-Russian organizations which even tried, but in vain, to seize the Secretariat to the League of Nations. 175

Unfortunately for the Czechoslovakian State and for Europe, the Government of Prague showed itself extremely distrustful of all Russian national tendencies. Not only was the autonomous Diet never summoned, but the Czech authorities neglected, moreover, the international obligation to recruit the administrative staffs among the native population. According to an *aide-mémoire* presented to the League of Nations in 1923, there were 1213 Czech officials of the Ministry of Finance in Sub-Carpathian Russia against only 77 Russians, 272 Czech officials of the Ministry of Interior against 45 Russians, and 14 Czechs of the Ministry of Health against 2 Russians, etc.

Such a situation made collaboration between Russians and Czechs very difficult. It soon ended in the resignation of the first governor of the country, M. Jatkovitch, of Russian sympathies, who had played a very important role in the inclusion of Sub-Carpathian Russia in Czechoslovakia.

But it was not only the Czech officials who made their appearance in large numbers in the land of the Carpathians. Distrusting the Russians, the Government of Prague clearly favoured Ukrainian tendencies. Masaryk himself mentioned in his memoirs that he viewed with 'the greatest sympathy the efforts which aim at the introduction of the Little Russian language in the schools and the administration' of Sub-Carpathian Russia. The popular masses were completely strange to this Ukrainian movement and one attempted to implant it in the Carpathians with the help of *émigrés*, mostly from Galicia. The Russian Press of the Carpathians never

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175 ceased to disclose the favourable conditions enjoyed by these foreign elements to whom the Czechoslovakian Government was quite ready to entrust public education in preference to Russians.

Thus Ukrainization nevertheless remained without appreciable results, when in 1937 the Czechoslovakian Government undertook a referendum in Sub-Carpathian Russia in order to establish the desires of the population concerning the choice of the language of instruction in primary schools; 82 per cent of the votes were given for the Russian language and only 18 per cent for Ukrainian. Even if we admit that this referendum had no political character, one would have to believe that the figures which resulted correspond to the facts.

A few days before the events of September 1938 the Czechoslovakian Government decided to inaugurate a federal policy and appointed the President of the 'Russian Agrarian Union,' Brody, as chief of the Government of Sub-Carpathian Russia. But as soon as the Munich agreements were signed the German Government demanded a change of political direction of this Cabinet. For a short while yet Brody remained at the head of the Cabinet of Sub-Carpathian Russia, but he was supplemented by two Ukrainian Ministers. In October a new change put an end to the power of the Russian party.

Under the growing pressure of the Reich, Czechoslovakia established a new Government in Sub-Carpathian Russia, presided over by Monsignor Volochine, of Ukrainian sympathies and with pro-German tendencies. Volochine proclaimed an 'Autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' thus conforming to the German plan which tended to the creation of a Ukrainian springboard which was required by the policy of the *Drang nach Osten.* The installation of this Government was

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in clear contradiction to the aspirations of the people. Actually, in 1937, during the last relatively free elections to the Czechoslovakian Parliament, the Russian block, called the 'Russian Agrarian Union,' had obtained 120,000 votes against 40,000 Ukrainian votes of the party of Monsignor Volochine.

Always pursuing their anti-Russian policy, the agents of Monsignor Volochine denounced Brody to the Government of Prague, accusing him of high treason to Czechoslovakia, and insinuated that he had had the intention of uniting Sub-Carpathian Russia to Hungary. Brody was imprisoned, but had to be freed in February 1939 as the tribunal had pronounced his case not proven. But Volochine was already strongly in power, supported by Revay, a partisan of the close union with Germany and a former social democratic deputy of the Hungarian Parliament, who had become one of the active members of the 'Ukrainian National Union,' 'U.N.O.,' a terrorists' organization whose headquarters are at Berlin.

Prague and Berlin already sheltered numerous Ukrainian *émigrés*, since the union of Galicia and Poland, and especially the members of the U.N.O. who, as soon as the New Ukraine was proclaimed, moved to Ujhorod, an ancient medieval city, the capital of Sub-Carpathian Russia, to reinforce the ranks of militant Ukrainianism. The population, poor and often inert and illiterate, did not participate in any Ukrainian political movement.

The installation of the Ukrainian Government was immediately followed by the inauguration of Hitlerist methods in the country. Semi-military organizations, formed on the model of the S.A., took over the direction of public affairs. The new methods were applied to the elections to the Ukrainian Diet, the results of which were astounding: 92 per cent of the votes were given to the Ukrainians, whose candidates figured on the one

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175 and only list, that of Volochine. It seems to us superfluous to insist on the impossibility of so rapid a change of public opinion, especially as no serious propaganda whatever had taken place before the installation of the new Government.

In order to have an idea of the new regime it is curious to note that the land, whose population does not exceed 600,000 people, saw itself endowed with three concentration camps in which all those were locked up who were Russians at heart and did not want to submit to this political farce.

During the period which passed between the Munich agreement and the annexation of Czechoslovakia by Germany, Sub-Carpathian Russia underwent the amputation of a narrow strip of her territory, along the Hungarian border, which was given to the latter together with the ancient capital, the town of Ujhorod.

As a reaction to the policy of Ukrainization of the Czechoslovakian Government, the Hungarians were eager to adopt a pro-Russian policy in the parts of Sub-Carpathian Russia which fell to them. The Russian schools were re-established and Ujhorod and Mukacevo returned to their ancient role of Russian cultural centres.

The Russian deputies of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, who represented the regions given to Hungary, and, in the first instance, Fenczik, the leader of the Russian Fascist Party, automatically became deputies of the Magyar Parliament.

It is curious to note that at the same time as the blue and yellow flag of the Ukraine was raised over the new autonomous Ukrainian republic, the tricolour flag of Imperial Russia is the only one authorized in the Hungarian part.

Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, deprived of the only big town, Ujhorod, had to establish a provisional capital at

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Chust, a place which is no more than a hamlet, and which has not even got a railway station. In this improvised capital the innumerable manifestations of the military force of the Ukrainian movement were displayed every day with the habitual pomp of Hitlerist mass meetings.

The scandal and the abuses of the last elections, the arbitrariness and brutality of the men of the *Sitch* (the name of the Ukrainian S.A.), obliged the Czechoslovakian Government to undertake measures for curbing the too clamorous activity of the blue-yellow Hitlerists, which was becoming too compromising.

The Czech general, Prhala, known for his Russian sympathies, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Czech troops stationed in the Ukrainian territory and entered as such into the Cabinet of Monsignor Volochine. At the same time Revay was dismissed. This operation did not please the German Government, which saw one of its most fervent adepts in Revay.

It is only after the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia and the establishment of the protectorate by the Reich in Slovakia and the occupation of Sub-Carpathian Russia by the Hungarian Army, that Ukrainian activities ended on its territory.

To-day we do not know yet what the immediate future of this country will be. It is more than probable that, once rejoined to Hungary, every expression of the Ukrainian movement will be suppressed, and the partisans of the Russian culture and spirit will again return to the direction of the land.

This seems to us the more likely as the Ukrainian movement was severely suppressed in Poland, the loyal ally of Hungary. This latter will never allow the inauguration of a movement on her territory which could one day be considered as being against the interests of Poland.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

175 At a first glance the pro-Russian movement seems equally dangerous in the eyes of the Poles. But if the Ukrainian movement has a clearly political character the russophile movement in Sub-Carpathian Russia never raises the question of the return to Russia, but limits itself to the expression of its cultural aspirations.

The official indifference of the Reich to the suppression of the 'Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' which had been created by it, seems astonishing. Is it because Germany has acknowledged that the 'Piedmont' had been badly chosen and had no chance whatever of becoming a serious Ukrainian springboard? Recent events would seem to indicate much wider plans. Or is it because for the moment she considers it inconvenient to take up an openly hostile position towards Hungary? It seems that the influential members of the U.N.O., disconcerted by the attitude of the Reich, hurriedly left Germany to find refuge elsewhere. The near future will throw light on this enigma. The scale of events is growing.

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000 The following three factors have put the Ukrainian problem in the forefront of to-day's international politics:

1. The development of the German dynamic initiative which seeks to assure a new living space and to open a path towards the east.

2. The Soviet power which finds itself to-day the master of Russia, but which shows itself of being incapable of sufficiently influencing the situation in Eastern Europe by its actions and of giving it permanent equilibrium.

3. Polish events.

The idea of a German hold on the Ukraine was inaugurated during the Great War, if not earlier, and has

103 nomads "whom Ukraine mourned very much." This popular name gradually supplanted 'Rus'. The nearer to our times, the more the names 'Ukraine', 'Ukrainian' are used*). The name 'Little Russia', which had been used as the official name of Ukraine in Tsarist Russia, was not accepted by the Ukrainian people**).

● 175 The Ukrainian problem is not new in European history. The Ukrainian nation (Ruthenians), which had lived for millenniums on the territories between the Don River and the Carpathian Mountains, and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, has rendered Europe a great service. The knight armies of the Princes of Kiev, Chernigov, Galicia and Volhynia, in heroic exploits defended their country against the nomad hordes, and for centuries did not allow the wild Asiatic tribes to enter Western Europe. A poetical picture of this struggle gives us the famous 'Discourse of the Campaign of Igor' from the 12th century, in which is described the campaign of the 'Rusychi' of Prince Igor against the steppe horde of the Kumans. The powerful Tartar Horde coming from the interior of Asia destroyed the Ukrainian capital Kiev and other cities, and devastated the country in 1240.

After the destruction by the Tartars in the 13th century the Ukrainian public life was concentrated in Galicia and Volhynia. In the 14th century Galician territory was annexed by the Poles after the dynasty of the Galician Princes, the descendants of Vladimir the Saint, had died out. Volhynia and other parts of the Ukrainian territory weakened and devastated by the Tartars, came under the rule of Lithuanian Princes. The Lithuanian state was the immediate continuation of the political and cultural tradition of the Kievan state. The official language of the Lithuanian state was White-Ruthenian and Ukrainian.

With the coming of the Tartars the complete separation of the northern principalities of the former State of Kiev (Suzdal, Ryazan, Moscow, Tver) from Ukraine took place. Under the rule of the Princes of Moscow who 'collected the country', a peculiar system of a centralised despotic state arose. Of the liberal constitu-

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*) The famous Czech scholar Jan Amos Comenius who had lived for a long time in Poland, wrote in a letter dated 24. 5. 1655: "Polonia nostra tota bellis ardet ... tacebo de remotioribus oris Lithuania et *Ukraina*". *The Correspondence of Comenius. Treatises of the Czech Academy of Science,* Class III, Ann. 1, No. 2, p. 179: Prague 1892.

**) The name 'Little Russia' for Ukraine is of scholarly origin. For the first time (1303) it was used in a paper of the Patriarch of Constantinople for the designation of Ukraine as the Metropolis *(μικρὰ 'Ρωσία)* in contrast to Moscow *(μεγάλη 'Ρωσία)* which formerly was hierarchically subordinated to Kiev.

tion of the Kievan State, where the Prince was only a servant of the 175 state and had to reckon with the will of his subjects, — knights and townsmen ('viche'), in Muscovy there was not the slightest trace. The Government of the Princes of Moscow imitated the despotic system of the Tartar 'Golden Horde'. Some Russian historians reject the legend of the taking over of the Kievan traditions by Moscow, and point out the peculiarity of the social and political order of the Muscovite state*). The Princes of Moscow did not tolerate the existence of the Republic of Great Novgorod on the Volkhov River at the side of their despotic state, and after having conquered that country they destroyed by bloody terror the freedom of the Republic of Novgorod (end of 15th century). The liberal traditions of Great Novgorod were definitely wiped out in 1570 by Tsar Ivan the Terrible, who carried out a cruel massacre in this city, and deported a great part of the population to the East. The Muscovite State, which had grown under the protectorate of the Tartar Khans, created a political and social order of its own, after the pattern of the eastern despotisms.

In an article published in the *Review of Politics* (July 1948) the [177] well known American historian Hans Kohn says that the state of the Princes of Kiev, i. e. Ukraine, "looked toward Byzantium, whence it received its Church and toward Scandinavia, from where its dynasty came. When Kiev succumbed to the Mongol invasion, modern Russia was created by the will of the ruthless cunning of the great princes around Moscow.

The new capital grew up, . . ., far from the old cultural centres to the west, on recently colonial land where traditional urban liberties were unknown. Its people were no longer the Slavs of the Dnieper [144] but a new race in which Slav, Finnish, and Mongol blood freely intermingled. From Moscow, no roads led to the West, the rivers pointed to the steppes and deserts of Asia; the political, cultural, and economic ties were with the great empire of the Tartars to whom it was tributary."

The oriental despotic features of the political and economic order of the Muscovite State gave the central government a tremendous power that was used for the enslavement of all social classes and for the seclusion of the Muscovite people from Western Europe. Until the end of the 17th century the Government of the Tsars did not permit its subjects to visit the countries of Western Europe and tried to prevent foreigners from entering their country. The Tsar

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*) Prof. Presnyakov, ***The Creation of the Great-Russian State:*** **Moscow 1918; various works of the historians Lyubavsky, Miliukov and others.**

175 was not only the unrestricted lord over the freedom and lives of his subjects; he was also the greatest merchant and contractor in his country (monopoly of foreign trade, monopoly of public houses a. s. o.). Even for the land that was cultivated by the Muscovite people a formula was stated: "The whole land belongs to God and the Tsar."

The Muscovite aristocrats had no power to use against the rule of the Tsars and signed in official papers with deminutive names 'Petrushka', instead of Peter, 'Ivashka', instead of Ivan, and called themselves 'Kholopy' (slaves) of their Tsar. The foreigners from the free Western European countries were impressed by the unlimited submission of the Muscovites to the Government of the Tsars, the lack of personal dignity among them, and their simultaneous enthusiasm for the absolute power of their Tsar, who had not to take an oath on the observation of the laws and the consideration of the liberties of his subjects as was the case in the free Western countries. The learned Scotsman Buchananus writes in his book *De iure regni apud Scotos,* in 1579, that Muscovy rejoices in tyranny ('Moscovia tyrannide gaudet').

[181] The present Communist Government has received the tyrannical tradition from the Tsars of Moscow. Soviet propaganda consequently glorifies one of the most cruel tyrants of universal history — Ivan the Terrible — in its press, literature and radio*). No less is the glorification of Tsar Peter I., the founder of modern Russian imperialism, by the Russian Communists. Here the Bolsheviks have found their corresponding Russian national tradition.

After the destruction of the Kievan State and the down-fall of the Principality of Galicia and Lodomeria the development of Ukraine and White Russia (Byelorussia) under the rule of the Lithuanian princely dynasty went in the general European direction. The nobility and the city population had their rights guaranteed by the laws in Lithuania and Poland, and the Monarch had to consider the will of his subjects. The Ukrainian nobility and the townsmen enjoyed these rights alike. However, after the Union of Lublin of 1569 between Lithuania and Poland almost the whole of Ukrainian territory was incorporated by Poland, and a strong pressure of the Polish State on the Ukrainian people began. The Polish authorities restricted the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox nobility and, on the other hand, gave those who abandoned the Greek Orthodox Church and turned Catholic all possibilities of career and enrichment. An

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*) Comp.: R. Wipper, *Ivan Grozny:* Moscow 1948 (An official glorification of the 'progressive and democratic' Tsar Ivan the Terrible).

even harder pressure was applied against the Ukrainian townsmen. /175 In those times the conversion of an Orthodox Ukrainian to Catholicism meant Polonisation. Since the end of the 16th century a large number of the Ukrainian nobility having accepted Catholicism left their Ukrainian nationality. The same pressure led to the Polonisation of a great part of the Ukrainian townsmen.

The neighbourhood of the Tartars was an obstacle to the normal development of Ukraine.

On the territory between Kiev and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov the stubborn struggle of the Ukrainian nation against the Tartars was carried on for centuries. The Tartars captured people from Ukraine and sold them into slavery in the oriental markets. The last invasion of the Crimean Horde into Ukraine was in 1769.

In spite of this permanent danger from the steppe and under these extremely difficult conditions the Ukrainian nation did not abandon its cultural activity.

Schools, literature, printing, developed in Ukraine. The learned [212] Arab Paul of Aleppo, who visited Ukraine in 1654, wrote in his memoirs that education was common among the Ukrainian people, and that even the Ukrainian women were literate. Academies had also been founded in Ukraine, and were the models and sources of education for all Greek-Orthodox Slav peoples. Ukrainians studied at the Universities of Italy, France, Germany and other countries.

Against the Tartar hordes, the Ukrainians created an organisa- [701] tion of its own — the Cossack Army. From the middle of the 16th century, the centre of the Ukrainian Cossack Army was in the fortress 'Sich', southward of the Dnieper Cataracts. From this the name of 'Zaporovian Army' arose ('porohy' are the rocks in the Dnieper). The Zaporovian Army performed great deeds in fighting the Tartars. The Ukrainian Cossacks under the leadership of Petro Sahaydachny saved Poland from a terrible Turkish force in the battle of Khotin (Bessarabia), in 1621.

When in 1683 Central Europe was threatened by the Turks, the Ukrainian Cossacks were the force without which the Polish King Jan Sobieski could not dare to begin the decisive battle against the Turks before Vienna.

After the Union of Lublin of 1569, the Polish nobles wanted to take possession of the territory the Ukrainian people had defended against the Tartars. The Polish Government planned to abolish the Ukrainian Cossack Army, and to make the Cossacks serfs of the nobility. The nobility wished to lay their hands on the free peasants of Eastern Ukraine who had not known serfdom. The relations between the Polish Government and the masses of the Ukrainian

●175 people deteriorated also in consequence of the religious persecutions of Ukrainians by the Polish State. For these reasons, in 1648 the great Ukrainian revolution against Poland broke out under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—1657), the Hetman of the Cossack Army.

[642] 175 648 In consequence of the revolution of 1648 the Ukrainian Cossack Republic was created headed by an elected Chief of State (Hetman). The official name of this State was 'Zaporovian Army' (Exercitus Zaporoviensis) with Tchyhyryn as Capital. Leaning upon the Cossacks and the free peasantry, the Ukrainian Republic could defend itself against the united forces of Poland and the Crimean Horde for several years. Having lost the hope for a settlement with Poland on the principle of equality, the Ukrainian Government concluded a treaty with the Muscovite Tsar in Pereyaslav, in 1654. The Muscovite Tsar promised the Ukrainians assistance against Poland and the Tartars. The treaty of Pereyaslav secured for Ukraine its own army, administration, and an independent foreign policy.

The transition of Ukraine towards Moscow in the 17th century provided the basis for the rise of the Muscovite state. The Ukrainian revolution of 1648 weakened Poland considerably.

Under the protectorate of the Tsar of Moscow Ukraine did not find security for its liberty, prosperity and progress. The Swedish King Charles X. Gustav understood this well when he wrote to his Ambassador to the Ukrainian Government, in 1657: "Moscow does not tolerate a free nation"*). When it had become evident that the Tsar of Moscow tried to reduce or to abolish the rights of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Government of B. Khmelnitsky planned the annulment of the alliance with Moscow, and concluded treaties with Sweden and Transylvania to secure the independence of Ukraine (1656 and 1657). The Ukrainian Government put forward the demand for the frontiers of the Ukrainian State as '*ius totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniae*' up to the Vistula, the Ukrainian ethnographic frontier of that time. In the treaty with Sweden of 1657, Ukraine was recognised as a free nation dependent on no one *('gens libera, nulli subiecta')*.

Against the Ukrainian aspirations for independence Poland and Moscow acted in common. By the treaty of Andrusov of 1667, Ukraine was divided among these countries on the Dnieper line. Turkey and the Crimean Horde interfered with the struggle in Ukraine. In these wars, lasting nearly 30 years, Ukraine on the western bank of the Dnieper River was disastrously devastated. In

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*) *Archives of South-West Russia*, Part III, Vol. VI: Kiev 1908.

a treaty between Turkey, Moscow, and Poland of 1681, it was 175 determined to depopulate Ukraine between the South Bug and 648 Dnieper Rivers to the Black Sea. The western Ukrainian territories (Volhynia, Galicia etc.) remained under Polish rule. Ukraine to the East of the Dnieper remained under the protectorate of the Muscovite Tsars, preserving restricted autonomous rights, with an elected Hetman as the head of the Government.

Tsar Peter I. planned the abolition of the remains of the autonomous order of Ukraine on the Eastern bank of the Dnieper. In order to defend the freedom of Ukraine, Hetman Ivan Mazeppa concluded an alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII. against Russia in 1708. The battle of Poltava (1709), fatal for Ukraine and Sweden, put an end to the plans of the Ukrainian patriots to restore Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, for decades even in the second half of the 18th century, the members of the Ukrainian Government which went into exile in 1709, continued in various countries their diplomatic action for the defence of the Ukrainian independence. They were headed by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, the successor of Mazeppa, and included the son of Hetman Orlyk, Hryhor Orlyk, General in the French service, Fedir Myrovych and others.

After the battle of Poltava the Russian Government restricted [661] the autonomous rights of Ukraine considerably. Tsar Peter I. 175 deliberately destroyed Ukraine in order to oppress her people the more easily, as we are informed by Weber, the Resident of Brunswick-Hannover in Moscow, a contemporary of Tsar Peter I.*). Ukraine was forced to pay heavy contributions, Ukrainians were sent in masses to the North to build Petersburg, the new capital of the Tsars. Many thousands of Ukrainians died from exhaustion while working for the strengthening of Russian Tsarist despotism. At the same time Moscow took from Ukraine its best cultural workers — scholars, artists, artisans. Western civilisation was introduced to Russia principally by Ukrainian intellectuals. (See K. Kharlampovich, *Little Russian Influence on the Great Russian Ecclesiastical Life:* Kazan, 1912; and Pekarsky, *Science and Literature in the Time of Peter* — I — II).

The Tsarina Catherine II. abolished the autonomous Ukrainian Government in 1764. Ukraine was brought to the level of the other provinces of the Tsarist Empire.

The Russian Government decided also to destroy the Zaporovian Army, the nest of democratic liberty in Ukraine. In 1775, Russian

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*) Weber, Das veränderte Rußland: Hannover 1729.

175 troops conquered the fortress of the Ukrainian Cossacks — the Zaporovian Sich. The remainder of the Zaporovian Cossacks migrated to the Turkish province at the mouth of the Danube, and founded there a new centre under the protectorate of the Sultan. The lands of the Zaporovian Army, that had been defended against the Tartar hordes in a fierce struggle lasting for hundreds of years, the Russian Government granted to its magnates, first of all to favourites of Catherine II.

175 648 The Western Ukrainian territories, which, by the Polish-Muscovite treaty of 1667, had remained in the Polish State after the dismemberment of Poland at the end of the 18th century, were incorporated partly by Russia and partly by Austria (Galicia 1772). Bukovina too, which had formerly belonged to Turkey, became a province of Austria in 1774. Carpatho-Ukraine had belonged to Hungary since the Middle Ages (cities Užhorod-Ungvar, Mukačevo-Munkacs).

181 175 [566] The struggle of the Ukrainians for independence under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—57) had abolished serfdom in the greater part of Ukraine. It was the ideal of the masses of the Ukrainian people to live free, independent like the free Ukrainian Cossacks. After the abolition of the autonomous rights of Ukraine at the end of the 18th century serfdom for the Ukrainian peasants was introduced in Ukraine in the Muscovite way. But against this oppression the masses of the Ukrainian people rose often in revolt.

Historical evolution has developed in the Ukrainian people an aspiration for freedom and defence of human dignity. Voltaire wrote in his *History of Charles XII.*: "L'Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre" (Ukraine has always aspired to be free). "This is a nation that wants freedom," wrote the prominent Ukrainian writer of the 17th century, the Archbishop of Chernigov, Lazar Baranovych, to the Muscovite Tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich.

The conviction prevailed among the Ukrainians that Ukraine was not dependent on Russia but was only associated in the person of the Monarch. In the political dialogue *Dispute of Little Russia with Great Russia* at the end of the 18th century we read the following words of 'Little Russia' addressing 'Great Russia': "Do not think thou art my lord, but thine and mine sovereign is our common master."

175 648 The Ukrainian patriots could not forget the loss of liberty and independence, and looked for understanding of the Ukrainian case to foreign countries. In 1793 the well known Ukrainian patriot Vasyl Kapnist tried to persuade the Prussian Minister Hertzberg

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people 175
to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French 648
Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate . . .*)

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th 175
centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the 181
Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly deve- 517
loped feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party '*Narodnaya Volya*'.

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language. [538]
In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords

"who did not give the people freedom
and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives 175
of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the 186
revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev).

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

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*) *Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.

175 greatest Ukrainian poet), Mykola Kostomarov, historian, Pantelei-
186 mon Kulish, historian and poet, Mykola Hulak, and others, took part in this organisation.

In the declarations of this society the idea of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic was promulgated: "And Ukraine will resurrect from her grave ... And Ukraine will be an independent republic" *(The Books of the Being of the Ukrainian Nation*, the work of the Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius).

The Russian Government punished the members of this society severely and acted rigorously against Ukrainian political and cultural regeneration.

[191] In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Tsar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books, periodicals etc. in the Russian Empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. Ukrainian could not be tought in schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire was forbidden until 1905. Only the revolution of 1917 made the introduction of Ukrainian in schools possible. This prohibition of the living language of a considerable nation, the instrument of its culture, had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people and is a feature absolutely unique in universal history.

[871] The prohibition of the Ukrainian language in the schools and in
175 the press hindered the development of education in Ukraine. The
517 statistics show that the number of schools and the level of education in Ukraine were higher in the 18th century than in the 19th*). On the other hand, the Russian schools separated the educated classes of the Ukrainian nation from their nationality, and put the intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin into the service of Russian culture. Thus, besides the economic exploitation to the advantage of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was deprived of her best intellectual forces which were drowned in the 'Russian Sea'. We can quote here only some names of prominent Ukrainians who, by virtue of circumstances, helped to create the Russian civilisation, and gave their talents for the increase of the Russian Empire: Archbishop Theophan Prokopovych, the deputy of the Patriarch of Moscow Stephan Javorsky, Bishop Dmytro Rostovsky — were prominent Ukrainian scholars of the time of Tsar Peter I. who were forced

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*) Thus there were in 1748 in four regiments (Ukraine had a military Cossack administration) of the Hetmanate (for three regiments the figures are missing) 866 elementary schools, i. e., one school for 1000 inhabitants. From this, little or almost nothing remained in the 19th century.

to leave Ukraine and to serve the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian, 175
Prince Alexander Bezborodko, directed for many years Russian 517
foreign policy in the time of Catherine II. (1762—1796) and of Paul I., who is known, however, to have disliked Russia and to have dreamt of a free Ukraine. The greatest talents of modern Russian literature, Gogol and Dostoyevsky, were of Ukrainian origin; Gogol did not master Russian exactly until the end of his life, it was strange to him. Far-famed scholars — Maxim Kovalevsky, sociologist; the philosophers Lesevich and Yurkevich, Vladimir Vernadsky, geologist, the famous painter Ilya Repin, — were Ukrainians of whom Russian culture is proud.

The Ukrainians in the provinces of Austria, Galicia and Buko- 175
vina had lost their educated classes under the rule of the Poles and 186
Turks. Here, as well as in the Ukrainian territory to the West of [668]
the Carpathian Mountains, Carpatho-Ukraine, which was under Hungarian rule, the Ukrainians were principally peasants; the cities were mostly not-Ukrainian. During the 'Spring of the Peoples' in 1848 the Ukrainian national movement in Austria and Hungary also appeared. In Galicia the Ruthenian Supreme Council — a political representative of the Ukrainians in Austria — was created. At the elections for the Austrian Parliament the Ukrainians secured a considerable number of mandates. The national rebirth began also in the Ukrainian territory on the western side of the Carpathian Mountains. But the reaction which occured in Austria hindered the Ukrainian national development. The Vienna Government put the Ukrainians in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine under Polish and Hungarian rule respectively in order to make the Poles and Hungarians loyal towards Austria. This enabled the Poles and Hungarians to conduct a policy of denationalisation against the Ukrainians. Only at the end of the 19th century, in spite of great hindrances on the part of the Poles, a Ukrainian political
and cultural life developed in Galicia. In connection with this, [517]
Ukrainian science and literature, prohibited in Kiev, Kharkov, and [814]
Odessa, found a home in Galicia (Lviw), and Bukovina (Chernivtsi). Ukrainians from Tsarist Ukraine published here their periodicals and books; here, under the direction of the famous Kievan historian Michael Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian Shevchenko Scientific Society developed. It was by its energy a real Ukrainian Academy of Science.

Gradually the Ukrainians in Austria were overcoming the obstacles created by the ruling class of the Polish nobility, and secured new mandates in the Austrian Parliament and the Galician Diet.

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

●175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end
of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for
the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the
Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under
162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation
423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged
to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%.
The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region
belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for
their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the
Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to
[517] education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia
of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Rus-
186 sian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist
631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created
their Military Council and their Military Government. In October
1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council',
with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region,
and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-
Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

859. Invasion of the Variags.
880. Power concentrated at Kiev.
988. Vladimir, prince of Kiev, accepts Christianity.
1015. Death of Vladimir and division of his dominions.
1169. Title of Grand Duke assumed by the Prince of Suzdal.
1315. Kiev, Volhynia, and Chernigov pass to Lithuania.
1340. Halich passes to Poland.
1386. Marriage of Prince Jagiello of Lithuania with Queen Yadviga of Poland.
1569. Union of Lublin; establishment of Polish domination.
1648. Beginning of Cossack wars.
1654. Treaty of Pereyaslavl.
1667. Treaty of Andrusovo.
1686. Conquest of Zaporogia.
1708. Rebellion of Mazeppa.
1709. Battle of Poltava.
1734, 1764. Powers of Cossacks curtailed by Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.
1763, 1783. Ukrainian peasants made serfs.
1768. Rising of the Koliivshchina.
1772. First Partition of Poland; Halich-Russ ceded to Austria.
1793, 1795. Second and Third Partitions; division of the remainder of the Ukraine between Russia and Austria.
1825. Liberal propaganda commenced.
1831. Polish rising.
1846. Beginning of Nationalist movement.
1861. Abolition of serfdom.
1900. Formation of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party.
1917. Proclamation of Ukrainian Republic.
1918. Government of General Skoropadski.
Establishment of a Directory.

GENERAL SKETCH OF HISTORY

The history of the Ukraine is not, until the seventeenth century, a connected chronicle of events which happened to one people of one culture, language, and religion; it is rather the story of events which have taken place in the land which is now called the Ukraine.

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The Eastern Slavs, with an admixture of Norman blood, who inhabited the Ukraine from the eighth to the thirteenth century, almost lost their contact with the Slavonic world after 1239, the year which saw the beginning of the Tatar invasions. Owing to the nature of the country—mostly level steppe—there was a more permanent assimilation of the invaders with the inhabitants here than in the Slavonic forest country to the north and west. After the invasions the literary language of the country became amalgamated with the Great Russian literary language; and the educated classes became polonized or russified. From the Tatar invasions to the middle of the seventeenth century the land appears in history as the territory or colony of its various neighbours, chiefly Poland. About the middle of the seventeenth century, however, the masses of the people, fully amalgamated with the Asiatic invaders, began, largely through Cossack influence, to feel a difference between themselves and the foreign ruling class. From this time onwards, an Ukrainian nation may be said to have existed.

The whole history of the Ukraine may be divided into the following four periods:

(A) The Kiev-Russ State (not Russia), 850–1340, organized by the Scandinavian conquerors.
(B) Lithuanian and Polish dominations, 1340–1795.
(C) Russian domination, 1795–1917.
(D) Ukraine since the Russian Revolution, 1917–19.

(A) FIRST PERIOD: KIEV-RUSS; THE TATARS (850–1340)

The territory of the Ukraine has been the scene of many short-lived dominations, such as the Scythian, the Sarmatian, the Gothic, and, in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., the Hunnic. The Slavs appeared shortly after the Huns. Just before the appearance of the Scandinavian Variags on the Dnieper, between the seventh and tenth centuries, a powerful

Turkish Khanate of Khazars on the Don and lower Volga subjugated from time to time some of the Eastern Slavs, while other branches of them on the San and Dniester were subdued by the Avars and the Lakhs (Poles). In 859 the Variags appeared under the leadership of Rurik. They had already organized the Slavonic state of Novgorod in the north (852); and they brought with them the name of Russ (Ruotsi), which had been given to them by the Finns. The organization of the various states which originated in towns set up by these Scandinavians was mainly directed towards opening up and protecting trade communications between Constantinople and Scandinavia through the then already well-known commercial town of Kiev.

But already, in 880, Oleg, the successor of Rurik, and Igor, Rurik's son, had concentrated their power in Kiev itself, whose prince assumed the title of Grand Duke. From this centre they not only enlarged their territory by the addition of Slavonic lands, but even threatened Constantinople. Thence onwards the history of the Scandinavian invaders is blended with that of the Eastern Slavs, whose national consciousness was not very strong at that time. The Scandinavians adopted an East Slavonic language but a Byzantine culture, and formed a privileged class of warriors (*druzhina*) and princes. The princes of Kiev extended their power over the Eastern Slavs of the Dnieper and Bug, and occasionally over the Eastern Slavs of Halich (Red Russ or Ruthenia), who otherwise paid tribute to the Poles or were ruled by their own princes. Until the time of St. Vladimir, the first prince of Kiev to accept Christianity (988), there were certain small independent East Slavonic princes in the neighbourhood of Kiev. Vladimir kept the control of the government in his own hands, in so far as external affairs, i.e. trade and war, were concerned; but otherwise the princes ruled in their own towns. Thus the Kiev principality was rather a confederation of states than one united state.

After the death of St. Vladimir in 1015, his dominions were divided among his children; and thenceforward the central government tended to become weaker and the power of the separate duchies to increase at its expense. Yaroslav, under whom the 'Russ Land Codex' (*Russkaya Pravda*) was compiled, united for a short time all the Russ lands; but, after his death in 1054, dynastic strife undermined the political and commercial importance of the Kiev state.

Several independent duchies overshadowed Kiev after the reign of Yaroslav; and still more was this the case after the death of Prince Vladimir Monomakh in 1125. The Scandinavian upper class had by this time become slavonized; and the cultural influence of Byzantium was stronger than that of Scandinavia among the Eastern Slavs. Three political centres replaced Kiev. In the north Novgorod recovered its old importance and developed its colonizing activity in the direction of northern Europe and Asia. In the south the Prince of Halich assumed the headship of Halich, Volhynia, and, to some extent, Chernigov; until in 1315, Kiev, Volhynia, and Chernigov passed to Lithuania, and Halich, in 1340, to Poland. The third political centre was formed by the princes who emigrated from Kiev-Russ and formed principalities along the Upper Volga and Oka, in Finnish lands. The leadership of these lay first with the Prince of Suzdal, who, in 1169, tried to subdue Kiev, and assumed the title of Grand Duke; then it passed to Vladimir-Suzdal, and finally to Moscow.

(B) SECOND PERIOD: LITHUANIAN AND POLISH DOMINATION (1340–1795)

(*a*) *Division between Poland and Lithuania* (1340–1569).—During this period Poland possessed Halich-Russ, where the Poles built a line of fortresses, proclaimed religious toleration for the Greek and Latin churches in 1447, brought Lvov to pre-eminence, and introduced the Magdeburg law into the towns. The Lithuanian dukes, who since 1315 had acquired the duchies of Chernigov, Volhynia, and Kiev, were the

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rivals of the Poles in Podolia. The success of the Lithuanian conquest was due partly to the fact that the conquerors often adopted the language of the Ukraine (White Russian dialect), and in many cases joined the Greek Orthodox Church. In this way the Poles and Lithuanians succeeded to the Tatars. While the north-western Ukraine remained in actual fact the property of the local princes, under a Lithuanian or Polish central government, the southern steppes were nominally claimed by the Polish Crown ; actually, however, the half-nomadic population of Volhynia and Podolia had migrated to the steppes and colonized them along the Lower Dnieper (Nizh). The Black Sea littoral was still dependent on Turkey. The keenness of the rivalry between the Lithuanians and the Poles in the Ukraine was blunted by a common fear of the Germans and of the growing power of Moscow. In 1386 the Lithuanian Prince Jagiello married the Polish Queen Yadviga, so that the union between Poland and Lithuania originated in a purely dynastic arrangement. The Union of Lublin (1569) consolidated this dynastic connexion, united Lithuania and Poland into a bipartite state, and attached Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev, and Podlasia to the Polish state. In these newly acquired Ukrainian lands the Poles recognized, in spite of Cossack opposition, both the Latin and the Greek Churches.

(*b*) *Polish Domination* (1569–1772).—To protect the frontiers of the enlarged state, the Polish kings arranged the ‘ registration ’ of the Cossack communities living in the Nizh (Lower Dnieper), called also Zaporogia, i. e. the ‘ country beyond the rapids ’, and in the Northern Ukraine. The Cossacks who were placed on the register were paid by the King, and recognized the authority of the Crown ‘ hetman ’ (chief), but otherwise lived in almost complete independence in villages and military camps, and were unwilling to adopt any permanent state ties. A series of rebellions under local Cossack leaders against the Polish administration from 1592 onwards secured reforms from the Polish Crown, while the Polish attempts to colonize the Lower Dnieper

● 175 and to control Zaporogia were more and more vigorously opposed by the Cossacks. The Muscovites meanwhile colonized the eastern steppes, now called also Ukraine (between the Dnieper and the Don), and gave support to all Cossack refugees from the Polish Ukraine.

The Cossack Wars (1648–1712), known also as ' The Ruin ', differed from the previous rebellions in that they were better led, and that the Cossacks under Chmielnicki had the support of the Ukrainian peasants, who rose against their Polish overlords, and of some of the Ukrainian *szlachta* (landlords), who, although favoured politically by the Polish Government, joined the others on the ground of religious fellowship. The year 1648 marks the beginning of a national consciousness among all the Ukrainian people. Chmielnicki was, however, in 1653 compelled to apply to Moscow for protection. The Treaty of Pereyaslavl between Chmielnicki and the Tsar Alexis in 1654, while recognizing a certain amount of self-government for the Ukrainian and Zaporogian armies, brought the people of the Ukraine, as well as the military communities of Zaporogia, under a control from Moscow stricter than that formerly exercised by the Poles. The Ukrainian Cossacks retained their own system of government, and were allowed to receive foreign envoys from anywhere except Poland and Turkey, but they swore allegiance to the Tsar ; while, from the beginning, the Tsar's envoy to Pereyaslavl, Buturlin, refused to confirm by oath the Tsar's allegiance to the treaty. Hence sooner or later most of the Hetmans, including Chmielnicki himself, rebelled against Moscow, in which revolts they were invariably supported by Turkey and Poland.

The failure of Moscow to subjugate the Ukrainians permanently, Turkish interference, and various dynastic reasons, led Poland and Moscow to make the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667). According to this treaty, Moscow obtained the country on the left side of the Dnieper (Trans-Dnieper and Kiev) and Poland the country on the right side of the Dnieper (Cis-Dnieper). Zaporogia or Nizh was left in theory under the protection of both, but in practice it served as a land of refuge for those whose plans for autonomy had been defeated. These defeated rebels organized the famous *Sich*, a kind of military and ascetic order, from which women were absolutely excluded, and which involved complete social equality, adherence to the Orthodox Church, and allegiance to the Zaporogian community. The Ataman (Hetman), or head of the organization, was elected for a year, and had the power of a dictator in time of war. In peace the supreme authority rested with the Rada, or Council. Zaporogia formed an obstacle in the way of Russia's obtaining the Black Sea littoral, and was therefore conquered by Moscow in 1686. Soon afterwards the Cossacks rose for the last time, under Mazeppa (1708–9), and received help from Sweden, then at war with Russia. But the Russian victory at Poltava in 1709 decided the fate of the Cossacks. Their privileges were suppressed; and, though in 1710, by the Pact of Bendery, Sweden promised independence to the Ukraine and Zaporogia, the country was again divided between Poland and Russia, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Andrusovo. The *Sich* was suppressed, and was finally abolished in 1775. 175

When the victorious Peter the Great moved to the left (i. e. Russian) bank of the Dnieper, he brought with him the majority of the population of the right bank. The Cis-Dnieper or Polish Ukraine thus became depopulated; and the Polish administration, by granting special privileges to the colonists from Poland, Halich-Russ, and Trans-Dnieper, fostered the growth of *slobodas* (land-holdings with special privileges). The power of the *szlachta* was now limited by national Ukrainian risings against the Catholic Polish landlords and the Jews, as well as by pillaging expeditions from the Lower Dnieper. The most eventful rising was that of the Koliivshchina in 1768. It was cleverly manipulated by Catherine the Great; but after some 200,000 Poles, Jews, and Uniat Ukrainians had been massacred, the Empress intervened in favour of the Polish landlords, who cared more for the interest of their houses than for the Polish State.

After the Treaty of Andrusovo the Trans-Dnieper country was known as Hetmanshchina, i. e. the country dependent on the Hetman. The Ukrainians in the Hetmanshchina were grouped into ten regiments, in which the colonels had full administrative power, In 1734 Peter the Great withdrew the self-governing privileges of the regiments, abolished the dignity of the Hetman, and organized a kind of Ministry for Cossack affairs, called the Malorossiyan (Little Russian) Collegium, in which all colonels had to be Great Russians. Peter II and Elizabeth restored the dignity of the Hetman, but it was finally suspended by Catherine the Great in 1764. The country was colonized with Kalmucks, Serbs (in 1732 and 1753), and Germans, to whom important privileges were granted in 1763 and 1764. In 1775 Catherine distributed large quantities of Zaporogian territory among Russian nobles and officials.

(c) *The Ukraine during the Partitions of Poland* (1772–95).—In the First Partition (1772), Austria received Halich-Russ, i.e. the *voyevodstvas* of Russ and Belza, called by the Austrians Galicia, and occupied northern Moldavia. Russia took the eastern part of White Russia. In 1786 Austria acquired the Bukovina. The Cis-Dnieper Ukraine, or the *voyevodstvas* of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov, protested against this partition. Between the First Partition and the Second (1793) a great economic, intellectual and political revival in Poland led to reforms in the Polish Ukraine. The Jesuit schools, which had been dissolved in 1773, were replaced by State schools under the Polish Minister of Education ; Krzemenietz and Winnica were the two intellectual centres around which the schools and industries were grouped. But all these reforms in the Polish Ukraine were made with a view to the retention of the country as a Polish province. At the same time, in the Trans-Dnieper country, the Russians, in spite of local protests, had carried out a ruthless russification.

After the final victory over the Turks in eastern Europe and the annexation of the Crimea in 1783, Russia surrounded the Ukrainians on all sides. By the decrees of 1763 and 1783 the Ukrainian peasants were made serfs; and in 1785 the Ukrainian nobles were raised to the privileges of the Great Russian nobles. In the same year, Cossack regiments were organized on the model of the Imperial regiments; and, from 1780 onwards, the administrative division into Imperial 'Governments' was introduced. General education suffered a marked relapse. Thus in 1768, shortly after the suppression of the last Hetman, in the districts forming the present Chernigov Government, there were 134 schools, or one school for 746 people, while in the same districts in 1875 there were only 52 schools, or one school for 6,730 people.[1]

At the Second Partition in 1793, Russia obtained most of the Cis-Dnieper Ukraine, i. e. the *voyevodstvas* of Kiev, Braclav, Podolia, and the eastern part of Volhynia, as well as the rest of White Russia and half of Lithuania. In the Polish insurrection which followed that partition, the *szlachta* and many peasants of the Cis-Dnieper Ukraine supported the Polish leader, Kosciuszko. In the Third Partition, Russia took the remaining part of Volhynia and the eastern part of Chołm, as well as the rest of Lithuania, while the greater part of Chołm was taken by Austria. By the Treaty of Paris (1815), all the Chołm land and Podlasia passed to Russia; and Eastern Galicia and the Bukovina were the only lands inhabited by Ukrainians retained by Austria.

(C) THIRD PERIOD: RUSSIAN DOMINATION, 1795–1917

(*a*) *Protests against Russification* (1795–1846).—After the Third Partition of Poland in 1795, the Russian Government of set policy favoured the aristocracy,

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[1] M. Hrushevski, *Sketch of the History of the Ukrainian Nation*, 3rd ed., Petersburg, 1911, p. 417.

175 whether Polish or Ukrainian, who were loyal to the Tsar, and to some extent also the Ukrainian peasants, at the expense of the Polish-Ukrainian middle class of landowners (*szlachta*), or the middle-class urban *intelligentsia* of Ukrainian nationality, who generally used the Russian language. Hence it was in these two latter classes that the spirit of protest still existed in
538 spite of its apparent hopelessness. The expression of this spirit of protest is to be found in the literature it produced, though this has obvious traces of Polish and Great Russian influence. Ukrainians such as Kapnist, Gogol, Velichko, Hanenko, Artemenski, and Hrebinka, were educated at the universities of Moscow and Kharkov, and wrote in the Russian language. To the same literary school belong Ivan Kotlarevski (1769–1839), the 'father' of Ukrainian literature, the first to write in Ukrainian as well as in Russian, and the Pole, Chodakowski, who was the first to study and collect the folk-lore of the Ukraine.

In the west of the Russian Ukraine a school of Ukrainian Polish poets arose, who wrote in Polish, but took as their subject the Ukraine and her liberation from Russia. Eminent among these were A. Malczewski, S. Goszynski,
175 B. Zaleski, and M. Czaikowski. Between 1803 and 1825, Adam Czartoryski and Tadeusz Czacki, two Polish Liberal nobles, acting for the Polish Education Committee under the then Liberal government of Alexander I, started numerous schools radiating from two chief centres—Krzemenietz, where a Catholic lyceum, and Human, where a Uniat college was founded. In 1818 a Masonic Lodge was instituted in Poltava, with the object of bringing about an understanding between the Liberals of Poland, the Ukraine, and Russia; and in 1825 an important meeting was held at Jitomir (*Slovyanskoye Sobranie*) of Dekabrist Russians, Poles, and Ukrainian *intelligentsia*—the latter still using the Polish and Russian languages. From 1825 dates the propaganda of the *lirniki* or Liberals, who wandered with their harps among the people like mediaeval bards, instilling into the Ukrainian peasants the ideas

of the abolition of serfdom and of freedom from Russia. 175 Most of these Liberals, as for example Rzewuski and Padurva, were Poles, or the products of Polish culture.

The Polish Rising of 1831.—This rising received much active support from the *intelligentsia* in the part of the Ukraine concerned; and the greatest of Ukrainian [538] poets, Shevchenko (born 1814), was influenced by Polish middle-class Liberalism and Polish literature. The University of Kharkov, founded in 1805, had until 1831 many Polish professors lecturing in their own language. But this Polish cultural and political influence was checked when the Polish colleges in Vilna and Krzemenietz were suppressed in 1832, and a Russian university was founded at Kiev in 1834. This latter was at first distinctly governmental and official in character, but by the middle of the nineteenth century it had produced a new school of writers of far more active revolutionary tendencies than were ever manifested by the Kharkov circle. Apart from the Polish and Dekabrist risings and the literary attempts of polonized and russified Ukrainians, the first part of the nineteenth century is marked by a passive submission of the masses to the military and autocratic regime of Russia.

(*b*) *Russian, Polish, and Austrian Rivalry; Growth of Nationalism in the Ukraine* (1846–1914).—The modern nationalist movement in the Ukraine began with the foundation of a purely Ukrainian society called the 'Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood' in Kiev about 1846. This society had not merely the literary object of promoting the Ukrainian language, until then only in oral use among the peasants, but also a far-reaching political programme. Friendly feelings towards Polish and Russian Liberals still existed, and a federation of autonomous Slavonic states was aimed at. In this federation the Ukraine was to form two states, West Little Russia and East Little Russia. The creators of the society were the most prominent Ukrainian literary men, the poet Shevchenko, the historian Kostomarov, and the journalist Kulish.

In 1847 they and many others were arrested by the Russian Government; and the society, which never was legal, was suppressed. At the same time in the Austrian Ukraine the Government, following for the time being an anti-Polish policy, was popular with nationalist Ukrainians. Supported by the Government, the Galician Ukrainian peasants rose and massacred the Polish landlords. In 1846–7 serfdom was abolished in Galicia and Bukovina; a measure which was naturally received with favour by the Ukrainians, of whom a great majority were peasants. Count Stadion, the Austrian Governor of Galicia, organized in Lvov (Lemberg) the *Holovna Rada Ruska*, a nationalistic Ukrainian body, anti-Polish and anti-Russian, but supporting the Austrian Government. The same year brought, as a reaction against Austrian manœuvres, a short-lived Ukraino- (Ruthen) Polish agreement, made at the Slavonic (Pan-Slav) Congress in Prague. This again displeased the Russian Government, which hurriedly organized a society, the *Galitsko-Russkaya Matitsa*, in Lvov, with the object of beginning an anti-Austrian and anti-Polish, but Russophil, propaganda among the Galician Ukrainians. This society was especially active in 1866, when the Poles obtained autonomy in Galicia, with control over the Ukrainians. Russophil propaganda in Galicia had begun with the visit of Pogodin, the Russian Pan-Slavist, in 1835; but the Russophils organized themselves only after the 'mission' of T. Lebedyntsev, who, as the agent of the Russian Government, came to enrol Ukrainians for anti-Polish propaganda in Cholm in the Russian Ukraine.

While encouraging the Ukrainians in Austria in their nationalist feelings, Russia tried to suppress the Ukrainian movement in her own territory. The result of this was seen during the Crimean War, when an Ukrainian Pole, M. Czaikowski (Sadyk Pasha), tried, with the help of Turkey, to revive the *Sich* and organized his 'Cossacks' to fight against Russia. Nevertheless the call to the colours during the recent war roused in the Russian Ukraine a spirit demanding the abolition of serfdom and the restoration of old Cossack freedom. The chief centre of Ukrainian propaganda during the period 1860–90 was in East Galicia, though the 'Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood' received more support among the *intelligentsia* of the Russian Ukraine, and proceeded on more nationalist lines. In the East Ukraine appeared the journal *Osnova* (1862–3). Sunday schools held in the Ukrainian language were established (1861) in Russia, and societies were founded which called themselves literary, but were really political and nationalist in their aims. The most prominent of these were the 'Prosvita' on both sides of the Ukraine (1868), the 'Gromada' in Kiev (1870), and finally the 'Shevchenko' (1873) in Lvov and Kiev, which, under the leadership of the Ukrainophil *intelligentsia*, started the movement for establishing a uniform Ukrainian language throughout the Ukraine and bringing about democratic reforms. The founders of the 'Shevchenko' Society, not unlike Hrushevski some twenty years later, tried to spread a uniform propaganda on both sides of the frontier, but the Russian Government frustrated their endeavour to influence the Ukrainian peasant by severe police restrictions on the *intelligentsia*, and by decrees suppressing Ukrainian books and language (1863 and 1876). 175

On the other hand the abolition of serfdom in 1861 made the Russian Government popular with the peasant. The Abolition Law gave to the peasants allotments of between three and eight acres, though a minimum of sixteen acres was necessary to support a family. From the beginning, therefore, the Ukrainian peasant felt a grievance against the large landowners rather than against the central government; and, as agricultural industries became centralized in the hands of capitalists, the economic problem grew yearly more acute. The unions of landowners, the *zemstvos*, had no Ukrainians among them, while the Ukrainian peasants, among whom the village community (*mir*) of the Great Russians was very little developed, were also behind other provinces of the Empire in co-operative and self-organizing capacity. There was, then, little hope that economic betterment would be brought about by the evolution of peasant communities, as in Great Russia and Siberia. This situation was used by the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Austrian Government, which supported them. The expectation of economic advantages underlay the nationalistic movement; and the villages afforded much better ground for it than the towns, which were mostly Russian. In order to counteract the influence of the Ukrainian 'Prosvita', the Russian Government supported the 'Society of the Kachkovski' in Lvov (1875), which had a Russophil tendency.

In 1898, under the leadership of the Ukrainophils Hrushevski and Franko, the language reform campaign began. The Ukrainophils accepted the Podgorski dialect spoken in the Carpathian valleys as far east as the Dniester as the standard language, and proposed a phonetic orthography; while the Russophil Ukrainians took the northern branch of the Russian Ukrainian dialect, called Little Russian, as the standard language, and proposed an 'historical' orthography based on etymological spelling. The Ukrainophils were supported by the Austrian Government, which in 1874 introduced the Ukrainian language into the elementary schools of East Galicia, and subsequently recognized in 1895 the phonetic orthography of the Ukrainophils as the standard orthography of the Ukrainian language in Galicia and the Bukovina.

After 1890, however, the Austrian Government altered the Ukrainian policy inaugurated by it in 1848. Acting partly in his capacity as an anti-Russian Austrian Premier, and partly as a Pole, Count Badeni, helped by Professor Antonovicz of Kiev, brought about in 1889–90 an understanding between the Nationalist Ukrainian *intelligentsia* and *szlachta* and the Conservative Poles on the ground of a common anti-Russian feeling. As a result of this understanding, Professor Hrushevski, a pupil of Antonovicz, went in 1894 from Kiev to Lvov to fill the chair of Ukrainian history. Another representative of the Ukrainian *szlachta*, Paulin Swiecicki, tried to rouse Polish sympathy with Ukrainian irredentism. 175

But these measures were the last conciliatory steps. In the last ten years of the nineteenth century the anti-Polish parties, the Radicals, led by Dragomanov (1895) in the Austrian Ukraine, grew in strength; and relations between the Poles and Ukrainians in the Russian, and still more in the Austrian, Ukraine became worse and worse. This was undoubtedly connected with the fact that after 1866 the Austrian Government subjected the Ukrainians to the Poles, while in the Russian Ukraine the Government favoured the large Polish landowners, who occupied high positions at Court. The Galician elections of 1897, when Badeni's Polish policy was victorious, finally made a gulf between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia which affected relations between them in the Russian Ukraine as well. For the first time the Russophils and Ukrainophils united in opposition to the Poles.

In 1900 there was a further important change in Austrian policy in the Ukraine. The visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph to Berlin in that year was understood to have had the object of reconciling German and Austrian opinion in regard to the Ukraine. Shortly afterwards the Ukrainian Radical, M. Sembratovych, published an anti-Polish book, *Polonia Irredenta*, which was cordially welcomed by the German press.

Growth of Political Parties.—About the same time various Ukrainian political parties began to organize themselves. Of these the most important was that of the 'National Democrats', founded in 1899 by Professor Hrushevski in Galicia to fight for rights equal to those of the Poles in Galicia and for the autonomy of the Russian Ukraine as a federate Russian state. This party resembled the Polish National Democrats; and their half-gymnastic, half-military organizations, called *sokoly*, were similar to the Polish and Bohemian *sokoly*. In 1900 the first Revolutionary Ukrainian Party was organized in Lvov; in 1905 it assumed the name of the

'Ukrainian Social Democratic Working-men's Party', and their gymnastic-military societies were called *sich*. Both these parties were in constant communication with the Russian Ukraine.

The Russian Revolution of 1905.—As a consequence of this revolution, the restriction upon the Ukrainian language in Russia, partly cancelled (with regard to theatres and public lectures) in 1881, was entirely withdrawn; and in 1910 the Russian Academy of Science published a report by seven academicians in which they supported the just demand of the Ukrainians to have their school text-books in their own language. This was taken by the Ukrainians to be a recognition of Ukrainian as a separate language. In 1906 the Ukrainian members of the first Duma joined the Autonomist-Federalist Group, but scarcely any separatist movement was noticeable. The second Duma had an Ukrainian club, which worked for the autonomy of the Ukraine; their organ was the *Ridna Sprava*. But in the third Duma, owing to manipulations of the franchise, the Ukraine was represented by very backward members, uneducated priests and peasants.

The Russian Ukraine turns to Austria and Germany.—Between 1907 and 1914 new anti-Ukrainian measures were passed by the Russian Government, much to the discontent of the Russian *intelligentsia*. After 1909 the Ukrainian Social Democratic party in the Russian Ukraine, which was connected with the Social Democrats in Galicia, grew stronger, and formulated a programme of autonomous government. The Ukrainian university students agitated in favour of Ukrainian chairs in Russian universities in Ukrainian territory; and Bishop Parthenius made an attempt to introduce the Ukrainian language as the medium of instruction in church schools. The attitude of the Poles towards this movement in the Russian Ukraine varied according to their connexion with one or the other of the two great political groups. The Conservative Polish landowners in the Ukraine, as for example Count Joseph Potocki, supported the Russian Govern-

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ment by building on their estates schools for Ukrainian peasants in which the Russian tongue was employed; and the leader of the Polish National Democratic Party in the Duma used his influence with Conservative Polish opinion in Galicia to support the Russophil propaganda carried on there by the Russian Government. As a result of these efforts, in the Galician elections of 1907 ten Russophils were elected to the Reichsrat as opposed to eleven Ukrainophils. This was followed by the murder of the Polish Viceroy, Count A. Potocki, by a Ukrainophil Radical in 1908.

Meanwhile in Galicia the Russophil propaganda of the Russian Government was rousing much opposition; and the Russophil party itself split up into two sections. The Pro-Russian Party, supported by the Pan-Slavist Count Bobrinski, and led by the Ukrainian Dudykievich, edited the *Prikarpatskaya Rus*; while the Moderate Russophil or Old Ruthenian Party, under the leadership of the Ukrainians Davydiak and Korol, published the *Halychanin*. The growing power of the Radicals also opposed the Russophils; and in the Galician elections of 1913 only one Russophil was elected. At the same time, German as well as Austrian influence began to assert itself among the Ukrainians of Galicia. This has been proved through the disclosure by a Polish journalist, Krysiak, of 97 documents exchanged from March 1903 onwards between the Prussian Anti-Polish Society (*Ostmarkenverein*) and the Ukrainian National Committee (*Ruthenisches National-Komitee*). The Prussian institution encouraged and materially supported the Ukrainian National Committee. Since both these institutions were nominally non-official, and the anti-Polish propaganda could not be treated as treason, because the State after all was Austrian, the Poles were unable to take direct measures against these intrigues; but in the trials of Russophil Ukrainians in Galicia for high treason the Polish Conservative jury acquitted the Russophils.

(c) *From the Outbreak of War to the Russian Revolution* (1914–17).—In the autumn of 1914 the Russian

● 175 army occupied Eastern Galicia. Russian public opinion, hitherto ignorant of the existence of 'Ruthenians' in Eastern Galicia, was then instructed, and now became very Pan-Slav. The attitude of the first Russian Governor, Count Sheremetyev, was the outcome of circumstances that preceded the war. The small Russophil party of Ukrainians in Galicia and the Poles were left fairly undisturbed, while the Ukrainian Nationalists were persecuted. But with the appointment of Count George Bobrinski, cousin of the Pan-Slavist Vladimir Bobrinski, as Governor, and the Pan-Orthodox bishop, Eulogius, as Bishop of Galicia, all the Ukrainians in Galicia as well as the Poles began to suffer religious and political persecution. Polish schools were closed and the 'Prosvita' was suspended. From August 1914 the Ukrainian leaders, W. Wassilko, E. and K. Lewicki, and L. Baczynski, carried on negotiations with the Austrian and German authorities, aiming at the partition of Galicia and the union of Eastern Galicia with Volhynia and other parts of the Russian West Ukraine. The russifying policy of the Russian Administration furthered this agitation.

In the spring of 1915 the Russian retirement began, and by the autumn Galicia was cleared of Russians. Under the pressure of the Ukrainophils, Count Sturgkh assured K. Lewicki at a secret interview on September 7, 1915, that Eastern Galicia and such part of the Russian Ukraine as was or might be under Austrian occupation would be united in an autonomous Ukrainian state attached to Austria, with, at the outset, Austrian officials and language.[1] The Russian policy in Galicia was severely criticized by the Liberals and even by the Central party in the Duma on August 28, 1914, and September 10, 1915. N. Bobchev and T. Romanchuk, in the Russophil Ukrainian press, accused the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine (Ukrainophils) of being the result of German intrigue.[1] This 175 again gave rise to a pamphlet, by L. Tschelski, issued in Sofia (1915) by the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, entitled *Is the Ukrainian Movement a German Intrigue?* The Russian Government took severe measures against the members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, who, including the chief leader, Hrushevski, were banished to Siberia, or were forbidden to enter Russia from abroad.

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[1] 'Documents Ruthéno-Ukrainiens', in *Extraits du Journal de M. Olesnyckyj* (pp. 7, 8), published by the Bureau polonais des publications politiques (Paris, May 1919).

(D) FOURTH PERIOD: SINCE THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1917

(*a*) *The Ukraine becomes independent.*—One of the 668 first questions which faced the Provisional Government 642 at the beginning of the Russian Revolution was the demand for an amnesty for the Ukrainian Nationalist offenders, who were allowed to return from Siberia and abroad. Next came the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and the appointment of a special Minister for Ukrainian Affairs, presented by a deputation sent from Kiev to Petrograd on April 6, 1917. Soon afterwards [646] the first Ukrainian National Congress was convened at Kiev (April 19–22), at which some 800 members representative of the *intelligentsia* and the Social Revolutionaries were present. They elected a Central Rada, and declared for an autonomous Ukrainian republic under a Russian federal republic. Professor Hrushevski was elected President. The territory [131] claimed for the Ukrainian state corresponded roughly to the western parts of the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, and the whole of the Governments of Kiev, Poltava, Kherson, Volhynia, Kharkov, Podolia, Yekaterinoslav, and Chernigov, and excluded the Austrian Ukraine. The Congresses of the Ukrainian Soldiers (May 5–7) and of the Ukrainian Peasants (May–June) supported the Rada at this time. But the Petrograd

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[1] In answer to a pamphlet by Tschelski, *No Liberator, but an Oppressor of Nations: How Russia freed the Ukraine.* L.L.U., Sofia, 1914.

648 hands, will be regulated in the separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic, which form an essential part of the present peace treaty, and, so far as is practicable, will enter into force simultaneously therewith.

ARTICLE IX.—The agreements made in this treaty constitute an indivisible whole.

ARTICLE X.—For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Ukrainian text is authoritative for the relations between Germany and the Ukraine; the German, Hungarian, and Ukrainian text for the relations between Turkey and the Ukraine.

Final prescription. The present peace treaty will be ratified. The ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as nothing therein prescribes otherwise, the peace treaty comes into force on its ratification. (Here follow the signatures.)

A supplementary treaty of twenty-eight articles was signed between Germany and the Ukraine on the same day. It deals with the resumption of consular relations, the revival of 'treaties, arrangements and agreements which were in force between Germany and Russia before the war', exchange of prisoners, compensation for damage, &c. (*The New Europe*, February 28, 1918.)

III

THE GERMAN COLONISTS IN S. RUSSIA (from F. Stach, *Survey of the History of the Colonists in S. Russia and their Present Life.* Moscow, 1916.)

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REALIZING that in the southern territories acquired by Russia in the eighteenth century only colonists with a certain amount of culture could introduce a settled life and develop the resources of the country, Catherine the Great published a manifesto on December 4, 1762, inviting foreign colonists. As a result, 102 colonies were established on the Lower Volga in the Saratov and Samara Governments, 6 in Chernigov, 1 in Voronezh, 2 in Lifland, and 6 in the Petrograd Government. A further manifesto followed on July 22, 1763, enlarging the privileges of the colonists, which were very considerable.

This manifesto was the basis of the colonies of Russia. On March 19, 1764, a supplementary act was issued granting 30 desyatines of land to each family and prescribing the method of settling and rights of inheritance. The land was to pass to youngest son; this measure would force the father to teach

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

elder sons various industries. Another manifesto of July 19, 1785, promised freedom from all taxation for 6 years. 175 563

The first party of settlers from Danzig, many of whom were Mennonite sectaries, arrived at Kremenchug in 1787. On September 6, 1800, Paul I proclaimed special privileges to the Mennonites of Novorossiya (Governments of Kherson, Taurida, Yekaterinoslav, and the Don Cossacks' Territory); 65 desyatines were granted to each family, and it was promised that they would never be called up for military and other duties against their wish. Further regulations concerning the colonists appeared in 1804.

In the reign of Alexander I, in 1818, a new Care Committee for South-Russian Colonies (Governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Bessarabia) was established in Yekaterinoslav 1818–22; it migrated to Kishinev a little later. On July 1, 1833, the Committee was limited in power and transferred to Odessa. It existed till July 4, 1871, when it was cancelled and all Russian colonists were placed under the general law. In 1874 they, together with the others, were made amenable to conscription.

Relations between the colonists and the Russians.—Before the Crimean War, and even down to 1860, the Russian towns had very little to do with the colonists, except in the case of those colonies which were situated in the neighbourhood of Odessa, Yekaterinoslav, Nikolaev, Simferopol, Chernigov, Voronezh, Samara, Saratov, and Petrograd. At first intercourse arose from commercial relations. But the influence of colonists on the Nogai was much greater after about 1809 and 1835 when the Nogai received land for permanent settlements. T. Kornis, a colonist of Orlovo, was responsible for helping some 17,000 Nogai to settle down. When the *dukhobors* of Tambov and Voronezh migrated to the neighbourhood of the Mennonites, they were greatly helped by them.

The Ministry of Public Property published in 1846 a report showing that at that time the colonists occupied 1,424,619 desyatines of land (1,309,945 arable). Their number was 95,342 men and 88,293 women, and they were chiefly engaged in agriculture, then cattle-breeding, butter-making, fruit cultivation, tobacco plantation, vegetable-growing, silk industry, wine plantation, and various applied industries.

In agriculture, so early as 1870, they used harvest machines, and in 1905 steam and electrical agricultural machines. In the sixties the Russian, Serbian, and Bulgarian colonists began to imitate the Germans, so that now their methods in agriculture are very much alike. During the last 50 years many colonists bought large private landed estates, especially in the Dneprovsk

175 563 district; but for the last 25 years there has been a tendency to sell all land to the Russian colonists and migrate to the towns.

The Russian language was introduced in the schools of the colonists in 1860; and in 1871 their schools were taken over by the Ministry of Education.

The German colonies are chiefly found in the Governments of Taurida, Volhynia, and Yekaterinoslav.

101 174 of Khazars established a kingdom here, which extended from the Volga to the Danube. The Khazars were nomads who became domiciled, founded cities and carried on trade. At their court the Jews obtained predominating influence, and it sounds almost unbelievable to say that the khans adopted the faith of Moses. /Facing page [000] 24: Character study of a Ukrainian head/*/Facing page 25: A Ukrainian girl with pronounced nordic features/*/25/

[101] [174] 181 Kiyev, the center of the Polyani, was tributary to the Khazar. The Slavic tribes of the Antae, the ancestors of the Ukrainians, were divided and fought one another. In the establishment of their society they scarcely developed beyond the formation of a district with several peasant communities. Fields and pastures belonged to all jointly. Family life was a patriarchy, and unanimity was demanded at the village and district meetings. These Slavs built compact houses of loam, and placed embankments around their towns. They cultivated their fields, made pottery and bartered their goods for swords, knives and various handicraft products. They offered sacrifice to the sun god Dashdboh, the wind god Stryboh, the thunder god Perun and other deities.

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●175 It was the Swedish Vikings, called Varangians, who in the ninth and tenth centuries unified the Slavic tribes and established a kingdom with Kiyev as the capital, which, during its most flourishing period, extended from the Carpathians to the Volga and from the Caucasus to the White Sea. They rowed in boats to Lake Ilmen, founded Novgorod and from there, about the middle of the ninth century, conquered Kiyev. Rurik was the name of the Viking king of Novgorod; his warriors were called Rus', meaning "rowers",

*[For plates, cf. pp. 217-218, Category 116 - Analyst]

nd the state as a whole: "Kiyev Rus", after urik's successor Oleg moved the capital to Kiyev. The princes still took their wives and members of their retinue from Sweden.

Soon the Kiyev Rus were known in Constantinople. The splendor of the imperial city dazzled the Vikings who came to plunder or to be enlisted as mercenaries. Even in ancient times they had come before the gates of Byzantium with 200 sailboats and 6000 men, and a few years later there were 14,000 of them who plundered its suburbs. /26/ They carried on their marauding expeditions as far as the wealthy settlements of the southern Caspian up to the border of Persia. Contemporary Arabian and Greek writers say of the warlike Rus': "They are bold and courageous. When they attack a strange people, they do not desist until they have completely annihilated it." (11) Georgius of

11. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 46.

Amastra writes that at the beginning of the ninth century "the race of the Rus' which is disastrous in name as well as deed" laid waste the coast of Asia Minor as far as Sinope. (12)

12. Ibid., page 67.

Oleg was a conqueror's figure of the following type. He subjected all Slavic tribes, and when he had sufficiently consolidated his kingdom, he sailed, as the chronicles maintain, at the head of 80,000 men and 2000 boats to Byzantium, in order to extort a tribute from the Greek emperor. Not all of his warlike expeditions succeeded; the fleets of his followers were more than once destroyed by Greek fire. Prince Sviatoslav the Bold was "more a vagabond knight than the head of a state". Persistent wars led him from the Don to the Danube. He defeated the Khazar Kingdom, plundered the "White City" on the Volga, and in 968 set out with 60,000 warriors against the Bulgarians along the Danube. He was already preparing to engage them in a tremendous battle when the news reached him that Kiyev was being harrassed by the bloodthirsty Pecheneg hordes. Sviatoslav liberated his capital and returned to defeat the Bulgars and to plunder their chief city of Prislav. "It almost looked as though a mighty Slavic empire was to arise from Novgorod to the very gates of Byzantium." (13) Byzantium was well aware of this danger; it gathered all its forces and defeated the Viking who had grown used to victory. On his way back to Kiyev he ended his life under the saber blows of the Pecheneg.

The states of these Kiyev princes were loose structures. The military forces were divided into aggregates of tens, hundreds and thousands, and the king stood at their head. His retainers were regarded as associates, not servants. Whenever they pleased, they could leave their king and follow /27/ another. There were plenty of principalities, for they were occasionally divided after the death of the ruler. But Kiyev always remained the chief principality to which all the partial principalities were subject. The rights of the ancient people's assemblies of the Slavs in part passed over to the princes in the course of time. In the government the council of boyars supported them. Slavs and Vikings swore allegiance to one and the same prince - the former by the god Perun, the others by Thor. The administration of the prince's court was at the same time that of the principality; it was not unusual that the ruler and his followers personally levied the tribute.

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13. Reeb: Russian History.

Joint military campaigns and marauding expeditions and the power of the grand-princes was what constituted the cement which held together the many principalities of the Kiyev Kingdom.

Vladimir, whom history has surnamed "the Great", a contemporary of Otto the Great, was not only a fearless general, but also a wise, farseeing statesman. The weakness of this kingdom which he conquered only by means of fratricidal war, was clear to him. Thus it seemed that the adoption of Christianity might prove a strong unifying tie between the ofttimes divergent, warring factions. Statesmanly insight persuaded Vladimir to adopt the Greek Orthodox, Byzantine form of Christianity. The papal legates of Rome tried in vain to win Vladimir over to the Roman Catholic faith. Byzantium was nearer, easier to reach, and there existed old, albeit often hostile, relations with it. For a baptismal present, as it were, the grand-prince obtained the hand of the Byzantine princess, a near relative of and from the same house as, Princess Theophano who was wedded to Emperor Otto II.

The adoption of Byzantine Christianity was one of those great historical events whose import could not have been foreseen at the moment when it was accomplished. /28/ Thus this decision of Vladimir was to influence East European history in the most enduring manner up to this very day. As a result of it, all of east Europe, with the exception of Poland, entered into the Byzantine cultural orbit. A country whose population as such bears a certain leaning toward passivity was joined to a cultural sphere which had already become rigid with formal doctrine. This world was on the way toward decline, whereas the West Roman world still awaited its flowering. In this way the east of Europe was to assume a position of great disadvantage as against the West.

The most immediate result of the adoption of Eastern Christianity was the transmission of this Byzantine culture which was far superior to that of Kiyev, to the far-flung kingdom of the Rus'. For a good 200 years Byzantine knowledge, literature and art, as well as commercial goods were carried north. Bulgarian monks and teachers came, bidden and unbidden, into the country and taught reading and writing in the monastery schools. The learned documents they brought, spiritual essays, edifying sermons, historical treatises and geographical descriptions, exerted a great influence on their students. Greek master builders "brought architecture into the land which had seen its greatest accomplishment in fortifications by means of embankments". The chief attribute of the intellectual life of that time was the aversion toward Christian ideas and customs. If the adoption of Christianity was already very halting among the higher classes, the country people continued to worship their heathen gods to whom they offered sacrifices in forest and meadow, along streams and swamps. People did not want to renounce old customs, such as the freedom of love and marriage.

The kingdom of Kiyev reached its greatest efflorescence under Iaroslav the Wise, a son of Vladimir the Great. Both grand-princes were obliged to maintain their position and that of their kingdom by means of constant wars, and both succeeded at the same time in expanding their territory. Iaroslav, even more than Vladimir, built schools, monasteries and magnificent churches. Under /29/ his rule an exact copy of Hagia Sophia was built on the Dniepr by Greek architects. The type of church edifice with a triple nave and a central cupola made its triumphal entry into East-Europe. Adam von Bremen called the Kiyev of Iaroslav "a rival of Constantinople". No less than 400 churches and numerous monasteries, proud edifices, decorated at that time the "Rome of the East".

The race of Kiyev Rurikians was so esteemed

175 that it was possible for them to fetch their wives from all the royal houses of Europe and to marry their daughters into these houses. Anna, the daughter of Iaroslav the Wise married Henry I, King of France. When he died she reigned until her son, Philipp I, came of age. Iaroslav's second daughter Elisaveta married King Harald Haardraade of Norway, and he himself had Ingegerd, the daughter of King Olaf Skotunung of Sweden as his spouse. Emperor Henry IV chose Evpraksia, the sister of Grand Prince Vladimir Monomakh, as his wife. The kings of Hungary, of Poland, of Denmark, of Norway, of Sweden, of Bulgaria and the emperors of Byzantium wooed women of the Kiyev court.

Within Iaroslav's kingdom there reigned a state of prosperity and freedom which was easily comparable to conditions in the western countries. A decree issued by the Grand Prince himself, the famous "right of the Rus", guaranteed lawful peace throughout the land. The nucleus of the population consisted of independent peasants who plowed their own land and slept in their own huts of loam or wood. Legally they were equal to the boyars. They planted wheat, oats, rye, barley, millet, peas, poppies and flax and gathered honey in the woods. They were not unfamiliar with domestic poultry. Besides that there were day laborers and peasants without land who were nevertheless free. Handicrafts reached a state of excellence which was to be sought for in vain 900 years later. In the few cities of the Kiyev Kingdom the boyars set the fashion. As wealthy landowners or merchants, /30/ they shipped grain, honey, wax, hemp, skins, amber and similar things on the Dniepr to Constantinople and imported precious fabrics, spices, wine and other rare items. They carried on a lively trade with Regensburg where they had their own settlement, with the Transcaspian cities and the Varangian country. Half merchants, half warriors, they also did not scorn the profit of occasional marauding expeditions - slaves were at that time a desirable item. Kiyev resembled a huge fair. The forest dwellers in the north built boats in the winter which, as soon as the rivers were free of ice, they took to Kiyev and sold to the merchants. Goods arrived ceaselessly from Smolensk, Novgorod and Lyubech and from other directions, only to be carried each year in June from Kiyev to Constantinople "in well-armed formations of ships along the coast of the Black Sea".

The life of the free citizens of the Kiyev Rus seems to have been an altogether tolerable one. Jolly festivals with long-drawn-out feasts were not rare, and it is said of Vladimir the Saintly One that he was a great tippler. In spite of the adoption of Christianity, no one wanted to renounce such tried and true customs as the ritualistic drinking bouts, especially at festivals in commemoration of the dead where people settled down on the grave of their dearest and there happily consumed around twenty jugs of beer or mead. The tax collectors, at that time still princely agents, led a wonderful life. Their provisions for the day consisted of: "A loaf of bread daily, millet and peas for the making of porridge, cheese, two chickens, a small lump of salt; a calf and a bucketful of malt for beer on Sunday; on fast-days a fish instead of meat." (14)

An unfortunate law of inheritance was only one reason, but a very important one, for the downfall of the Kiyev Kingdom which began after Iaroslav's death in 1054. According to the existing practice of seniority succession, each of the brothers of the Grand-Prince and each of his sons was heir apparent to the highest rank. The Grand-Prince in turn ruled over the parts principalities that were being vacated. /31/ If one man

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14. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 45.

175 man moved up, many others moved with him. The higher the prince stood in rank, the more comprehensive was the change in the princely seats. The princes divided up their domain in order to make it possible for their sons to live as befitted their rank, and this in later times caused many principalities to be no larger than rather imposing hereditary estates. The only favorable thing about it was that the small princes were obliged to establish princely residences, in other words, to found small cities along with warriors, merchants and monks.

Iaroslav's total lands were split up into six autonomous territorial formations. Inasmuch as each change of grand-princes was accompanied by violent struggles for seniority, the chain of eternal feuds was never broken. From then on the history of the Rus of Kiyev was a chronicle of princely fraternal struggles, as a result of which the cities and the open countryside were made to suffer greatly. During the two centuries between Iaroslav's death and the downfall of Kiyev, there arose and fell "64 principalities, 83 civil wars ravaged the country, 293 princes engaged in a struggle for Kiyev during this time." (15)

15. Reeb: History of the Ukraine, page 22.

Once again, before the Kiyev Rus, outrageously weakened by fratricidal strife, internal dissention, indifference of the Church, passivity of the citizens, went under with the first great assault from without, a superior figure of a prince appeared. It was Vladimir Monomakh, the last grand-prince of Kiyev who succeeded in holding the local princes under control. He was highly esteemed. Once again splendid churches and monasteries were built, once again the country experienced a late cultural flowering. Monamakh himself is a famous writer; his "Precepts to my

Children" exert an important influence on the public. But Monomakh is also a general.

Again the swift horses of hostile hordes appear before the walls and palisades of Kiyev. Wherever there is no high grass on the steppes for protection, they break through the midst of the grain fields. They belong to the Polovtsi, also called Kuman, who, no less warlike and greedy for spoils /32/ than the Pecheneg, roam through the land. Since the time of Sviatoslav when the Pecheneg had invaded the country, driven the farmers from the Pontic Steppe and destroyed entire Ukrainian tribes, the land lay devastated almost up to Kiyev. Vladimir had had long walls, palisades and wooden towers coated with loam, built to protect the boundary. The Pecheneg and after them the Turks were repeatedly defeated by the princes and thrown back across the Danube. But like a magnet to iron, the fertile steppe with its spicy herbs attracted the vast herds of peoples who drank sheep and mare's milk and tenderized their mutton by carrying it under their saddles.

The Polovtsi, greedy for spoils, had crossed the Danube and invaded the country after the Turks, venturing upon the Kiyev of Monomakh and the princely city of Pereiaslav. Thereupon Monomakh united the rulers of the southern principalities in a military expedition against the wanton horde. The Polovtsi suffered a serious defeat. He also waged war against the Circassians and the rest of the Pecheneg. In his "Precepts" the Grand-Prince gives the following report of his combats to his sons: "I have waged 83 battles, I have signed 19 peace treaties with the Polovtsi, captured at least 100 of their princes whom I again liberated, and killed more than 200 of them by having them thrown into the river." The same Monomakh warns his sons: "Do not forget the poor, be a father to orphans! Always strive to learn, that is a wonderful thing! My father spoke five languages." (16)

16. Tisserand R.L.: The Ukraine, Life of a People.

•175 The wars which broke out among the local
princes after Monomakh's death belong to the
darkest chapter in the history of the Kiyev Rus.
Actually the kingdom ceased to exist. Nothing
remaired to hold it together, neither dynastic
ties nor marauding expeditions, nor the church,
which was powerless. For 35 years, from 1146 to
1181 there were ceaseless struggles for the throne
728 of Kiyev, and an almost /Facing page 32/ /Map 1:
631 Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938. The
Ukraine was divided between four states as a re-
sult of the Peace of Riga on March 18, 1921 be-
tween the Soviet Union and Poland, the transfer
of Bessarabia to Rumania, and the edicts of St.
Germain and Trianon. In the west Poland was given
West Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia), Carpatho-
Ukraine passed from Hungary to Czechoslovakia,
small parts of Carpatho-Ukraine, Bukovina and
Bessarabia went to Rumania, while the major portion
of Ukraine was left to the Soviet Union which es-
tablished the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic
on one part of Ukrainian national soil./ /Keys to
the map: -.-.-. state boundaries, ——boundaries
of the Soviet Republics, ---boundaries of the au-
tonomous Soviet Republics, -..-..- boundaries of
the autonomous territories, ... boundaries of the
territories (oblasts), administration centers un-
175 derlined./ /33/ uninterrupted war was waged for
sovereignty within the leading principality. The
princes of Suzdal in the north waged the most bitter
and brutal fight of all for supremacy. They whose
descendants are to become the princes of Moscow do
not shrink from an alliance with the khans of
Polovtsi against Kiyev. More than once these hordes
devastated the unfortunate country. Finally in
1155 Georgii Dolgorukov, Prince of Suzdal, was
victorious over Kiyev, and fourteen years later the
splendor of this city which had not seen its equal
throughout eastern Europe melts away in the flare
of Suzdal-Polovtsi pillage. (17)

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17. Grushevskyj: *History of the Ukraine*, page 91.

•175 It is Nestor's chronicle, the oldest literary monument of the Ukrainian people, which tells us about the Rus of Kiyev. It was written by many monks but bears the name of Brother Nestor, a contemporary of Monomakh. The three chronicles from which he obtained his knowledge of earlier events within the kingdom have been lost. Preserved to us, besides the Nestor chronicle, is the lofty "Song of Igor's Expedition", the Nieblungenlied of the Ukrainians and their first patriotic song. It narrates in extremely poetic form the military expedition of the Novgorod prince Igor Sviatoslavovich against the Polovtsi. Heaven and earth and animals and the entire animate world take part in the battle which is narrated quite in the spirit of the Nordic epics.

Scarcely was this beautiful song ended when in the east peoples began swarming in "of whom it was not known whither they came and what gods they worshiped". Jenghis Khan was their emperor and Mongolia their homeland, the same Jenghis Khan who had said to his son when the latter wanted to grant mercy to a city: "Compassion is proof of a weak character." His hords coming from Persia conquered the northern Caucasian and Crimean countries in 1222. When the Polovtsi learned of the approaching mighty army from their scouts and from captured Tatar, they called upon the princes of Halicz (Galicia), Kiyev and Chernigov for help. The entire militia of the southern /34/ principalities were called out in order to stave off the impending danger. The armies clashed at the Kalka, on the Sea of Azov, where the 100,000 Tatar of the Mongolian emperor annihilated the flower of the Ukrainian people. "The heads of the Rus fell under the sabers of the Tatar like stalks on the field under the sickle." (18)

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18. Reeb: History of the Ukraine, page 14.

•175 Vae victis! Mountains of corpses, burning villages and cities, smoldering ruins, - these were the tracks left by the Tatar on the march to Moscow, Vladimir and Suzdal. In 1240 Kiyev is overtaken by the same fate; the men and women of the free Rus are dragged to the Asiatic slave markets.

/35/

Poland Colonized

To be one's own master or to be a slave: that is the fate of peoples! Poles, Lithuanians and Tatar are now the ones who, for four hundred years after the fall of Kiyev, determine what is right and what is criminal in the Ukrainian countries. Kiyev Rus sinks to the lowest level; its principalities become provinces of Poland, Lithuania and the Tatar tent city on the Volga, while the inhabitants become serfs.

It sounds ironical that at the moment when the wings of a dire fate already cast their shadow over the Ukraine, a member of the Rurik dynasty should adorn himself with a king's crown. Danilo Romanovich, grand-prince of Halicz-Volhynia, in 1253 receives the crown from the hands of the legates of Innocence IV.

Under his predecessors the principality extended from the mouth of the Danube up to San, a tributary of the Vistula, and since 1199 as far as Volhynia. But this imposing kingdom was internally dismembered. It even happened that princes and aristocrats hanged one another. "In the character of this aristocracy there is a streak of anarchism which expresses itself in a tendency to unbridled despotism, in imperiousness and lack of consideration toward subjects, in rebelliousness and treason against the princes, along with servile forms of social intercourse, all of which was bound to bring misfortune to any kingdom." (19) Danilo also

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19. Kaindl, R.F.: Poland, page 64 and 65.

•175 fought against these insubordinate boyars. To break down their defiance, entire cities with all their inhabitants are destroyed. Ambitious Danilo has far-flung plans. He, the tributary prince of the Tatar khan in Sarai on the /35/ Volga, who has a king's crown from the papal city on the Tiber, wants to stretch out his hand to Kiyev, in spite of the fact that his plans of a crusade against the Tatar failed, and that only legates in cowls came instead of well-armed warriors. The khans, however, had long since seen through him; at their command he was obliged to burn down his own fortifications in 1259. Poisoned by the boyars, Danilo dies, and with him ends the Rurik dynasty of Halicz, exactly one hundred years after the destruction of Kiyev.

The history of the Ukraine, the territory on the border*, as the southern regions of the Kiyev Rus began to be called, is from now on for long periods a history of its bondage. Foreign peoples dictate its laws. The country is completely exhausted as a result of the eternal wars of the

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[103] *The name "Ukraine", meaning "borderland", appears for the first time in the chronicle of Nestor, which tells of a prince of Pereiaslav who is killed in 1187 in a battle with the nomads. The chronicle reported that "the Ukraine mourned him a great deal". In the year 1198 there is mention of a "Galician Ukraine" on the Polish border, and in 1215 of a "Ukraine" near Brest Litovsk. In the ceaseless wars of the principalities of the Rus', the various border countries gradually shrink to a single frontier country, the "Ukraine". This name which bears witness to the life of constant danger in these regions, is also in the course of time applied to the indigenous population.

princes and the devastations of the Tatar expeditions. Fortunately, the Mongols are milder rulers than the princes and the Poles. After they have subjected the Ukrainians, they are content with tributes in the form of young women, grain and cattle, and for the rest do not interfere with the affairs of the former principalities which have been split up into numerous communities. The people of the Ukraine are tired of eternal wars, and loosen the bonds toward their rulers wherever possible. They have had enough of compulsory labor; they would rather plow the land for wheat and millet for the Tatar.

The hunger for land of the Polish szlachta - aristocrats -, the greed for spoils of the heathen forest princes of Lithuania, /37/ and the rapacity of the newly-emerging Crimean Tatar after the destruction of the Golden Horde of Sarai, - these are the historical forces which the Ukrainian people are to feel during these centuries.

After the death by poison of the last member of the Rurik dynasty at Halicz-Volhynia, the glistening silvery Black Sea is already mirrored in the covetous Polish eyes. The Moldavian principality between the lower course of the Danube and the Dniestr, is a vassal state of Halicz-Volhynia. Casimir the Great now occupies Halicz and Lubart of Lithuania from the dynasty of Gedymin occupies Volhynia. The Lithuanians are more successful than the Poles in gathering up what was left behind by the Kiyev Rus. After they have defeated the Golden Horde in 1362 at the Blue Waters, the way to Kiyev and into the Dniestr basin lies open to them. The discipline and order which the new masters introduce into the resurrected principalities are weak, but at any rate they are better than the former anarchy. Like the khans of Sarai, the grand-princes of Lithuania are also gentle masters, and the subject principalities are given a sort of national autonomy, frequently under the rule of the old families.

●175 But the most amazing thing is the triumph of the olf Kiyev culture at the heathen court of the Gedymins. The grand-prince and his retinue speak the language of the Rus, take over their laws and in most cases even their Greek-Orthodox faith. The influence of the culture of the Rus at the Lithuanian court, as exercised by the Ukrainian princes and scholars, makes it seem not impossible that, under the leadership of the energetic Gedymin, the Kingdom of Kiyev might rise again.

But the ambition and vanity of Grand-Prince Iagailo is fateful for the Ukrainians. Deluded by the deceptive splendor of the Polish throne, he signs the blood alliance in 1385 and hands Lithuania and the Ukraine over to Polish despotism. The conditions imposed by the Polish szlachta are beyond all measure. In order to obtain the hand of the /38/ fifteen-year-old Polish queen Jadwiga, Iagailo is obliged to have himself and his people baptized in the Catholic faith and to promise to reconquer Poland's lost countries at his own expense, to guard and respect the privileges of the aristocracy, to release all Polish prisoners, to pay 200,000 guldens forfeit, and, above all, "to unite all his Lithuanian and Russian lands with Poland for all time." (20) Lithuania, White Russia, Black Russia and the Ukraine - at that time a territory three times as large as Poland - is debased to the status of a province of Cracow by the signature of the prince who was seized by Polish megalomania.

Iagailo's resolve was a decision against the Ukraine.

It is now all over with Ukrainian influence at the court of the Gedymin. The personal union, the identity of the person of the grand-prince of Lithuania and the king of Poland was to be of far-reaching significance for all of eastern Europe.

(20) Brandenburger: Polish History, page 37.

But the Iagailo family were not to lead the Poles to the Black Sea, but into the Bohemian cauldron, and while they were holding court in Prague on the Vitava, the Turks entrenched themselves north of the Danubian estuary in the principality of Moldvia, only to afford from there a constant threat to the Poles. The rise of the Muscovite princes was to be of even greater significance. While the Iagailo family ruled in Prague and Cracow, these princes laid the foundations of a kingdom that in the end was to devour them all, the Lithuanians, the Poles and the Ukrainians. Moscow united the North Russian principalities in the Kingdom of Muscovy and shook off the Tatar yoke. Ivan III conferred upon himself the name "Czar of all the Russians" and thus formulated Moscow's claim to all "Russian" countries for the first time.

The extinction of the Iagailo dynasty at last gave Polish nobility the opportunity to annex the Lithuanian and East Ukrainian countries altogether. They met at Lublin in 1569, three years before the death of the last member of the Iagailo family, in order to receive the application given to their Ukrainian and /39/ Lithuanian mercenaries for the annexation of these countries. Since the Lithuanians, meanwhile, failed to come, their country was, in contumatiam, placed into the arms of Poland, while the Ukrainians signed the alliance. What booty for the impoverished Polish szlachta, for whom the gates of the Ukrainian provinces, which had in part still stood under Lithuanian dominion, now opened wide! In endless hords these debt-ridden panowie, accustomed to living from the proceeds of the labor of others and to regarding everything Ukrainian with condescension, journeyed beyond the Dniepr. They begged for land from the king, seized offices and positions and on flimsy pretexts snatched huge pieces of land from the Ukrainian aristocracy.(21)

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21. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 193.

•175

The Ukraine is "blessed" with the culture of Polish aristocracy. Polish law is enforced first of all in Galicia and, with the advance of Polish rule, also in the remaining territories. The Polish nobility culture - this means the greatest distinction between the two strata of society, the szlachta and the common people; it means omnipotent nobility and impotent peasantry, deprived of rights. In Galicia this culture begins with the introduction of one-day service to the master. At first compulsory labor is required only a few days during the year, then one day a week, two days, finally every day. And still more is squeezed out of the unfortunate ones, for the master's life in Warsaw and Carcow costs a great deal of money. Toward the end of this development the peasant is nothing more than a work horse on the estate of the squire, at whose mercy he stands together with his family. "The Poles and the natives who have become Poles seize all power and might, all proceeds, all land. The native Ukrainian population is forced into a position of complete servitude, is converted into a thoroughly impoverished, deeply humiliated and despised mass of slaves and drudges of the Poles, divested of everything. Their culture and religion, their judiciary and economic life are brought to a state of complete ruin /40/ by this Polish rule." (22) The despotism of the Polish starosta (elder) and his friends prevails in the cities. All positions are closed to non-Catholics, that is to say, to the Greek-Orthodox Ukrainians.

In this state of deepest affliction the marvelous power of the spirit is revealed. Vladimir's faith and scanty remnants of Byzantine culture separated the Ukrainians from the Poles, from Polish-Latin culture. "The faith of the fathers formed the elementary, albeit unconscious substructure of

22. Ibid, page 180.

national sentiment." (23) The Jesuits worked hard to combat the Reformation in Poland. They erected schools and raised considerably the general level of education. Many Ukrainian gentlemen, enticed by superior Jesuit knowledge and the privileges of Catholic Polish nobility, adopted the Roman faith. But the people stubbornly clung to their religion. Then, in the period of greatest national danger, there developed the brotherhoods among the commoners of the cities. They founded schools, built churches and in this way, together with individual noblemen who had remained faithful to their people, they laid the foundation for a Ukrainian renascence. The contact of Byzantine-Ukrainian culture with that of Roman-Polish also showed its good sides: the Ukrainians learned from the Jesuits. The first Ukrainian books appeared, but were immediately banned by the Polish clergy. In his princely residence of Ostrog in Volhynia, Prince Constantin Ostrozhskyj set up the first printing press.

Nevertheless, the Poles and Jesuits and those bishops who had been placed by them in the vacated orthodox sinecures, did not give up their plans of uniting the Orthodox Church with the Roman-Catholic Church. Actually they succeeded in winning over a number of Ukrainian bishops to the Union which was agreed upon in Brest Litowsk in 1595. "But when, in the following year, a new synod of Brest Litovsk was supposed to ratify the union, Jesuit zeal which did not want any special position, and the selfishness and arrogance /Facing page 40/ /Map II: The Ukraine in the 11th to the 13th centuries. The independent Kiyev Kingdom at the height of the Middle Ages with its local principalities in the period before its destruction by the Mongol-Tatar invasion./ /Key inside map: -o-o-o National boundary. ......Boundaries of the

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23. Zalotzieckyj: The Spiritual Life of The Ukraine, page 45.

175 principalities. ------Boundaries of the temporary annexations./ /41/ of the Roman prelates, who opposed the admission of the Greek bishops into the Senate, spoiled everything. Two parties were formed which excommunicated each other." (24)

24. Brandenburger: Polish History, page 72.

Indignant, the princes of the Church departed, and the tension between their camps was discharged in violent polemical treatises. Against every attempt to win them over by force to the fold of the supreme Roman shepherd, the Ukrainian populace offered stubborn resistance. A fresh breeze blew through the Byzantine churches and monasteries and swept away the despairing mood of penitence.

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Between 1250 and about 1500 whole swarms of Jews immigrated into Poland and Galicia. They came from Spain and France, from Germany and Holland and later also from Italy. At the time when in Brest Litovsk the bishops were consigning each other to hell, the haughty Polish magnates were already deep in Jewish debt. Jews were the bankers of royal marriages and of warriors. Wholesale trade was predominately in their hands, and there was a large class of Jewish tenant farmers with their quick profits, retail dealers and tradesmen. The Jews had, of course, assumed intimate connections from the beginning, "With the higher nobility as well as with the king, on the basis of credits, rents, and so forth. But the more the gentry retired from the management of their estates, in order, in their feeling of liberty, to carry on politics on a grand scale in the provincial and national diets and in the confederations, or to lead a life of enjoyment..., the more money they naturally required for all these purposes. Only the Jew was capable of providing


WEISSRUSSISCHE
FÜRSTENTÜMER
TUROW-PINSK
WOLHYNIEN
GALIZIEN
Halitsch
(HALYTSCH)
KIEW
TSCH
PERE
POLE
UNGARN
1290-1320 zu Wolhynien gehörig
1290-1320 Zu Galizien gehörig
Danzig
Breslau
Krakau
Lemberg
Wladimir
Kiew
Belgrad
Silistria
Preslav
Sofia
Philippopel
Adrianopel
Thessalonich
Konstantinopel
Amastris

[Map II: The Ukraine in the 11th to 13th centuries, cf. complete legend pp. 38-39]

11: Obermaier--39B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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
Wladimir
Murom
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Kursk
CHERNIGOW
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[Map II the Ukraine in the 11th to 13th (centuries)

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•175 this money, and thus he became the creditor but at the same time, in order to protect himself, the administrator of the large as well as the small estates of the gentry." (25) There was scarcely an estate without a Jewish manager. The Jews migrated from the city to the country as administrators, innkeepers, /42/ tenant farmers, tax collectors and even as colonizing promoters in order to entice new farmers into the depopulated regions. The more money the gentlemen needed, the more the Jew wrested from the peasant serfs. Whatever amount was above that which was demanded by the lord of the manor, disappeared into the Jew's pocket.

These were the social, cultural and religious conditions at the beginning of the new era, the era of the Republic.

/43/

The Republic of the Steppes

C, 648 "Theodatus Chmielnicki, Dei gratia generalissimus ecclesiae Graecorum, imperator omnium Cosacorum zaporoviensum, terror et extirpator nobilitatis Poloniae fortalitiorumque expugnator, exterminator sacerdotum romanorum, persecutor ethnicorum, Anti-Christi et Judaeorum", which translated means: "Theodatus Chmielnicki, by the grace of God head of the Greek Church, emperor of all the Zaporogian Cossacks, terror and extirpator of the Polish nobility and conqueror of their fortifications, destroyer of the Roman clergy, persecutor of heathen, the anti-Christ and Jews." (26)

Cromwell was the one who sent the document

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25. Seraphim: The Jewry in the East European Area, page 45ff.

26. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 309.

Cossacks RD2

culent ribs and loins are used, everything else is U
discarded. The female deer and wild boar are not 136
hunted at all. In winter roes and wild boars C 136
wander in large herds from the steppes into the forests, and in summer they return to the steppes. ...The bird world is so marvelously rich that in spring vast quantities of eggs and fledglings of wild ducks, wild geese, cranes and swans are gathered in. In spring such large schools of fish swim up the river that a spear thrown into the water comes to rest upright." (28)

28. Rudnytskyj: Ukrainians, the Country and the People, page 123.

This, then, was the kingdom of Chmielnicki, U
the Emperor of the Cossacks. As soon as the 175 ●
hordes of the Pecheneg and Polovtsi had driven C 178
the agricultural Ukrainian population out of the 621
fertile South Ukrainian territory with scimitars and with fire, the first gangs of freebooters, fishermen and hunters from among the homeless banded together. On one of the more inaccessible islands of the Danube Delta a troop of no less than 6000 exiled Ukrainian farmers settled. There could scarcely be any question of their clinging to their native soil in regions where the farm population was obliged to withdraw into certain areas of swamps and virgin forests to avoid the constantly roving Asiatic nomads. For generations /47/ peasants ventured out into the open field only at the time of sowing and reaping. And in spite of that, millions of men, women and children fell victims to the "organized slave hunts" of these hordes.

Around the middle of the sixteenth century C 621
there developed small and later large militarily 642
organized bands made up of homeless aristocratic 182
and bourgeois refugees and the peasants who had escaped serfdom. As a result of a constant influx and integration, a regular army was formed which,

C 726 648 181 of the Cossack wars. Everywhere the daredevils of the sech "are in great demand as combatants..., especially in the Prussian army where they often attain the rank of officers." (34) An altogether adventurous characterization of the Cossacks is given by Nicolas de Bartenon, Sieur de Monsacré in his general history of the wars of the Turks, which appeared in Paris in 1608. "These men are loath to work like the Scythians, hardened against all difficulties like the Huns, devoted to arms like the Goths, tanned by the sun like the Indians and cruel like the Sarmatians...lions in the hunt, equal to the Turks in craftiness. They remind one of the Scythians in their cruelty and of the Christians in their simple faith." (35)

34. Kuschnir, W.: The Ukraine and its Importance in the Present War with Russia, page 23.

35. Borshchak, The Ukraine in Western Literature.

U 175 C 177 There was ample cause for disputes with the Poles. After the Union of Lublin the Polish nobility "greedily" rushed into the Ukraine on the right of the Dniepr, and attempted to introduce there also the rule of the szlachta. The Jesuit and the Jew belonged to its entourage, the one in order to win over the Orthodox for Rome and therewith for the Polish nation, the other as estate manager and often even as - gatekeepers of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Jews who, according /50/ to the Orthodox Ukrainian conception were "damned" because they belonged to the race that had crucified Christ, the Jews who were despised in the city, here very quickly rose to the position of masters of the Ukrainians. As leaseholders of the estates of the Ukrainian nobility seized by the

11: Obermaier--49 J-3(no date) 1942 RDl Ukraine RDl
Cossacks RD2

Polish szlachta, they were also not rarely in U
charge of the keys of the church. Thus if some 175 C
poor little farmer wanted to christen his newborn 177
child or if a young couple wanted to be married,
they were obliged to pay a fee to the Jew before
he would unlock the church. And this at a time
when the "Zaporogian league of knights" set itself
up as the patron of the Greek Orthodox Church and
reaffirmed the rights of the hierarchy in Kiyev.

Repeatedly, -in 1592, in 1596, 1630 and U
1637 - the Cossacks rose up against Polish arro- 175
gance. The result was bloody, extremely cruel C
reprisals. They pilloried one another, scalded, 669
burned, quartered, excoriated, hanged, broke
each other on the wheel and beheaded one another.

From 1637 on the uprisings of the suppressed
peasants in the Ukraine west of the Dniepr against
the Polish masters and their Jesuit and Jewish
executors went on ceaselessly. The hatred of the
Ukrainian people assumed such proportions that
the slightest provocation caused the lust for
revenge, which had been suppressed with difficulty,
to flare up into madness. The Jewish historian U
Graetz in his history of the Jews characterizes 175
the days before the purgatory of the great Ukrain- C
ian insurrection in the following words: "The 669
Polish Jews were sorely deluded when they offered 563
assistance to the nobility and the Jesuits in
suppressing the Zaporgian Cossacks in the Ukraine
and in Little Russia. The magnates desired to
make profitable serfs out of the Cossacks, the
Jesuits, Roman Catholics out of the Greek heretics;
the Jews who had settled in the territory wanted
to enrich themselves in this way and lord it over
these humblest pariahs. They advised the owners
of the colonies as to how they might most /51/
thoroughly demean, torture and maltreat the Cossacks.
They presumed to set themselves up as judges over
them, and offended them in religious matters. No
wonder that the enslaved Cossacks hated the Jews
almost more than their aristocratic and spiritual

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● 175 enemies." (36)

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36. Quoted by Seraphim: The Jewry in East-European Area, page 51.

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669 The rock started rolling when the Poles took away the estate of the Cossack chieftain Bogdan Chmielnicki, when they abducted his wife and killed his son. In vain the Cossack sought justice, and when he failed to find it, he galloped into the sech where he, the rebel, prepared to do anything, was elected hetman by the general assembly of warriors. The insurrection of all free Cossacks and all serfs became thus an accepted fact. With the cry: "death to the nobility, death to the Jesuits!" a mighty Cossack army set out from the sech in 1648, in order to fling the torch of rebellion into the land. The flames of rebellion leapt up everywhere, and soon the Ukraine was ablaze. Estates along with their masters, cities along with their inhabitants were reduced to ashes. Nearly 300,000 rebels took bloody revenge. The Polish armies were devastated or fled in the night before the Cossacks, like the troops at Pilavce which were 230,000 strong. Chmielnicki reached the gates of Lwów. All of Poland trembled at the thought of the day when the Cossacks will be lords of the land. But the hetman did not seize the opportunity - he made a compromise for 70,000 gulden and marched to the gates of Zamosc in order to besiege it. In Warsaw a king was being chosen. Chmielnicki's word sufficed to put Jan Casimir, the cardinal of the Jesuits, on the throne. With craft and cunning and grandiose promises the king succeeded in pacifying the insurrection. The long baggage train of rebels with their heavy cannons drawn by oxen and their booty-laden carts slowly rolled back to the Dniepr. The hetman did not know then that, just before reaching his goal, he thus gambled away Ukrainian freedom.

11: Obermaier--52 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
cossacks RD2

and the Ukraine itself thus paved the way for Moscow to the Black Sea and thus helped it attain decisive superiority in eastern Europe. /53/ c 669 648

In the following decades many attempts were made to alter this fact. There were three parties in the Ukraine, one of which wanted to join with Moscow, the other with Poland and the third with the Turks. All three felt that a protectorate was necessary. And all three of them had their turn, one after the other, without any effect on the fate of the Ukrainian people, except to divide it up like the spoils of war between the Russians and the Poles in the Peace of Andrusiv in 1667: Ukraine on the left bank fell to the Muscovite Kingdom, on the right bank to the Poles, except for Kiyev which went to Moscow. A later protectorate of the sultan over the right-bank Ukrainians lasted only a short time. The attempt of hetman Doroshenko to enter into an alliance with the Elector of Brandenburg in 1671 failed. U /175 ● c 648

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The Ukrainian people look back with pride to the Cossack Period and celebrate it in many songs. Perhaps an independent state would have grown up for the Ukrainians in that heroic epoch if there had been but one great statesman among the victorious generals, the hetmans. Death-defying warriors and the joyous shedding of blood were not enough, and there was no political, but only a religious idea at the basis of the "struggle against the infidels". Thus from a national political point of view the tremendous energy of the Cossacks was simply wasted and at the end of an epoch which might have led to the formation of a state important in world history, the mission that sought protection from two foes found itself faced with a third, Moscow.

In spite of the continual unrest, the cultural achievements were significant. From the time U 175 c 517 178

11: Obermaier--53 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
COSSACKS RD2

the Zaporogians took over the patronage of the Orthodox Church, Kiyev experiences a new cultural flowering. Metropolitan Mogila, himself a Jesuit scholar, reformed the famous Kiyev monasteries and schools after the Jesuit pattern. Under him the /54/ Academy, which still follows the old Byzantine tradition, also came into contact with western culture. Seven years after the death of Mogila, [181] the Arabian author Paul of Aleppo, after a journey through the Ukraine, writes: "The Ukrainians are informed people; they love the sciences and the study of law. They know rhetoric, logic and philosophy. They like to carry on controversies. Beginning with Rakhov, all through Cossack territory we unexpectedly met with something very nice: Almost all the inhabitants can read and write, even their wives and daughters who know the liturgy and religious songs. Children are as abundant as grass, and all of them have learned to read, even orphans who are taught by clergymen." (37)

U 175 ● c 517 178 c

37. Tisserand: The Ukraine, the Life of a People.

During the era of the hetman Mazepa, around the turn of the 17th and 18th century, under Muscovite rule, the cultural life of the Ukraine experienced its greatest upsweep. Almost every village had a school, which was never again to be the case. This period found its most splendid expression, however, in the Ukrainian baroque, the union of Byzantine with the baroque style. The fund of knowledge and culture which had accumulated from the time of Mogila's enthronement in 1632 up to the tragic flight of Mazepa, was so rich that Peter the Great and his successors were able to draw abundantly from it. The Kiyev scholars and their students had a significant share in the Europeanizing process of the Muscovite Kingdom which up to that time was buried in obscure barbarism.

Under the two friends, Peter the Great and Ivan Mazepa, the protector and the hetman, the cultural development of the Ukrainian people came to an abrupt end. Peter waged bitter combat with the Swedes for access to the Baltic which lay in Swedish hands. The Czar's difficulties made it seem urgent to the hetman to shake off Moscow's dominion by means of an allegiance with the Swedish king Charles XII. The alliance was formed and Charles XII, coming from devastated /55/ Saxony, attacked the Muscovites. Meanwhile Peter, setting fire to his own land, retreated far into the interior and in one attack destroyed an army of reinforcements amounting to 18,000 men of the Swedish king. Amid dreadful deprivations, exhausted from hunger and cold, young Charles wandered about with his main forces of 33,000 landsknechts on the devastated trail of Peter. He got within 300 kilometers of Moscow when Mazepa persuaded him to turn off to Ukraine. There 30,000 Cossacks were supposed to be ready to come to his aid. However, the hetman promised too much. The mobilization of the Cossacks was only partially successful because Peter was occupying large areas and because, moreover, many Cossack chieftains were not cooperating. Near Poltava in Central Ukraine Czar Peter attacked King Charles and the hetman and destroyed both armies in 1709. Charles and Mazepa fled to the sultan; the one destroyed Sweden's chances of becoming a great power, the other defrauded the Ukraine of its autonomous rights.

The Muscovite meted out dreadful punishment on the followers of Mazepa. There were confiscations, banishments and trials. The hetman state became the province of "Little Russia", the Ukrainians became "Little Russians", the Muscovites "Great Russians" and the entire kingdom: "Russia". The suspension of the autonomous rights of the Ukrainians in 1764, the abolition of the sech by Catherine II in 1775, and the introduction of feudalism in 1783 struck the Ukrainians simply as the affixing of a seal to their defeat at Poltava. The

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•175 situation in the Ukraine under Polish rule, where the rage of the Ukrainian pariahs vented itself in the extremely violent hajdamak /robber/ rebellions, was hopeless. Bishops consecrated the knives which were "destined to become sated with blood". Hundreds of thousands of Poles, Jews and Jesuits were mercilessly massacred, and on the gallows along the streets hang, in groups of threes, a Pole, a Jew and a - dog, "all of one faith". The insurrections are quelled in a no less bloody manner. Even the /56/ partitioning of Poland, as a result of which the part of the Ukraine on the right bank fell to Russia, did not change the hopeless situation of the Ukrainian peasants.

000 Peter the Great attained his goal: Moscow's power was firmly anchored on the Baltic and the Black Sea. The significance which was to accrue to the Ukraine in the Muscovite Kingdom is summed up by Napoleon in the ominous "Will of Peter the Great" in the following words: "To come as close as possible to Constantinople and East India! Whoever rules there will be the true master of the world. To this end incite continual wars, alternately against the Turks and against Persia; build wharfs on the Black Sea. The latter, like the Baltic, to be taken possession of step by step; both are essential for the attainment of that goal. To hasten the downfall of Persia. To push forward to the Persian Gulf. If possible, to restore the old trade route to Syria and set out straight for India, the market of the world. Once there, we shall be able to dispense with the gold of England". (38) /Facing page 56/ /Map IV: The Ukraine Around the Middle of the Seventeenth Century (At the time of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki). From the territory of the Zaporogian Cossacks there arose a first "Ukrainian" hetman state with Chigirin

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38. Trietsch, Russia, page 61, 62.

as its center. It dealt heavy blows to the Polish-Lithuanian state in the middle of the seventeenth century. The arrows leading from Bazadenk to Lwów point out the direction taken by the army of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki to Poland./ /Key inside map: \\\\\\ -.-.-. National boundaries. ┬┬┬┬Provincial boundaries. ++++ Western boundaries of the Ukrainian voivodeships in Poland.←←← Campaign of Bogdan Chmielnicki against Poland in the year 1648. ◈ Cossack regimental command. * Seat of the military order "sech". U 175 C 712 726

/57/ In the "Death Quadrangle"

"In a piercing, frosty north wind" on November 16, 1919 there marched passed each other in 'the quadrangle of death, silently, without a military salute, the fragmentary, wretched, barefoot detachments of the West Ukrainian supporting troops and the likewise fragmentary, wretched, barefoot East Ukrainian front-rank troops. The former were going east into the East Podolian area of concentration where the remnants of the West Ukrainian army were to capitulate before the 'Pan-Russians'; the others were going west to Central Volhynia where they were to surrender to the Poles. Both left behind the same landmarks along their way: frozen corpses in the ditches." (39) This was the funeral march of the last soldiers of the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic. U 726

The episode of the new Ukrainian statehood began with the March Revolution in Russia in 1917. On March 22, 1917, a few days after the revolution in Moscow, the "Ukrainian Central Council" was formed in Kiyev, consisting of representatives of U 668 672 175

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39. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism in the Years 1918 to 1923, page 389.

11: Obermaier--56A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
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
Westpreussen
PREUSSEN
LITAUEN
POLEN
UKRAINE
Krakau
Warschau
UNGARN
Siebenbürgen
Klausenburg
Moldau
Jedisan
Budschak
Tschigirin
(Tschyhyryn)
Sapor
Walachei
TÜRKISCHES
Adrianopel
Konstantinopel

[MAP IV: Ukraine around the Middle of the Seventeenth century, cf. complete Legend, pp. 55-56]

11: Obermaier--56B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
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
RUSSLAND
Don Kosaken
Krim
Kaukasische Stämme
PERSIEN
REICH

[Map IV. the Ukraine around the middle of the seventeenth century.]

668 the parties. At the same time the process of making 642 Ukrainians of the various divisions of the troops on the front began, so that within a few months the 175 Central Council had about one and one-half to two million Ukrainian soldiers at their disposal. But in spite of this enormous army, the Central Council by and large yielded to the orders of the Kerenskii government of Moscow. Its further policy is characterized by the four manifestoes which it issued up to the time of its dissolution in April 1919. On June 23, 1917 the first manifesto of the Central Council announced the autonomy of the Ukraine. It was to maintain its own parliament, the Central Council, and a /58/ government, the general secretariat. On July sixteenth the second manifesto followed, giving particulars as to what was meant by autonomy, and containing an emphatic declaration for confederacy. In its manifesto of November 19, 1917 after Lenin had already stepped into power, the Central Council still clung to the union with Moscow. Again in this "Universal"-that was what the manifestoes were called - which proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic, there was mention of federation with Moscow. On December fourteenth the Council of 648 People's Commissars in Moscow recognized "the 175 Ukrainian People's Republic and its right to separate completely from Russia or to enter negotiations for a federation or similar relationships." But in the same document of recognition the Council of People's Commissars laid down the condition that the disarming of Red troops in the Ukraine would have to cease and that the Central Council would have to desist from its "counter-revolutionary activity". Should the People's Commissars fail to obtain a satisfactory answer to this demand within 48 hours, "the Council of People's Commissars would assume that the Central Council was in a state of open warfare against the Soviet government." A few days after this recognition coupled with an ultimatum Bolshevik troops broke into the Ukraine. In Khar'kov there was formed a Ukrainian-Bolshevik counter-government, and Moscow'

648 war against Kiyev began.

668 Straightway Bolshevik propaganda made itself felt in the Ukraine. It was easy to unleash revol-
175 utionary energies, after the Central Council had prepared the ground with the same arguments, albeit in a weaker form. In the country unbridled peasant rebellion against the squires raged. It was arable land and fine cattle and horses on the farms that the peasants wanted; they did not care who ruled in the cities. This was the state of affairs in the Ukraine when on January 22, 1918 the Central Council in Kiyev in a fourth manifesto proclaimed the sovereign "Ukrainian People's /59/ Republic" and put into effect separation from "indivisible Russia". However, at the same time it did not forget to announce that after the overthrow of Bolshevism, there should again be cooperation with Russia. The manifesto which was meant at last to arouse national passions suppressed for so long, was not heard in the noise of general rebellion. A few days after the proclamation of the Ukrainian People' Republic, the parliament and the government at Kiyev were surprised by a revolt of Bolsheviks and its members were arrested. If they had not been freed by the Ukrainian sharpshooters of the sech who became the nucleus of the later Ukrainian armies, and the corps of free Cossacks consisting of workmen, these parliamentarians would have faced certain death. It was precisely in those days that the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk recognized the independent Ukrainian People's Republic on February 9, 1918. Vienna was facing a famine and needed grain, so the peace was favorable to the Ukraine. For the adjudication of national sovereignty they were obliged to furnish a half million tons of grain. The "peace for bread" had been signed one day when the Bolsheviks drove the Central Council out of their capital. In March the situation became so threatening for the Ukrainian government that it was obliged to appeal to the Central Powers

648 for occupation and riddance of the Ukraine from Bolsheviks. Thereupon German and Austro-Hungarian
668 troops occupied the country. In Kiyev the Central
175 Powers established military, diplomatic and political representation. In order to take the wind out of the sails of the vigorous Bolshevik agitation, the Central Council nevertheless saw itself forced to continue its revolutionary activity. Thus, against their will, they led "the country toward a complete social-revolutionary dissolution in which East Ukraine had inevitably to fall victim to the Bolshevism of Moscow." (40)

40. Kuchabskyj: *Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism*.

It is obvious that the conservatively-minded German authorities had no understanding of such governmental tricks as would seriously jeopardize /60/ the furnishing of grain. Therefore they supported the attempt of the former aide-de-camp of the Czar and Russian general of Ukrainian origin, Pavlo Skoropadskyj, to introduce the monarchical office of hetman instead of the Republican Central Council. On April 29, 1918 Pavlo
668 Skoropadskyj, the offspring of a hetman family,
175 proclaimed a new hetman state in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the indigenous props of this monarchical regime were very weak. If he had not been protected from the beginning by the authority of the army of occupation, the revolutionary masses would have driven him out along with his few dozens of landowners, industrialists, merchants and officers on the very first day. Skoropadskyj's first efforts were directed toward restoring the pre-revolutionary social conditions in the country, during which process his men did not shrink from severe penal expeditions and from the use of the "traditional Russian wisdom" - the club. This led to repeated bloody rebellions on the part of the embittered peasants. An uneducated, fermenting,

668 destitute mass of humanity, as yet incapable of
self-administration, a much too small middle class
175 and a corrupt reactionary society at the head,-
these were the elements of the hetman state. But
it was the hetman's doom that, for lack of a
national Ukrainian conservative stratum, he was
obliged to lean more and more on the old domiciled
Russian circles who in the end completely won over
the Ukrainian head of the state to their reactionary
plans. On November 14, 1918 Skoropadskyj set
642 up an Old Russian government in Kiyev and announced
648 the federation of the Ukraine with a czarist Russia
175 which, however, was never again to arise. Twenty-four
hours after the announcement of the annexation of the Ukraine to this fictitious czarist Russia, the revolt of the "Ukrainian National League" against Skoropadskyj and the Old Russian counter-revolutionaries broke out. There begins the period of the second Ukrainian People's Republic, at the head of which is a five-man governing board. At the end of the /61/ seven-month rule of Skoropadskyj, after his flight from the new Ukrainian government, he made the following confession in his last manifesto of December 14, 1918: "God did not give me the strength to attain my goal."

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In the meantime Austria-Hungary also approached its dissolution. On October 10, 1918 in the Imperial Council of Vienna, the Ukrainian parliamentarians from Galicia demanded the right of self-government for the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary; it was only a few days before the collapse of the Empire. On the eighteenth of October the Ukrainian members of the Imperial Council and the Diet in Lwów founded the Ukrainian National Council which on the following day proclaimed the union of all Ukrainian territories in Austria-Hungary. The National Council set up three executive committees and therewith imagined it had done all that

was necessary. Then they believed a telegram of 642
the Western powers containing the confirmation or 648
the order to make use of self-government and found 175
the West Ukrainian state would come fluttering into the house. The parliamentarians who received their political education in the lobbies of the Imperial Council building had complete faith in the magic formula of self-government and were waiting to see what the Western powers would have to say. Action was taken only by several companies of East Galician-Ukrainian troops who in the night of the first of November seized Lwów in a surprise attack. The Galician capital was predominantly inhabited by Poles and Jews, and the Poles immediately countered with a revolt. The Ukrainian National Council was still waiting patiently; it had made no real preparations to take over power in Galicia. Thus its appeals must be directed to the anonymous masses, "To everyone", with the request that they lend a helping hand everywhere and intervene everywhere. Finally on November ninth the government, the temporary state secretariat, was formed and the division of governmental power very neatly handled. The /62/ National Council was to make the laws, the State Secretariat was to see that they were enforced. Then the order was given that all "necessary steps be taken to unite all the Ukrainian provinces into one state". The new state called itself the "West Ukrainian People's Republic". Its alliance with the East "Ukrainian People's Republic" was solemnly announced on January 22, 1919 in Kiyev. The West Ukrainian People's Republic was given the name "Western Territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic". In reality, however, conditions remained as before between the West Ukrainian and the East Ukrainian state, in spite of formal amalgamation. Both states continued to be independent allies, small West Ukraine being the stronger.

The West Ukrainian state was obliged from the beginning to reckon with opponents who were

642 bent on the most extreme measures. Roman Dmovski,
chairman of the Polish National Committee founded
648 in Paris during the war and leader of the Polish
•175 delegation at the peace negotiations, was the
most bitter enemy of any kind of Ukrainian state. He countered the partition of Great Russia at Brest Litovsk with the partitioning of the Ukraine. It was completely in accordance with his ideas when as early as February 28, 1918, after Brest Litovsk, the Paris National Committee decided completely to destroy Ukrainian state in East Europe at any cost. To this end Polish agents in Paris, London and Washington used all their powers of persuasion on leading politicians and newspapers. They wisely suppressed the fact that Polish plans secretly included the entire Ukraine west of the Dniepr which had fallen to Russia in the partitions of Poland. These opponents of independent Ukrainian state were augmented: the Polish army of General Haller, which was formed in the summer of 1918 on French soil and which was recognized as the "confederate army" on the twenty-eighth of September, arrived in Poland.

West Ukraine could be nothing more than booty or a tool in the hands of the Allies. Inasmuch as France /63/ wanted to build up against Germany a Poland that was as strong as possible, it was best that Poland subjugate West Ukraine and thus exclude any threat from the rear. Only Foch for a time entertained the plan of erecting a Ukrainian vassal state and of throwing in its soldiers against the Bolsheviks. For the English Liberals, West Ukraine was an object of barter which could be used as an extortionary measure against the French, or, if there was no other way, could be made into a mandate state under the supervision of the League of Nations.

The fiercest enemies of the East Ukrainian
648 statehood, however, were the Bolsheviks who, fully
175 aware of the fateful significance of a loss of the

648 Ukraine for the Muscovite realm, strained every
175 effort to fight for the country. The Pan-Russian
counter-revolutionary armies also proved themselves opponents not to be underestimated. "The campaigns of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and other Russian generals clearly proved that there were only two forces fighting in the Russian civil war: the old Czarist absolutism against the new Bolshevik despotism. And both of them fought with equal ferocity against the Ukraine." (41)

41. Danko: The Nation in Soviet Chains, page 25.

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726 A surprise attack of the Ukrainian troops
on Lwów set off the Polish-West Ukrainian War.
175 For weeks wild fighting raged in the streets of the city; finally the Poles succeeded in bringing in troops and forcing the Ukrainians out of Lwów during the night of November 22, 1918. The victors exercised bloody reprisals on the Ukrainian population; they destroyed Ukrainian property and dragged many respected citizens into concentration camps from which they were never to return. The Jews expiated for their neutrality with a three-day pogrom, during which whole blocks of houses went up in flames.

[631] After the loss of Lwów, the West Ukrainian
state included about 40,000 square kilometers with
642 four million /64/ inhabitants, among them three
648 million Ukrainians. To destroy this dwarf state
was the firm intention of the leaders of the Polish
726 state of eighteen million. The Ukrainian govern-
175 ment now had its seat at Stanislawów; Dr. Ievgen Petrushevych was the head of the state. He and many other men who were responsible for the fate of West Ukraine still regarded it as "an incident, a misunderstanding, an error" that there was any fighting at all between Poles and Ukrainians. Heedless of the front which was expanding day by

642 day and of the increasingly bloody battles, they
648 abandoned themselves to the illusion that these
misunderstandings would merely have to be cleared
726 up and all would be well. They believed that
175 patience was required until the Allies carried out
the right of self-government for which the Ukrainians alone were obliged to fight with weapons. "The fact that individual destinies must be determined by the will of the individual - such points of view which are so familiar to conquering nations, were completely foreign to the 'Ukrainian National Council', all the more since there was not a single, in any way outstanding, personality in leading political circles, who would have been capable in a critical situation to grasp the reins and direct events." (42)

42. Kuchabskyj: West Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 52.

175 The war which at the beginning was carried
726 on with a few thousand men on both sides was in
full force by the end of December. At this time the Ukrainians successfully mobilized their fighting manpower up to 35 years of age. Then, however, they made the mistake of abandoning warfare in the open country and of leaving the initiative to the Poles who, in keeping with their reckless methods, made use of it. In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian front which ran northward from the Carpathians presented considerable deficiencies along its approximately 250-kilometer length, that the battalions, for example, were strung together loosely and without a unified supreme command, nevertheless the Polish troops which arrived from mid-January on suffered heavy defeats. Thus Gen-
000 eral Romer /Facing page 64/ /Above: A typical
Ukrainian church made of wood, in the Carpathians. Below: Ukrainian peasant woman baking bread./[1] /Facing page 65/ /The Ukrainian landscape is full

[1] [This plate not processed for files — Analyst]

000 of unique charm. - In spite of their poverty, Ukrainian peasants keep their loam huts clean./1*
726 /65/ along with 5000 men was defeated and shortly thereafter other Polish detachments north of Lwów
•175 were destroyed.

And now the Ukrainians fell into a situation which was somehow reminiscent of the siege of Lwów by hetman Chmielnicki in 1648. It was again Lwów that was besieged and cut off from the rest of the world. The city seemed hopelessly lost, there was even no water. At this point when the war was developing favorably for the Ukrainians and when it could only be a few days before Lwów fell into their hands as a trump which might even overtrump the Western Powers, they ceased hostilities as a result of the promises of a French military mission. "...If, in turn, you accept our proposal we shall take steps toward the recognition of your sovereignty...". But the peace terms of the French General Berthelemy seemed so severe to the Ukrainians that after three days they resumed the fight. The brief pause sufficed for the Poles to recover. Morale in the Ukrainian army was also no longer of the best after the prospects of peace had been shattered. The soldiers lived through a severe winter. Some of them were in need of coats, and even more, or a corps of officers which might have served as a moral support to them during the long months of life in the trenches. Five hundred soldiers and one officer! That represents a catastrophic dearth of officers. Gangs of East Ukrainian peasants sent to help, caused mutiny and plunder so that they were decimated and sent back over the border.

To what extent the Ukrainian general staff had already lost the leadership of its troops was proved by the vote which it took among the individual battalions upon the armistice command of the Entente of March 19, 1919. Whereas the Ukrainian army, in response to it, declared itself

1*[For plate, see p. 219, category 116 - Analyst] for the armistice, the Poles who started a general offensive on March eighteenth, paid no attention to the wishes of their allies /66/ in Paris. On the contrary, without running up against any opposition worth mentioning, they built up a favorable starting point for a new offensive, extending from the Carpathians to Volhynia. General Haller worked out the plans, unconcerned over the fact that the Supreme Council in Paris was already preparing the armistice terms. For the Council attached importance to a rapid ending of hostilities in order that Bolshevik Moscow may be all the more rapidly and positively destroyed. Polish attacks on the first and second Ukrainian army corps announced the impending catastrophe. The Ukrainian soldiers were tired of war; they marauded, mutinied, plundered, left the trenches and simply went home. No wonder that the two army corps were defeated in "wildest flight". At this point General Haller prepared for what he considered would be the mortal blow. The disintegrated Ukrainian front was faced with nine Polish infantry divisions, among them two Haller divisions equipped in the best possible manner by the French. In most cases the Poles stormed empty ditches and deserted villages; occasionally they broke up local resistance. The defeat of the Ukrainians was complete.

At this moment, slowly, guardedly, two Rumanian divisions pushed across the crests of the Carpathians into southeastern Galicia and captured the only infantry supply base still left the Ukrainians.

The remnants of the exhausted West Ukrainian army marched eastward with its baggage and accompanied by fleeing civilians toward an unknown destination, while in East Ukraine Bolsheviks drove the remnants of the East Ukrainian army westward. Ievgen Petrushevych rose up to become dictator of his wandering West Ukrainian state.

11: Obermaier--67 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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Another page was turned. General Haller 726
was obliged to throw his divisions onto the 175
western frontier of Poland. The Treaty of Versailles was to be signed. No /67/ one knows whether the Germans may not refuse to sign, ally themselves with the Bolsheviks and enter a desperate struggle.

It does not seem impossible that a surprise attack of the Ukrainians may be successful. Petrushevych named the Russian General A. Grekov, who had staked everything on the Ukraine, supreme commander of the West Ukrainian forces. He is the author of the plans for an offensive which, under his name, was to enter Ukrainian military history as one of the most daring deeds.

In the early morning of June 8, 1919 the Ukrainians began the assault on the town of Chortkov which had been captured a few days before by the Poles. "The effect of this advance was baffling. Several Polish battalions who were defending the town dispersed and took to wildest flight. Almost the entire enemy artillery of this division, all their baggage and several hundred prisoners fell into the hands of West Ukrainians. In the marketplace of the town a national parade of the Polish inhabitants of the entire countryside had just gathered in order to celebrate the 'burial of the Ukraine'. The fleeing soldiers fell upon this crowd: 'Run! The Ukrainians are already here!' - and the entire festively-clothed multitude fled with the troops, just as they were, abandoning everything. Then something improbable happened to the Ukrainians under General Grekov when the news of the battle of Chortkov reached them. On the
entire West Ukrainian front of 35 kilometers the 726
8000 men whom West Ukrainians engaged in combat 703
pushed forward, and there followed a sudden, pos- 175
itively miraculous transformation in the attitude of the entire nation. Suddenly they became aware that they were being led, that they were being

commanded by a real general. The soldier who 726
only yesterday was unable to halt an enemy advance 703
now dashed ahead recklessly. The divisions which 175
throughout the war did not know how to cooperate
with their neighbors /68/ now functioned with a baffling tactical assurance. They attacked, they pushed through, they rolled up enemy flanks, they pursued, they marched into the roar of enemy guns to help their neighbor to victory. The higher staff officers who up to that time had known nothing but caution, suddenly learned how to seek out the enemy, to find him, to attack, to pursue, to break into the enemy's rear. The ones who only yesterday were deserting, those who were barely able to carry arms, young and old, all now joined the advancing West Ukrainian troops. A crowd marched into a village, only to leave it as a company." (43)

43. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 302.

From the beginning an extreme shortage of 175
infantry munitions imperiled these brilliant 726
victories of West Ukrainia. There were only enough weapons to equip a bare 20,000 men. On June ninth and tenth the Ukrainians overran two Polish divisions who fled in wild panic along with all the inhabitants. Ten days later they put to flight five divisions, and on June 27 a new Polish line of resistance became shaky. It, too, was destroyed. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians did not succeed in capturing the badly needed arms and munitions. At last, only two days' march from Lwów the offensive was halted. New Polish divisions were thrown in and Pilsudski himself, who had previously already taken over the supreme command but had been unable to avoid the last breakthrough, now gave the command for a counter-offensive...In its extremity Poland mobilized the

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Supreme Council in Paris which on June 25 already drew up the following decision which was to be communicated to West Ukrainia: "In order to protect life and property of the peaceable inhabitants of East Galicia from the dangers which threaten them at the hands of the Bolshevik mobs, the 'Supreme Council' ...has resolved to empower the forces of the Polish Republic to carry on their operations as far as the Sbrucz River."

With new, completely equipped divisions the /69/ Poles began their offensive on June 28, 1919, exactly half an hour before General Grekov also ordered a new attack. The proportion of forces was too unequal, a Ukrainian victory became impossible. The Ukrainian army retreated amid constant counterattacks. Various positions could not be defended at all, because whole divisions had not a single cartridge. Thus the Ukrainians reached the river which forms the boundary between Galicia and East Ukraine. "A giant baggage train dragging the entire supplies of the army into the uncertain future, columns of civilian refugees, more than a hundred thousand people, left their homes. Among them was an army of over 60,000 men comprising the quartermaster corps, over 20,000 of these fighting forces." On July 16 the rear guard crossed the Sbrucz.

An eyewitness dramatically described the end of the Polish-West Ukrainian War: "These were dreadful days! From one side came Poles, from the other Bolsheviks. The territory of both Ukrainian states now comprised only a narrow strip along the bank of the Sbrucz River. In this area could be heard the booming of guns from the east and the west...Endless files of West Ukrainian army service corps marched past...From afar cannon boomed: this was the West Ukrainian artillery which held off the Polish attack with greatest bravery to give the service corps time

726 175 to retreat with the sick and wounded and with the supplies. There was still some ammunition for the cannons, the foot soldiers had none left. The latter helped their artillery wherever they could hold off the Poles with blank weapons, and they defended with their bodies the last fields of their West Ukrainian homeland." (44)

44. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 319.

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175 The same tragedy accompanied the battles of the East Ukrainians. Shortly after the summons of the Directorate which was secretly elected by the "Ukrainian National League" and was headed /70/ by the writer Volodimir Vynnychenko and the former bank official and journalist Simon Petliura, the army of the Directorate marched from Bila Cerkva to Kiyev. It consisted of 4 companies of infantry, 1 battery of field guns, 12 heavy machine guns and half a squadron of cavalry. Hetman Skoropadskyj threw all the forces he could spare at that moment into the troops of the Directorate: 3 battalions of infantry. At Fastiv, not far from Kiyev, the sech sharpshooters of the Directorate, after a heroic struggle, turned the tide of the battle in which a battalion of Russian officers was annihilated up to the last man, in their favor. "The effect of the battle was tremendous. With one blow, as though suddenly paralyzed, the counterrevolution in the Ukraine, specifically in Kiyev, gave itself up as lost. On the other hand, the entire East Ukraine arose at the first report of this victory as though at a magic word. Hundreds of thousands of peasants from all over stormed the cities and towns. The entire East Ukraine resembled a storm-lashed ocean." (45)

45. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 109.

•175 However minute the battle of Fastiv may have been, it was nevertheless of decisive historic importance. With the hetman-Ukraine the Russian counterrevolution lost its strategic basis from which no lesser person than Marshall Foch was planning to launch the destructive campaign against the Bolsheviks. Fastiv destroyed the foundations of his plans which had seemed feasible and the success of which would have resulted in a system of government other than the Bolshevik. But the victory of Fastiv was also the condition for the subsequent battles for freedom of the Ukrainians against the Russians and the all-Russian counterrevolution; as a result of them Ukrainian national sentiment was to gain unexpected strength.

As one of its first official acts the Directorate signed the agreement about the annexation of West Ukraine. On December 14, 1918, "supported by a hundred thousand armed peasants", it made its triumphal entry into Kiyev. Nevertheless, the mood of the people and appearances were deceptive. Aside /71/ from the fact that after the hetman administration was driven out, the forces absolutely necessary for the establishment of a new apparatus of government were lacking, a radical socialistic trend forthwith began to undermine the prestige of the Directorate in a fatal manner. When the Central Council sent out feelers to the Supreme Command of the French intervention troops which had landed at Odessa, Kherson and Mikolaiv, it was accused of negotiating with the intruders in order, like Skoropadskyj, to reinstate the Polish and Russian large landowners. The Bolshevik agitators coming from Moscow maintained the very same thing, and pointed to the counterrevolutionaries who were gathering together among the intervention troops. Mistrust of the Central Council finally became so great that many Ukrainian officers, with Grigorijev and Tiutiunnyk at their head, deserted in order to fight with their own troops against the Entente intervention. It was the army of Grigorjev, that had joined the Bolsheviks, which so disgracefully threw the invading army into the sea. When Lenin wanted to send his allies to the Hungarian Communists, Grigorijev refused to obey and proclaimed a separate independent Soviet Ukraine.

In this way a realm larger than Germany drifted into anarchy. Outside of Kiyev armed mobs of peasants constituted the supreme authority. Plundering, they marched into the cities, and woe to the landowner, woe to the Jew who fell into their hands. They deprived the homeward-bound German and Austrian troops of their weapons; they also made the railroads unsafe. From Austria and Germany the completely dilapidated prisoners of war wander back. "Headmen arose among the armed masses as well as among the country people who called themselves otamans - meaning approximately "commander" -, and the bands of the 'People's Army of the Directorate' soon largely turned into actual gangs. It was a matter of chance as to which side these bands joined - whether the 'Directorate', the /72/ Bolsheviks or the socialist-revolutionary 'pedocrats' who were opposed to everything. It all depended on what happened to please a headman. Here the 'social-revolutionary' circles rebelled against the Directorate, there a vulgar mob carried out bloody pogroms against the Jews, either under national-Ukrainian, Bolshevik or, as happened even more often, under anarchist slogans..."

In the middle of January, 1919, the West Ukrainian delegates arriving in Kiyev in order to attend the proclamation of the Great Ukrainian state, happened upon this unbelievable chaos.

This celebration was scarcely over when Bolshevik troops already approached the Great Ukrainian capital and, on February fourth, drove out the Directorate along with the West Ukrainian guests. Soon Lenin's hosts which were joined by revolutionary peasants as well as Jews and poor workers became

175 masters of the cities which were decisive for possession of the country. The Directorate, however, wandered about in Podolia and Volhynia with dwindling fighting forces, one day set up its quarters in railroad coaches, the next day in one of the horrible Jewish cities. The People's Republic "resembled a barricade of chariots on the march".

The Directorate now consisted of only three members. Simon Petliura, war minister in the Central Council of the Ukrainian Republic before the hetmanship of Skoropadskyj was chairman. His modesty and his brilliant eloquence fascinated his people, especially the sech sharpshooters. He was "a tribune, not a statesman; not a general but only a leader", (46) yet always imbued with an unshakable faith in the victory of the Ukrainian national idea.

The thing which in March 1919 had called
itself in Volhynia the "Ukrainian People's Rep-
ublic" was no longer a state. Nor did it carry
on any foreign politics. Petliura's idea of it is
000 that it /Facing page 72/ /Harvest time. From
early morning until late at night the mowing
machines, formerly drawn by horses, now by mighty
tractors, are driven over the endless fields./[1]
/Facing page 73/ /The hut in which a Ukrainian
worker's family lives in Krivyi Rog.[2] Below:
These are specialists - tractor drivers and
tractor assemblers of a collective farm near
175 Uman./[2]/73/ supplied the troops with war material.
There could no longer be any question of a fixed
front. In April the East Ukrainian army numbered
15,000 men all told, half of which are West
Ukrainians. These 15,000 are what is left of the

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46. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 119 ff.

[1] [This plate not processed for files -Analyst]

[2] [For plate, see p. 220, category 116-Analyst]

100,000 volunteers with whom the Directorate entered Kiyev after the battle near Fastiv, four months before. The majority of these hosts were lost, joined wild bands, or went home. The ones who were faithful to Petliura, however, were like the Cossacks of earlier times, freedom-loving rebels, brave and fearless in the face of death.

In view of the situation which became ever more threatening, Petliura from the first saw his only hope in incorporating his troops into the Foch Plan. The Marshall wants to destroy the Bolsheviks - the Directorate has the same desire. As early as February, even before Petliura assumed dictatorship, the emissaries of the Directorate implored the supreme commander of the intervention troops of the Entente, which had landed in Odessa, to give them armaments. On February sixth the French officers delivered an "ultimatum" to the representatives of Greater Ukraine, by means of the fulfillment of which the Ukrainians would be able to attain the right of dying a hero's death under French supreme command - other privileges were to be discussed later.

French demands were simply incredible. The French, in possession of only a tiny area around Odessa, still drunk with victory in the west, set up conditions which completely overshadow anything the Central Powers demanded when they held in a firm military control all of Greater Ukraine. The president of the Directorate, the war minister and another member of the Directorate which, according to orders of the French supreme commander is to be reorganized, were supposed to withdraw. Railroads were to be put under the control of the French supreme command, the troops of the Directorate under the leadership of the French supreme commander. /74/ Russian officers were to be placed side by side with the Ukrainian ones, and the Ukrainians, finally, were to address a document to the French government in which they were to

●175 repent of their shortcomings - friendship with Germany and attempts at socialization -, promise to continue the war against the Bolsheviks, and ask France's support in mobilizing a Ukrainian army and in building up the entire "economic, financial, military and political life of the Ukraine All of this was crowned by the demand that the petition to the French government must emphasize how very much the plea of the Ukraine to France "arose primarily from its confidence in the French people, their magnanimity and their historical renown".

The sech sharpshooters, the backbone of the army of the Directorate, protested against every attempt to remove Petliura, and since the Grigorijev army, allied with the Bolsheviks, drove the army of intervention into the Black Sea on April 3, 1919, the Ukrainians were spared the trouble of making use of French magnanimity. Thus the plans of the all-powerful Foch of rearranging east Europe according to French ideas failed. After the defeat of the army of intervention in Odessa, the prospects of its troop movements to Moscow being financed were very slight.

With this the East Ukrainian army lost all value as far as Foch's plans were concerned, and he therefore turned his wrath toward the West Ukrainian army which was causing trouble to his Polish protégés. "All that was left in the end of the world-shattering plans of Foch was the concentration of his forces for the terrible blow which was supposed to have brought 'occidental civilization' as far as the Volga, on the tiny country of West Ukraine which was no more than 200 kilometers wide and 200 kilometers deep. Like a hungry lion not scorning even a mouse, the mighty marshall discharged his terrible wrath on the little heap of misery which represented West Ukraine in combat with world powers." (47)

47. Kuchabskyj, Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism. page 214.

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175 /75/ After its withdrawal from East Galicia, 726 the West Ukrainian army joined the remnants of the army of the Directorate. "Quadrangle of death", this is the name given to the region between the Polish border and Kiyev and southward toward the Dniestr. There was no longer any escape for the Ukrainians; they were encircled by enemies from whom they either became isolated, as from the Rumanians in the southwest and the Poles in the west, or else are engaged in combat as by the Bolsheviks and the all-Russian, counterrevolutionary Denikin army. In spite of the union of West and East Ukraine on January 22, 1919, the West and East Ukrainian ministers rule side by side wherever the "capital" happens to be. Petrushevych still believed in the necessity of an independent West Ukrainian government. He was convinced that the Entente will surely give authority to such a government upon the expected rebirth of the West Ukrainian People's Republic. The dictator was possessed "of that firmness which is commonly called character". As though the supreme council of war had not already on June 25, 1919, when Grekov's victorious troops were still standing at the gates of Lwów, pronounced the death sentence over West Ukraine! Dmovskij remained the victor. The Ukrainian peace delegation whose members were at variance with one another, and who had even had difficulty entering the country, had been given no opportunity whatsoever to speak. Other peoples were given to states in which they never grew up; the Ukrainians were strangled in the midst of the fight for their state.

After the various divisions of their armies were united, the dictators Petliura and Petrushevych decided on an offensive against Kiyev. Once again with their fight for the capital of the country,

●175 they wished to prove to all the world the Ukrainian will for independence. By the middle of July 1919, one month after the tragic crossing of the Sbrucz, the entire country between the Pripyat swamps in the north almost to Odessa in the south, from Sbrucz halfway to Kiyev, was conquered, and the outlines of the "quadrangle of death" pushed forward and extended. /76/ The influx of volunteers and rich spoils made possible the establishment of an army of 100,000 men with whom the assault on Kiyev could most probably be risked.

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Once again Petliura tried to lead his strange form of a state out of its dreadful isolation. He offered to cover the flanks of the army of Denikin, the all-Russian counterrevolutionist. The general whom England supported in return for the tacit surrender of the oil fields of Baku, had just begun an impetuous course of victory which was to lead his armies made up primarily of Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks and Russian-Ukrainian Don Cossacks, east of the Dniepr to Moscow. Bolshevik rule seemed to be nearing its end. Supported by America and Japan because of prospects of concessions, Admiral Kolchak was fighting in Siberia against Lenin's troops. The nucleus of Kolchak's army consisted of the Czech Legion. North of the Arctic Ocean, with Archangel as the port of embarkation, English, Americans and Italians under the leadership of General Gurko threatened the Bolshevik state which was being attacked from Esthonia by the army of intervention under General Iudenich. - No, Denikin with his 200,000 victorious soldiers did not need to have his flanks protected by the Ukrainian separatist and rebel leader! Denikin instructed General Bredov to push on toward Kiyev in forced marches. Meanwhile Petliura pushed ahead a part of his now quite respectable army against the Fourteenth Army Corps of the Bolsheviks concentrated north of Odessa and

175 threatened - what a chaos! - in the east simul-
176 taneously by Denikin and by rebellious peasants. On this occasion the Ukrainians destroyed one Bolshevik division completely. Their offensive against Kiyev also hit the mark; the capital was occupied during the night of August 31, 1919 by the Ukrainian armies.

In a state of mad delusion Denikin, on the following day, snatched /77/ Kiyev from the Ukrainians who in their hatred of Bolshevism were certainly a match for the all-Russian reactionary general. What a fateful day! From the east Denikin's troops caught the guards on the Dniepr bridge unawares and entered the city when the Ukrainians were just making their solemn entry. With the salvos which were breaking in the midst of the parade of the unsuspecting victors, a simply grotesque battle began. The war which Petliura always wanted to avoid, broke out. Lenin can triumph - he got a breather while his enemies were murdering each other, and he threw the forces that were relased in this way into the front, which was most seriously threatened. The crime of the reactionary was punished on the spot. His victorious troops advanced to within 300 miles of Moscow when the Bolshevik Cavalry General Budienny attacked them and literally ran them down. The catastrophe which thus broke over the proud general and his world was crushing. Budienny destroyed corps after corps of the Denikin army, whose chaotically retreating soldiers, moreover, perished in the deluge of a wild peasant insurrection.

The physical and spiritual resistance of the Ukrainians was broken by the cowardly attack on Kiyev. Upon the ranks of discouraged and despairing soldiers who retreated into the "quadrangle of death" there descended a new enemy: spotted typhus. Without food, without underwear, without shoes, without clothing, without sanitary supplies, without weapons, without medicine - the Entente had forbidden the importation of drugs - they

175 726 dragged themselves away from the pursuing enemy. Whither? No one could answer this question. "In the railroad stations along the front hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers lay dying, without any kind of human help; and hundreds marched and fought while they were infected and broke down in the camps." By the end of October 1919, the two armies numbered 6000 men, of which 4000 were West Ukrainians. They were concentrated in the region of Kamenets in Podolia. /78/

The end was ghastly, like a vision of inferno. The "scourge of God", typhus, also lashed down upon the troops of Denikin which, exhausted by the epidemic and discouraged by the defeat at the hands of Budienny, had gathered together southeast of the remnants of the Ukrainian army. "Then suddenly the phantom of the 'all-Russian' counter-revolution loomed up: ruins of Denikin's army ignored the West Ukrainian frontal troops and everywhere pushed on only against the East Ukrainian divisions, in order to wreak revenge on the East Ukrainians at the last minute, before the victorious Bolshevism was to banish to the grave that 'all-Russian' ghost. This 'assault' of a few hundred pestilence-stricken 'all-Russians" against an equally few pestilence-stricken East Ukrainians was horrible. Everywhere the wreckage consisting of East Ukrainians surrendered, almost without a struggle, just as the 'all-Russians', who were in a state of even greater disintegration than the East Ukrainians, would surely have surrendered if it had occurred to the East Ukrainians to storm their positions."

In this way the Greater Ukrainian state perished. "In a piercing, frosty northwind there marched in the 'quadrangle of death', silently..."

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After the victory of the Bolsheviks over their

175 enemies Warsaw trembled at the thought of the
726 moment when the Muscovites would begin their assault on young Poland in order to take it back into the folds of "indivisible Russia". Pilsudski awaited the attack which he would have liked to forestall, in the spring of 1920. For this preventive war Petliura, with the remnants of the East Ukrainian army which were sitting in concentration camps - the remnants of the West Ukrainian army put themselves under Bolshevik protection and were in part fighting on that side against the Poles, - is just good enough. With blissful confidence the head of the erstwhile Ukrainian People's Republic signed an alliance with the Poles. Petliura renounced /79/ West Ukraine, although it was precisely the West Ukrainians with their undeniable talent for organization and their picked troops who had made possible for him the unprecedented fight for freedom. In return the Poles promised him the formation of a new East Ukrainian state under their patronage. On April 17, 1920 Pilsudski's divisions and the faithful followers of Petliura set out for the east, and, as a matter of fact, they reached Kiyev. Petliura's troops were the bait with which they endeavored to catch the West Ukrainians fighting on the side of the Bolsheviks; they actually succeeded in catching them. A large number of West Ukrainians who had become Bolsheviks went over to the Poles and were disarmed. The Bolsheviks took this occasion to shoot the officers of the Ukrainian divisions that have remained faithful to them.

Polish rule in Kiyev lasted only five weeks, until June eleventh. Then Budienny followed close on the heels of the Poles, as he did previously on Denikin's troops. The honor of covering the headless retreat of the Poles with Ukrainian blood fell on Petliura. The elite of the French general staff finally halted the Russians not far from Warsaw, and then caused them to retreat. The

175 "miracle on the Vistula" took place: the Bol-
726 sheviks turned around and halted beyond the
Sbrucz.

175 At the peace negotiations in Riga the part-
ners of Andrusov met after two and a half cent-
726 uries for a partition of the Ukraine. The Rus-
728 sians conceded the Poles the western parts of
Polesia, Volhynia and Podolia, Lublin and Podlakhia
in the Riga Treaty of March 18, 1921. The protest
of Petliura who was not admitted to the negotia-
tions remained unheard. Was it blind hatred of
the Bolsheviks, a commission of the Poles or
burning patriotism, which, after this bitter dis-
appointment, again drove him across the borders
with a small band of followers? Whatever it is,
the guerilla war which the ex-dictator unleashes
in East Ukraine does not change anything in his
country's fate, which was definitively sealed at
Riga. /80/

175 Driven out of his home for the last time and
again disarmed by the Poles, he was nevertheless
726 permitted to kindle rebellions in East Ukraine
from within the Polish state. If the East
Ukrainians bled to death and the Bolsheviks had
internal difficulties, this could only please
Warsaw. When the Bolsheviks finally cruelly
quelled these uprisings - according to accounts
in the Communist of February 23, 1923, 6000 groups
of rebels were discovered and destroyed in 1921 -,
Petliura, the ally of Pilsudski at the conquest
of Kiyev, was now merely a troublesome foreigner
in Poland. As such he was banished. /Facing page
728 80/ /Map V: The Ukraine Before the First World
War (1914). At the end of the eighteenth century
631 the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom disintegrated. From
that time on the main part of the Ukraine belonged
to the Czar's realm. Parts of West Ukraine in
so-called East Galicia and Bukovina, along with
Chernovtsy went to Austria, Ukrainian territory
in the Carpathians to Hungary./ /Key inside map:
-.-.-. National boundaries. ...Provincial boundar-

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine

By Michael Pap

175 THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN controversy over the status of the Ukraine[1] dates as far back as 1654. In that year, Bohdan Khmelnitzkyj, Hetman of Ukraine, taking into account the constant dangers of Polish and Tartar aggressions, concluded a mutual assistance treaty, called "Perejaslavka Uhoda," with the Moscovite Tsar Alexej. The treaty provided for stationing a small military detachment of Tsarist forces in the Ukraine. The Russian Tsar pledged to respect the sovereignty of the Ukraine by not interfering in the internal, political and social life of the country. However, after the occupation of strategic military bases, these solemn vows were gradually ignored and forgotten. Tsarist agents, sent to the Ukraine under various pretexts, conducted themselves as conquerors rather than as allies of an independent power.[2] Recognizing his historical error in voluntarily submitting the Ukraine to Russian rule, Khmelnitzkyj mad vain preparations to drive out the Tsar's forces. His sudden death on August 6, 1657, interrupted his plans, and gave the Russian officials the opportunity to impose, without consulting the local government, more and more of the Tsar's laws and decrees upon the Ukraine. After Khmelnitzkyj's death, the Moscovite rulers found themselves in a very favorable situation. There was no leadership in the Ukraine capable of combatting the Russian occupation policy and of inspiring the Ukrainian people, exhausted in wars with the Tartars and Poles, to resist the forcible restrictions governing the Ukraine's independence.

Fifty-five years later, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, esteemed by Ukrainians as the most loyal servant of Tsar Peter I, concluded a secret agreement (1708), aimed at shaking off the Russian rule, with the Swedish King Charles XII. When the Swedish forces entered the Ukrainian frontiers, Mazepa issued a proclamation to his Cossacks to join the

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[1] Ukraine is the second largest of the Soviet republics with a present population of approximately 50 millions of which about 42 millions are Ukranians. After World War I, the country was divided between the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. As a result of World War II, all Ukrainian territories came under the rule of the Kremlin, and were made parts of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which is a member of the United Nations.

[2] For the detailed story see G. Vernadsky, *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1941).

15: Pap S-4.5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

175 King and to regain their lost independence. However, his appeal was distrusted because of his loyalty to the Tsar. As a result, only a small Cossack force joined the King's army; and it was defeated in the battle of Poltava on July 10, 1709. Russian military units occupied the entire territory of the Ukraine and made it a province of Russia. Gradually, even the existence of a separate Ukrainian nationality was denied by the Russians; but the spirit of lost liberty could not be completely destroyed. The opposition against the Tsar's oppression was felt and later promoted by the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) who, because of his courage, was forced to spend a considerable length of time in exile. The Russian reaction to the stirrings among the Ukrainian masses inspired by Shevchenko was a more severe and inhuman suppression. The lowest point of Russian chauvinism was reached when the Minister of the Interior, Count P. Valuev, issued on June 21, (June 8, old style) 1863 a ukase in which he angrily stated that "a Little Russian (Ukrainian) nationality never has existed, does not exist and cannot exist."[3] On May 18, 1876, Tsar Alexander II signed in Ems a special order prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian language in literature.[4] This order was remitted in 1905 but reimposed in full force in 1914 at the beginning of World War I. The Tsarist policy of oppression of non-Russian peoples was among the factors which contributed to the collapse of its regime in March, 1917.

* * *

668 After the fall of the monarchy, the non-Russian peoples availed themselves of the first opportunity to regain their freedom.[5] In the Ukraine, a National Central Rada (Council) was spontaneously organized in April, 1917 under the presidency of a well known historian, Mychajlo Hruschevskyj. This National Rada was recognized and welcomed as the representative organ of the Ukraine by the Congress of Ukrainian soldiers in Kiev in 1917, by the Peasants Congress of Ukraine, and by the Worker's Congress, July 1917. The political

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[3] T. G. Mazaryk, *The Spirit of Russia* (New York, 1919), p. 304.

[4] D. Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine* (Edmonton, 1939), p. 591.

[5] The major non-Russian nationalities in the former Russian empire such as the Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians, Georgians, Azerbaijans, Armenians, Kasakhs, etc. have a long history of struggle aaginst Russian imperialism and oppression. However, former historians and Tsarist representatives abroad refer to them as Russians, despite the difference of culture and languages. This oversimplification of the real facts caused much confusion in the Western world in the past. Even today many responsible individuals refer to the Soviet Union simply as Russia.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians

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THE BRIDGE BETWEEN WEST AND EAST

101 The political boundary between Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia is not a clear-cut dividing line between two different worlds. There are a number of Ruthenian peasants in the eastern parts of Slovakia who form a gradual transition between the two neighbours. True, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians are two different Slav races. The Slovaks are closely related to the Moravians and Czechs in the West; the Ruthenians belong to the Russian family—mainly to its Ukrainian branch—although the thousand years of isolation from their kinsmen have had a specific effect on the character of the Ruthenian population on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. But there is a gradual link between the Slovaks and the Ruthenians, and Carpathian Ruthenia may aptly be described as a bridge between the Western and Eastern Slavs.

131 175 Geographically, too, the two neighbouring countries are similar. A chain of wooded mountains separates them from the kindred Slav populations to the North and North-East; while to the South both countries have stretches of fertile plain which run down unobstructed into the vast Danubian basin. That is the reason why both countries fell victim to Hungarian expansion early in their history and remained under Hungarian rule as second-rate provinces for a thousand years. Until the end of 1918, neither Slovakia nor Carpathian Ruthenia were on the map.

177 212 Both these countries suffered from the long alien domination which hampered their development. Slovakia was the more fortunate of the two because, in spite of her political separation from the independent lands of the Czech Crown, cultural and religious contacts with them had been maintained for centuries. But the Ruthenians received less support of this kind from their kindred beyond the Carpathians. As a result, Ruthenia was still more at the mercy of her Hungarian overlords and remained in a state of greater backwardness than her neighbour in the West. This is well illustrated by the degree of illiteracy in Ruthenia under the Hungarian regime which was, indeed, appalling; according to the last Hungarian census about three quarters of the Ruthenian population could not read or write.

177 181 Only people of considerable racial individuality could have resisted systematic denationalisation as the Ruthenians did. They may be a simple people; but their mode of living, their outlook and their character have an unmistakable stamp of their own.

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Ukraine RD1

S.U. Soviet Russia has often followed in the footsteps of Czarist Russia,
522 but as far as the appraisal of the Ukraine is concerned there is no
635 continuity between old and new Russia. Czarist Russia simply denied
UK. the existence of a Ukrainian nation and denounced all Ukrainian national
698 feeling as 'South Russian separatism'. Soviet policy, on the other hand,
175 has encouraged Ukrainian nationalism in as far as it was able to serve Russia's territorial expansion. The most spectacular territorial advance which the Soviet Union has made since 1939 was that realized under the slogan 'unification of all Ukrainian lands in one national State'. In the course of this unification the Soviet Union not only re-annexed territories which Russia had lost in the Civil War but also occupied territories which had ceased to be 'Russian' ever since the Middle Ages, such as Eastern Galicia with the city of Lvov.

UK. There cannot be the slightest doubt about the existence of a Ukrainian
[101] nation which some Russian nationalists tried to deny in the past, but it would be a mistake to consider the Ukrainians, despite their numbers, as a nation equal in character to the French, Italians, Spaniards, etc., as the extremists among the Ukrainian nationalists would like to represent it. The Ukrainians cannot claim to be historically and culturally a nation so complete that they could afford to cut themselves loose from their Russian neighbours and exist without them.

All foreign invaders fighting Russia had illusions in this respect; they all believed in a separation of Ukraine and Muscovy and conducted their political warfare accordingly. The Swedish King, Charles XII, allied himself with the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Mazeppa; Napoleon came to Russia with the project of a Ukrainian State, 'Napoleonide', cutting Russia off from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The Third Reich of Adolf Hitler also tried to play up the Ukrainian issue against Great Russia.

'LITTLE RUSSIA' AND 'NEW RUSSIA'

UK. There is every justification in the demand for a genuinely autonomous
101 Ukraine but there is no logic and no life in an anti-Russian Ukrainian
186 nationalist ideology. Neither Russian and Ukrainian history, nor the
538 area of Russian and Ukrainian settlement, nor even Russian and Ukrainian literature can be separated from each other. Gogol, for instance, who wrote in Russian only, can be claimed by the Ukrainians not only because he was born in 'Little Russia', as the Ukraine used to be called in Czarist times, but also because some of his great works are devoted to his homeland, including the most Ukrainian literary work *Taras Bulba*. The Ukrainians have failed to produce any Ukrainian-writing poet or writer who even approximates to the importance of a Gogol.